Skill Eval

zuvo:skill-eval — Behavioral skill evaluator

Measure whether a skill's own instructions lead a competent agent to the correct behavior. For each eval case in the skill's corpus, a fresh executor sub-agent runs the skill against the case prompt; a fresh grader sub-agent then scores that run's transcript against the case's assertions — judging only real tool calls, never prose or marker text. The output is a per-assertion pass/fail report with verbatim evidence, plus an optional old-vs-new score diff.

This skill is dev-only: it reads the repo's evals/ corpus and (for --compare) .git history, so it is deliberately NOT distributed into installed plugin caches.

Argument Parsing

Parse $ARGUMENTS: the first non-flag token is [skill-name]; --compare consumes the following token as <ref>. If neither [skill-name] nor --all-evals is given, stop and ask which skill to evaluate (do not default to all).

Mandatory File Loading

Phase 0 — Bootstrap (load before any work)

CORE FILES LOADED:
  1. ../../shared/includes/eval-schema.md               -- READ/MISSING (corpus + grading + report contract)
  2. ../../shared/includes/report-output-location.md    -- READ/MISSING (canonical zuvo/ output dir)
  3. ../../shared/includes/env-compat.md                -- READ/MISSING (agent dispatch + path resolution)
  4. ../../shared/includes/codesift-setup.md            -- OPTIONAL/READ IF AVAILABLE
  5. ../../shared/includes/session-state.md             -- READ/MISSING (resume/report continuity)
  6. ../../shared/includes/run-logger.md                -- DEFERRED (completion)

Resolve these relative to this skills/skill-eval/SKILL.md. Degraded-mode rule:

• eval-schema.md missing → HARD STOP with BLOCKED_NO_SCHEMA: eval-schema.md not found — the corpus schema + grading contract + injection hardening are undefined without it. It is the trust anchor; a report produced without it would be trustless, so it is never degradable.
• Any 1 OTHER core file missing (env-compat / session-state / codesift) → proceed in degraded mode, note it in the report.
• 2+ other core files missing → stop; the plugin installation is incomplete.

eval-schema.md is the source of truth for the corpus schema, the grading contract, the transcript injection hardening, and the report-output convention. Do not re-derive any of them here — this SKILL orchestrates; eval-schema.md specifies.

Phase 0.2 — Dev-only precondition (fail closed)

skill-eval reads the repo's evals/ corpus, so it is a dev-time tool. Before any dispatch, confirm an evals/ directory exists at the working-tree root. If it does not, stop with BLOCKED_DEV_ONLY: skill-eval needs an evals/ corpus in the working tree — it is not runnable from an installed plugin cache.

Do NOT hard-require git here. Git is used only where it is used, so a non-git checkout still grades the current version: Phase 2 isolates each case with a cp -R copy of the working tree (no git needed), and every git-specific step is gated on git presence with a non-git fallback — git remote remove is skipped when there is no .git (nothing to push to), and the --all-evals dedup key falls back to sha256sum of the corpus when git hash-object is unavailable. --compare (Phase 4) degrades via GUARD_NO_GIT when there is no git repo (it needs git clone/git show). Making git a bootstrap hard-stop here would make that GUARD_NO_GIT path unreachable — so it is deliberately left to Phase 4.

Preflight the two hard tool dependencies (fail loud, never mid-pipeline). Per the preflight-missing-tools rule, a missing prerequisite must stop BEFORE dispatch, not crash per-case and read as a behavioral failure:

• command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 — Phase 3 sanitization/nonce is python3 (a de-facto repo dep: validate-skills.sh, the eval-schema test, and install.sh all use it). If absent, stop with BLOCKED_NO_PYTHON: skill-eval needs python3 for transcript sanitization.
• Transcript-capture feasibility. The grader scores real tool calls, so the run is worthless unless each executor's actual tool-call transcript can be captured (a parent agent that only sees a sub-agent's final prose would grade every assertion false by construction — the Task 6 spike used HAND-CRAFTED transcripts and never proved auto-capture). This is verified by the concrete canary probe at the start of Phase 2 (dispatch one throwaway executor that runs a known marker command, then assert the captured transcript contains that marker) — NOT by the orchestrator merely reasoning that capture "should" work. If the canary's marker is absent from the captured transcript, stop with BLOCKED_NO_TRANSCRIPT_CAPTURE: cannot capture executor tool-call transcripts in this runtime — grading would be vacuous rather than emitting an all-false report.

