Performing Active Directory Compromise Investigation

Performing Active Directory Compromise Investigation

Overview

Active Directory (AD) compromise investigation is a critical incident response capability that focuses on identifying how attackers gained access to domain services, what persistence mechanisms they established, and the scope of credential compromise. Since 88% of breaches involve compromised credentials (Verizon 2025 DBIR), AD is the primary target for enterprise-wide attacks. Investigators must analyze NTDS.dit database integrity, Kerberos ticket-granting activity, Group Policy modifications, replication metadata, and privileged group membership changes to reconstruct the attack chain and determine full compromise scope.

When to Use

• When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory compromise investigation
• When following incident response procedures for related security events
• When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
• When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Detection Gaps & Validation

• Golden Ticket evades 4768: a forged TGT is minted offline with the krbtgt hash, so you see service-ticket requests (4769) with no preceding 4768 AS-REQ from that account. Hunt for 4769s whose account has no matching 4768, tickets referencing disabled/deleted accounts, RC4 (0x17) where the realm is AES-only, and abnormal ticket lifetimes (>10h default).
• Silver Ticket leaves almost no DC trail: it forges a service ticket directly, so there is no 4768/4769 on the DC at all — validate at the target service host instead (local logon 4624/4672 with no corresponding DC Kerberos event).
• DCSync looks like replication: confirm with 4662 containing the replication GUIDs 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) / 1131f6ad-... (GetChangesAll) from a principal that is not a domain controller. Cross-check repadmin /showrepl and netflow for DRSUAPI from non-DC hosts.
• Cross-corroborate before declaring scope: pair 4624 Type 3 (NTLM) + 4648 explicit-cred chains with EDR process lineage to separate pass-the-hash from normal admin activity. A lone 4769 spike is Kerberoasting or a busy SPN — confirm with RC4 requests for AES-capable accounts from workstations that never touch that service.
• FP tuning / don't conclude clean until: vuln scanners and PAM tools generate benign 4662/4769 noise — allowlist them. Check krbtgt password age and AdminSDHolder/Protected Users ACLs; a "clean" auth log does not rule out a Golden Ticket, so a krbtgt double-reset is the only reliable invalidation.

Prerequisites

• Familiarity with incident response concepts and tools
• Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
• Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
• Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Key Investigation Areas

1. NTDS.dit Database Analysis

The NTDS.dit file is the core Active Directory credential database containing all password hashes for domain accounts. Attackers commonly exfiltrate this file using tools like ntdsutil, secretsdump.py, or DCSync attacks via Mimikatz.

Detection indicators:

• Event ID 4662: Access to directory service objects with replication permissions
• Event ID 4742: Computer account modifications on domain controllers
• Volume Shadow Copy creation on domain controllers (Event ID 8222)
• Unusual ntdsutil.exe or vssadmin.exe execution
• Replication traffic from non-DC sources (DCSync detection)

2. Kerberos Attack Detection

Golden Ticket indicators:

• TGT tickets with abnormally long lifetimes (default is 10 hours)
• Event ID 4769 with encryption type 0x17 (RC4) instead of AES
• TGT issued without corresponding Event ID 4768 (AS-REQ)
• Kerberos tickets referencing non-existent or disabled accounts

Silver Ticket indicators:

• Service tickets without corresponding TGT requests
• Event ID 4769 with unusual service names
• Tickets with forged PAC data

Kerberoasting indicators:

• High volume of Event ID 4769 for service accounts
• RC4 encryption requests for accounts that support AES
• Requests from workstations not normally accessing those services

3. Group Policy Abuse

• GPO modifications granting new privileges (Event ID 5136)
• Scheduled task deployment via GPO
• Software installation policies added to domain
• Login script modifications
• Registry-based policy changes for persistence

4. Privileged Group Enumeration

Track modifications to these critical groups:

• Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins
• Account Operators, Backup Operators
• DnsAdmins (can execute arbitrary DLLs on DCs)
• Group Policy Creator Owners
• Protected Users group membership changes

5. Trust Relationship Analysis

• New forest/domain trusts created (Event ID 4706)
• SID History injection for privilege escalation
• Trust ticket forgery indicators
• Cross-domain authentication anomalies

Investigation Methodology

Phase 1: Scoping and Evidence Collection

1. Identify potentially compromised domain controllers
2. Collect Security, System, Directory Service event logs
3. Extract AD replication metadata using repadmin
4. Capture ntdsutil snapshots for offline analysis
5. Collect DNS server logs and zone transfer records
6. Export Group Policy Object configurations
7. Document current privileged group memberships

Phase 2: Authentication Log Analysis

1. Parse Event ID 4624/4625 for logon patterns
2. Identify pass-the-hash indicators (Event ID 4624 Type 3 with NTLM)
3. Analyze Event ID 4768/4769/4771 for Kerberos anomalies
4. Review Event ID 4776 for NTLM authentication failures
5. Cross-reference logon events with known compromised accounts
6. Map lateral movement paths through authentication chains

Phase 3: Persistence and Backdoor Detection

1. Enumerate AdminSDHolder ACL modifications
2. Check for SID History abuse on accounts
3. Verify krbtgt account password age
4. Audit DSRM password configuration
5. Check for skeleton key malware indicators
6. Review AD Certificate Services for rogue certificates
7. Validate DNS records for poisoning

Phase 4: Remediation Planning

1. Double-rotate krbtgt password (wait replication between rotations)
2. Reset all compromised account passwords
3. Remove unauthorized privileged group members
4. Revoke rogue certificates if AD CS compromised
5. Rebuild domain controllers from clean media if needed
6. Implement tiered administration model
7. Enable Protected Users group for privileged accounts

Critical Event IDs for AD Investigation

Tools for AD Investigation

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

References

• CISA: Detecting and Mitigating Active Directory Compromises
• Microsoft: Total Identity Compromise IR Lessons
• Semperis: Top 10 Active Directory Risks
• Fidelis: Active Directory Compromise Response