gabrielmoreira Hunting For Spearphishing Indicators
When to Use
- When proactively hunting for indicators of hunting for spearphishing indicators in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises
Detection Gaps & Validation
- Delivery variants gateways miss: HTML smuggling (JS-built blob, nothing inbound to scan), ISO/IMG/VHD containers that strip MOTW, password-protected ZIPs (uninspectable), QR-code phish in PDFs, and OneNote
.oneattachments. - Endpoint pivot is the reliable signal: hunt Office/Outlook spawning children — EID 1 where
ParentImageis winword/excel/outlook.exe and child is powershell/wscript/mshta/cmd — plus EID 11 writes of.iso/.lnk/.htato%TEMP%/Downloads. - MOTW check: absence of a
Zone.IdentifierADS on a freshly downloaded payload is itself suspicious (container-bypass indicator). - Pure-link blind spot: credential-harvest links leave no endpoint artifact — you need proxy/URL logs, not EDR, to see them.
- Validate: run Atomic T1566.001 (macro spawns child process); confirm the parent→child EID 1 chain fires.
- FP tuning: baseline legitimate Office automation/add-ins and known mail-merge senders.
Prerequisites
- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation
Workflow
- Formulate Hypothesis: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
- Identify Data Sources: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
- Execute Queries: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
- Analyze Results: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
- Validate Findings: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
- Correlate Activity: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
- Document and Report: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment |
| T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link |
| T1566.003 | Spearphishing via Service |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |
| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |
| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |
| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |
| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |
Common Scenarios
- Scenario 1: Macro-enabled Excel executing PowerShell downloader
- Scenario 2: HTML smuggling delivering ISO with LNK payload
- Scenario 3: Credential harvesting link as SharePoint notification
- Scenario 4: QR code phishing in PDF attachment
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-HUNTIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1566.001
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]