Phase 0.1 — Retro checkpoint marker (run this bash at bootstrap)

# >>> zuvo:retro-marker  (skill-eval — passive checkpoint capture)
_RS=$(command -v retro-stub 2>/dev/null || ls ~/.claude/plugins/cache/zuvo-marketplace/zuvo/*/scripts/zuvo-home/retro-stub 2>/dev/null | head -1)
_ZH="${ZUVO_HOME:-$HOME/.zuvo}"
_RSK="${SKILL:-skill-eval}"
_RPR="${PROJECT:-$(basename "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)")}"
_RSHA=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo "-")
[ -n "$_RS" ] && "$_RS" --sweep >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if mkdir -p "$_ZH/run-markers" 2>/dev/null; then
  { printf 'start_ts=%s\nskill=%s\nproject=%s\nsha7=%s\nbranch=%s\nsession_id=%s\nrepo_root=%s\n' \
      "$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)" "$_RSK" "$_RPR" "$_RSHA" \
      "$(git branch --show-current 2>/dev/null || echo -)" "${ZUVO_SESSION_ID:-$_RSHA}" \
      "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)" \
      > "$_ZH/run-markers/$_RSK-$_RPR-$_RSHA-$$-$(date +%s).marker"; } 2>/dev/null || true
fi
# <<< zuvo:retro-marker

Phase 1 — Resolve and load the corpus

0. Compute $RUN_ID ONCE with a single Bash call and reuse it for every filename in this run (baseline snapshot in Phase 4, reports in Phase 5) — never $$, which differs across the orchestrator's separate Bash tool-calls and would desync the filenames: RUN_ID="$(date -u +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)-$(head -c4 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')".
1. Resolve the target set: [skill-name] → evals/<skill-name>.evals.json; or with --all-evals, glob evals/*.evals.json. Validate [skill-name] as strict kebab-case first (^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$): reject /, .., whitespace, and shell metacharacters, and require the matching skills/<skill-name>/ dir to exist. This name is interpolated into git show "<ref>:skills/<skill>/SKILL.md" and the zuvo/context/skill-eval-baseline-<skill>-<run>.md path (Phase 4), so an unsanitized name could traverse outside zuvo/context/ or misresolve the git ref — reject it with BLOCKED_BAD_SKILL_NAME before any git/--compare step. Pass the ref and name to git as argv (git show "$ref:skills/$skill/SKILL.md"), never via shell string-building.
2. Fail loud on a missing or malformed corpus. If the file does not exist, stop with BLOCKED_NO_CORPUS: evals/<skill>.evals.json not found — author it first (see eval-schema.md). If it exists, validate it against eval-schema.md (the same tests/skill-suite/test-eval-corpus-schema.sh structural rules: exact key sets, skill_name == stem, ≥2 evals, assertion-quality floor). A schema-invalid corpus stops with BLOCKED_BAD_CORPUS: <first validation error> — never grade against a corpus you could not validate.
3. Load {skill_name, evals[]}. Each eval carries {id, prompt, expected_output, files, assertions}.
4. On --dry-run: print cases × assertions per corpus and stop here (no dispatch).

Phase 2 — Execute each eval case (executor sub-agents)

Dispatch follows ../../shared/includes/execution-policy.md through env-compat. Reuse existing authorization within that policy; session restrictions take precedence. Run each required gate and report its actual independence or an unmet requirement.

For each eval case, dispatch a fresh agents/executor.md sub-agent (no shared context, no memory of other cases). See env-compat.md for the dispatch pattern. When multi-agent dispatch is unavailable, fall back to running each case in a fresh sub-context sequentially — the same per-case isolation + BLOCKED_NO_ISOLATION stop apply; never skip cases and never run in the live checkout.

Give each executor: skill_name; the full text of the target skill's SKILL.md read from that executor's OWN workspace (so a --compare baseline case gets the OLD text, never the current tree's); the eval's prompt; its files; and — when the runtime cannot auto-capture sub-agent tool calls — an explicit ACTION_LOG=<path> for the executor to self-log to (executor.md "Action log"). Do NOT give it expected_output or assertions — the executor must not know what it is graded on. The dispatch prompt MUST also restate executor.md's HARD BOUNDARY: no writes outside the workspace — in particular $HOME/.zuvo / $HOME/.claude and their append helpers; HOME-global telemetry steps in the target skill are declared [SKIPPED-FOR-ISOLATION], never run for real. The filesystem sandbox only guarantees where the executor STARTS, not where it can write — a 2026-07-10 run invoked ~/.zuvo/append-retro from the sandbox, polluted the real global logs, and destroyed (then Time-Machine-recovered) the user's real retros.log during its own cleanup. The prohibition is part of the dispatch contract, not optional guidance.

Isolation (MANDATORY, fail-closed, PER-CASE). Executors have unrestricted Bash, so isolation is enforced by WHERE they run — in a fresh, fully-INDEPENDENT copy of the repo (never a git worktree, which shares the parent's branch namespace + .git/config, so an executor could git branch -D/checkout and mutate the developer's REAL repo). Each case gets its own workspace under a single mktemp -d parent that an EXIT trap removes (interrupts never orphan workspaces; no worktree metadata to leak), materialized by revision then HARDENED (all four steps verified safe on an independent copy):

• Current-version run (TARGET_REF=HEAD) → copy the WORKING TREE excluding heavy dep/build dirs (rsync -a --exclude=node_modules --exclude=.venv --exclude=dist --exclude=build --exclude=.next or cp -R then prune) — a plain cp -R of a repo with a large node_modules/.venv would exhaust disk/inodes across --all-evals. A worktree/clone of HEAD would drop uncommitted/untracked edits, but skill-eval is run WHILE editing a skill — grade what is on disk.
• Baseline run (TARGET_REF=<ref>, --compare) → git clone --local <root> <ws> then git -C <ws> checkout --detach <ref> (own refs/config/branches — full namespace isolation; hardlinked objects, so cheap).
• Then, in BOTH cases (safe because the workspace .git is an independent copy, NOT shared): strip ONLY the graded corpus — rm -f <ws>/evals/<skill>.evals.json (NOT rm -rf <ws>/evals, which would break evaluating skill-eval itself, whose own run needs an evals/ dir) so the executor cannot read the assertions it is graded on and cheat; and, WHEN in a git repo, remove ALL remotes (for r in $(git -C <ws> remote); do git -C <ws> remote remove "$r"; done) so a push cannot reach any real remote (edits only the copy's config). Strip any other file that would leak this skill's grading criteria.

Materialize the eval's fixtures (AFTER hardening, BEFORE dispatch). If the eval carries a fixtures[] array (eval-schema.md → "Self-contained fixtures"), write each {path, content} into the hardened workspace so the target the prompt names actually exists on disk — without this, a corpus whose prompt references src/services/order.service.ts (a file not in this repo) forces an all-false run that reflects a missing fixture, not skill behavior. Fixtures carry an optional stage so GIT-STATE scenarios (a review diff, a pre-existing plan for execute) work, not just plain files:

• stage: "head" (default) — written LAST, left uncommitted in the sandbox tree.
• stage: "base" — the pre-change git state. When ANY base fixture exists: (1) snapshot-commit the sandbox's ENTIRE working tree first, so developer WIP copied in by the cp -R isolation never pollutes the eval's git diff; (2) write the base fixtures and commit them; (3) then write the head fixtures on top — git diff in the sandbox now shows EXACTLY the eval's intended change and nothing else. These scaffold commits use --no-verify deliberately: they are setup plumbing inside a disposable, remote-less sandbox, and repo/global commit hooks (pipeline gates) must not fire on eval scaffolding — this never touches the real checkout and is not a work commit. A base fixture in a NON-git sandbox is BLOCKED_FIXTURE_NEEDS_GIT (single-skill mode halts; --all-evals records that corpus and continues).

This step is fail-closed on path safety: for each fixture, resolve path against the workspace root and reject any ../absolute escape or glob metacharacter (BLOCKED_BAD_FIXTURE for that case) BEFORE writing — the executor gets unrestricted Bash, but the orchestrator must never let a fixture path write outside the disposable sandbox. mkdir -p the parent, then write content verbatim. Because the workspace is already an independent copy, these writes never touch the developer's checkout:

# $WS = hardened workspace root; $FIXTURES_JSON = this eval's fixtures array (may be absent/empty)
python3 - "$WS" "$FIXTURES_JSON" <<'PY'
import json, os, subprocess, sys
ws = os.path.realpath(sys.argv[1])
fixtures = json.loads(sys.argv[2] or "[]")

def safe_dest(k, p):
    if not isinstance(p, str) or os.path.isabs(p) or any(c in p for c in "*?[]"):
        sys.exit("BLOCKED_BAD_FIXTURE: fixtures[%d].path not a safe relative literal: %r" % (k, p))
    dest = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(ws, p))
    if dest != ws and not dest.startswith(ws + os.sep):
        sys.exit("BLOCKED_BAD_FIXTURE: fixtures[%d].path escapes the sandbox: %r" % (k, p))
    return dest

def write(k, fx):
    dest = safe_dest(k, fx["path"])
    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(dest), exist_ok=True)
    with open(dest, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
        f.write(fx["content"])

base = [(k, fx) for k, fx in enumerate(fixtures) if fx.get("stage") == "base"]
head = [(k, fx) for k, fx in enumerate(fixtures) if fx.get("stage", "head") == "head"]
if base:
    if not os.path.isdir(os.path.join(ws, ".git")):
        sys.exit("BLOCKED_FIXTURE_NEEDS_GIT: base-stage fixtures need a git sandbox")
    git = ["git", "-C", ws, "-c", "user.name=skill-eval", "-c", "user.email=skill-eval@localhost"]
    def commit(msg):
        subprocess.run(git + ["add", "-A"], check=True)
        subprocess.run(git + ["commit", "-q", "--no-verify", "--allow-empty", "-m", msg], check=True)
    commit("eval-fixture: sandbox snapshot (pre-existing WIP)")  # keep dev WIP out of the eval diff
    for k, fx in base:
        write(k, fx)
    commit("eval-fixture: base state")
for k, fx in head:
    write(k, fx)
PY

Fresh-per-case is mandatory: if case 1 commits/mutates a file, case 2 must not inherit it (cross-case bleed reads as a false regression). Two distinct failure semantics, never conflated: if the workspace cannot be created (cp/clone/checkout fails) → hard-stop BLOCKED_NO_ISOLATION (never run in the live checkout); if the executor is provisioned but returns non-zero / crashes → record that case executor-failed, re-dispatch once, then continue the batch.

Capture (proven before the batch, with a REACHABLE fallback). Write each executor's tool-call log to a TRANS_FILE under $WORK. Phase 0.2's preflight is a real canary, not prose, and it SELECTS the capture mode rather than only rejecting: dispatch ONE throwaway executor that runs a command emitting a LARGE known payload with a distinct marker at BOTH the START and the END (e.g. echo CANARY_HEAD; printf 'x%.0s' {1..5000}; echo CANARY_TAIL). The canary passes only if the captured transcript contains BOTH markers — a runtime that captures just the first N bytes (dropping large Bash/Write payloads) would show CANARY_HEAD but not CANARY_TAIL, which must FAIL the canary (reachability alone is not enough; the grader needs full tool-result payloads). Try the runtime's auto-capture first; if either marker is missing, retry the canary in ACTION_LOG mode (pass ACTION_LOG=$TRANS_FILE, the executor self-logs structured records per executor.md). Only if BOTH auto-capture AND ACTION_LOG fail to surface both markers do we hard-stop BLOCKED_NO_TRANSCRIPT_CAPTURE. The passing mode is then used for every real case — so a non-auto-capture runtime DEGRADES to action-logging instead of being unusable.

Per-case status (never abort the batch on one bad case): ok, executor-failed, or (Phase 3) grader-* — all infra statuses carried to Phase 5, excluded from the behavioral rate. Before its workspace is reclaimed, a NON-ok/failing case's raw TRANS_FILE is copied to zuvo/reports/skill-eval-<skill>-<run>-case<id>-transcript.txt so a developer can audit why the executor went off-track (the grader's short evidence snippet alone is not debuggable).

Fan-out bound. --all-evals fans out over corpus × cases × 2 sub-agents — hundreds of dispatches for 50+ skills. Process corpora sequentially, one fully graded before the next; executor cases also run sequentially — the reason is bounded fan-out (dispatch-slot / rate-limit budget), not filesystem racing (each case is already isolated). In --all-evals, a single missing/malformed corpus is recorded as a skipped corpus and the run CONTINUES (the BLOCKED_* halt applies only to single-skill mode). Re-runs skip a corpus that already has a report for its OWN deterministic key — a hash of the evaluated bundle: that skill's SKILL.md + its agents/*.md + evals/<skill>.evals.json. It must include the skill files, not just the corpus: a change to skills/<skill>/SKILL.md with an unchanged corpus is exactly what you re-run to detect, so a corpus-only key would skip it and grade against stale results. KEY="<skill>-$( { git hash-object skills/<skill>/SKILL.md skills/<skill>/agents/*.md evals/<skill>.evals.json 2>/dev/null || cat skills/<skill>/SKILL.md skills/<skill>/agents/*.md evals/<skill>.evals.json 2>/dev/null | shasum -a 256; } | shasum -a 256 | cut -c1-12)" — git hash-object when available, else a shasum fallback so dedup also works in a non-git checkout. Scoped per-corpus (never git HEAD, which invalidates all 50+ on any unrelated commit; never a repo-wide hash, which collapses every corpus to one key).

Phase 3 — Grade each transcript (grader sub-agents)

For each executor transcript, dispatch a fresh agents/grader.md sub-agent given ONLY the filled scoring prompt — the case's assertions + skill_name + the transcript wrapped in the random-nonce fence. The grader has no conversation history and no tools (tools: []).

Build the fenced transcript with a concrete Bash step — never "apply the regex mentally." Nonce generation and sanitization are string operations an LLM cannot reliably perform on a large adversarial transcript in-context, so run them as code (Python is a repo dependency; install.sh/dev-push.sh already rely on it):

grader.md ALREADY contains the fence (<transcript-{NONCE}>{TRANSCRIPT}</transcript-{NONCE}>), so this step emits the nonce and the sanitized transcript separately as JSON — it does NOT pre-wrap them (that would double-fence). The orchestrator parses the JSON and substitutes {NONCE} and {TRANSCRIPT} into the template's existing fence:

# $TRANS_FILE = raw executor transcript; $SAN_FILE = output. Writes {"nonce","transcript"}
# to $SAN_FILE (a FILE, not stdout — a 120k-char JSON on stdout would be truncated by the
# orchestrator's Bash tool and break parsing). The orchestrator then READS $SAN_FILE.
python3 - "$TRANS_FILE" "$SAN_FILE" <<'PY'
import re, os, sys, json
# errors="replace" so binary/non-UTF-8 bytes (e.g. an executor cat-ing a compiled file)
# degrade gracefully instead of crashing the grader pipeline for that case.
text = open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").read()
# (1) PER-BLOCK, CHAR-BASED truncation: cap each block by CHARACTER budget (not line
#     count) so a single giant one-line result (minified JS, base64, huge JSON) is also
#     bounded, and only that block's middle is elided — intermediate tool calls survive.
def cap(block, max_chars=16000):
    if len(block) <= max_chars: return block
    h = max_chars // 2
    return block[:h] + ("\n... [%d chars elided from this block] ...\n" % (len(block)-2*h)) + block[-h:]
# split on turn markers (keep them). Per-block capping ONLY when we actually recognized
# blocks (len>1); if the runtime uses a different marker format, parts==1 and per-block
# 16k capping would gut the whole run — so in that case we skip it and let ONLY the
# generous whole-transcript ceiling bound it head+tail.
parts = re.split(r'(?m)^(?=\[(?:assistant|tool_call|tool_result)\])', text)
if len(parts) > 1:
    text = "".join(cap(p) for p in parts)
text = cap(text, max_chars=120000)   # whole-transcript ceiling (format-agnostic backstop)
# (2) neutralize closing-fence lookalikes (case/ws/unclosed-tolerant) — eval-schema.md
text = re.sub(r'(?is)<\s*/\s*transcript[^>]*(?:>|$)', '<\\/transcript>', text)
# (3) unguessable per-run nonce (16 hex chars) — written SEPARATELY, not pre-wrapped
open(sys.argv[2], "w", encoding="utf-8").write(json.dumps({"nonce": os.urandom(8).hex(), "transcript": text}))
PY

Read $SAN_FILE, parse its JSON, then substitute its nonce into every {NONCE} and its transcript into the single {TRANSCRIPT} in grader.md's scoring prompt. Do NOT hand-craft the fence in prose, and do NOT wrap the transcript twice. If the sanitizer itself fails (no $TRANS_FILE, non-zero exit, or non-JSON output), record that case executor-failed (an infra status) and continue — never abort the batch on one sanitizer failure. (Authority for the sanitization + nonce rules: eval-schema.md §"Transcript injection hardening".)

Grader output + failure taxonomy. The grader returns a JSON array — one object per assertion, in input order: {"text", "passed", "evidence"}. When parsing, tolerate a markdown code fence (LLMs often wrap bare JSON in json … despite the instruction) — strip a leading/trailing fence or extract the outermost [ … ] before json.loads; only genuinely non-array output is malformed.

Pair objects to assertions by position (position is authoritative — the grader is instructed to return verdicts in input order), and cross-check for reordering leniently: compare each object's text to input assertion i under a NORMALIZED match (collapse whitespace, ignore quote-escaping differences) OR a leading-prefix match — LLMs echo long strings imperfectly, so a minor variance must NOT reject the run. Only a GROSS mismatch (the position-i text clearly corresponds to a DIFFERENT assertion) flags a reorder → grader-malformed. This catches genuine mis-pairing without false-malforming on trivial echo drift. Record one status per case, never a silent drop:

• graded — a well-formed array of the right length whose text fields align by position with the input assertions.
• grader-malformed — length mismatch, positional text mismatch (reorder), or non-JSON even after fence-stripping. Re-dispatch once; if still malformed, record grader-malformed (do not guess verdicts).
• grader-dispatch-failed — the grader sub-agent never returned (dispatch error / timeout). Re-dispatch once, then record the failure.

grader-malformed, grader-dispatch-failed, and Phase 2's executor-failed are all INFRA failures — carried into the report and accounted per Phase 5 (excluded from the behavioral pass rate, reported separately) — they are findings, not omissions.

Phase 4 — Comparison mode (--compare <ref>)

Materialize the OLD skill version and score it the same way, then diff the pass rates. Two DISTINCT, both-reachable failure guards decide up front whether the comparison can run — set SKIP_COMPARE and never fall through to the materialization on a guard hit (a fall-through would write a zero-byte baseline and diff against a phantom run):

SKIP_COMPARE=""
if ! git rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  echo "GUARD_NO_GIT: skill-eval --compare needs a git repository here; grading the current version only, no old-vs-new diff"; SKIP_COMPARE=1
elif ! git cat-file -e "$ref:skills/$skill/SKILL.md" 2>/dev/null; then
  echo "GUARD_BAD_REF: skill-eval --compare could not read <ref>:skills/$skill/SKILL.md via git (bad ref, or the skill did not exist there); skipping the comparison, grading the current version only"; SKIP_COMPARE=1
fi

GUARD_NO_GIT is reachable because Phase 0.2 does not hard-require git; GUARD_BAD_REF covers a bad ref OR a skill absent at that ref. Only when SKIP_COMPARE is empty do we run the baseline — and it materializes the complete old bundle (not just SKILL.md: behavior often lives in agents/*.md and relative ../../shared/includes/… paths). This is why the baseline reuses Phase 2's new_workspace with TARGET_REF="$ref": each baseline case is a git clone --local checked out at <ref>, so the WHOLE old tree (SKILL.md + its agents + includes) resolves at natural depth — no separate worktree, no $BASE path to collide across skills in --all-evals. $RUN_ID is computed ONCE at Phase 1 (a single Bash call — not $$, which differs per orchestrator tool-call) and reused for the baseline snapshot AND the Phase 5 report so filenames stay in lockstep:

if [ -z "$SKIP_COMPARE" ]; then
  mkdir -p zuvo/context                         # the redirect below fails if the dir is absent
  git archive "$ref" -- "skills/$skill" | tar -xO > "zuvo/context/skill-eval-baseline-$skill-$RUN_ID.txt" 2>/dev/null \
    || git show "$ref:skills/$skill/SKILL.md" > "zuvo/context/skill-eval-baseline-$skill-$RUN_ID.txt"  # whole OLD skill dir (SKILL.md + agents) as the audit record; SKILL.md-only fallback
  TARGET_REF="$ref"                             # re-run Phases 2-3: new_workspace clones+checks out $ref per case
  #   ... run the baseline pass ...            # (OLD SKILL.md + OLD agents graded from the clone at natural depth)
  TARGET_REF="HEAD"                             # restore for any subsequent current-version work
fi

If the clone/checkout of <ref> fails during the baseline pass (transient FS/permission, unavailable object), that is a BLOCKED_NO_ISOLATION for the baseline case per Phase 2 — recorded and the current-version run still completes; the comparison degrades to "baseline unavailable", never a crash.

Hold the measuring stick constant. Both the old and new runs are graded against the current evals/<skill>.evals.json corpus AND with skill-eval's OWN current executor.md/grader.md — deliberately. Loading the OLD corpus (or old eval agents) for the baseline would confound a change in the SKILL with a change in the CASES or the grader, making the delta uninterpretable. The comparison answers exactly one question: "does today's skill do better than the old skill on today's fixed benchmark?" So only the target skill's own SKILL.md+agents differ between the two runs; everything else is held at HEAD. Report old <pass-rate> → new <pass-rate> per assertion and overall; the run-suffixed zuvo/context/skill-eval-baseline-<skill>-<run>.md snapshot records exactly what was compared (a fixed path would let parallel/retried runs clobber the audit record).

Phase 5 — Report

Pass-rate accounting (fixed + honest about the SOURCE of failure). The behavioral pass rate measures the SKILL, so it must not be polluted by evaluator infra failures:

• The behavioral pass rate = passed-assertions / assertions-in-GRADED-cases. Only graded cases are in the denominator — a skill evaluated during a rate-limit storm must NOT report a false regression because the GRADER timed out.
• Infra failures (executor-failed, grader-dispatch-failed, grader-malformed) are excluded from that denominator and reported SEPARATELY in a prominent "not graded (infra)" tally with counts per kind — never silently dropped, and never folded into the behavioral number.
• Trustworthiness gate: if not-graded cases exceed a threshold (default: >25% of cases, or ANY case in a corpus with <4 cases), the report headline is RESULT: INCONCLUSIVE (<n>/<total> cases not graded — infra), not a pass rate — a 10% behavioral rate computed from 1 of 10 graded cases is noise, and labelling it a regression would be dishonest.

Write to the canonical output dir (report-output-location.md) under zuvo/reports/, using the SAME $RUN_ID computed once at Phase 1 (<YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS>-<rand> — one Bash call, reused everywhere; NOT $$, which differs per orchestrator tool-call and would desync the report filename from the Phase 4 baseline snapshot):

• zuvo/reports/skill-eval-<skill>-<RUN_ID>.md — human-facing: per-eval, per-assertion pass/fail + verbatim evidence, headline pass rate, the "not graded" list, and (with --compare) the old-vs-new diff.
• zuvo/reports/skill-eval-<skill>-<RUN_ID>.json — machine record: the graders' raw per-assertion arrays + run metadata (refs, nonce-fenced=true, per-case executor + grader status).

Print a SKILL-EVAL COMPLETE block: skill, cases, behavioral pass rate (or INCONCLUSIVE per the trustworthiness gate), the not-graded (infra) tally by kind, failing assertions (with the missing tool-call/artifact the grader named), and the report paths. For --all-evals, add an aggregate headline: if more than 10% of corpora came back INCONCLUSIVE, print AGGREGATE: INCONCLUSIVE (<k>/<N> corpora not trustworthy) instead of a suite pass rate — one flaky-infra corpus must not be averaged into a clean-looking suite number. Then append the run log via ../../shared/includes/run-logger.md, using this literal template:

Run: <ISO-8601-Z>	skill-eval	<project>	-	-	<VERDICT>	-	<N>-cases	<NOTES>	<BRANCH>	<SHA7>	<INCLUDES>	<TIER>

The template is spelled out here rather than left to "append the run log", because a skill that names the contract without showing the line makes the agent reconstruct 13 fields from memory — which is how tests-performance and retro ended up appending 11-field rows. VERDICT maps: all corpora graded and passing → PASS; any corpus INCONCLUSIVE → WARN; a behavioral regression → FAIL; BLOCKED_NO_PYTHON/BLOCKED_NO_ISOLATION → BLOCKED. TASKS is - (skill-eval writes no production files); DURATION is <N>-cases.

Notes

• No approval gates. Execute end-to-end; only --dry-run gates output.
• Honest degradation. Missing corpus / bad schema / non-git repo each stop or degrade with their OWN message — never a generic "failed". A grader that returns malformed JSON is a recorded finding, not a silently-dropped case.
• Not a quality gate substitute. skill-eval measures skill behavior against a corpus; it does not replace zuvo:review on production code.

Known limitations (fail-closed, runtime-validated)

skill-eval depends on two runtime-specific mechanisms it cannot prove abstractly, so it is designed to fail closed — block or degrade with a named status, never silently produce a wrong result:

• Transcript capture varies by runtime (auto-captured sub-agent log vs. executor ACTION_LOG). The Phase 2 canary empirically selects a working mode before the batch and hard-stops BLOCKED_NO_TRANSCRIPT_CAPTURE if none works — so a run either grades on real captured tool calls or does not run.
• Push prevention is enforced by removing ALL remotes from each isolated workspace's OWN (copied/cloned, never shared) git config plus executor rule 3; a target skill's push step then fails harmlessly inside the sandbox. This is mechanical for the common case; a skill that re-adds a remote and pushes is out of scope.
• Network isolation is NOT provided. The executor has unrestricted Bash, so an instruction alone cannot stop a target skill's curl/API call from hitting a real endpoint — skill-eval is a behavioral evaluator, not a security sandbox. Skills with network-MUTATING steps (deploy webhooks, external writes) should be run under OS-level network isolation (unshare -rn, a container, or an offline box), or their network-mutating cases excluded from the corpus. This is stated, not silently assumed.

These are validated per-runtime by the canary + the isolation steps, not assumed. The first real-repo use of --compare and of a non-auto-capture runtime should be smoke-run once to confirm the selected paths behave as specified.