DB Security Access

db-security-access (M10)

Security is a Design & Integrity (axis design) concern: a schema can be perfectly normalized and still leak every row. This module checks who can read/write data and whether the data itself is protected at rest and in flight. RLS-off on a relied-on multi-tenant/Supabase table and plaintext secrets/SQL-injection are severity-5 caps.

What it checks

1. Row-Level Security (RLS) — on Postgres/Supabase, is RLS enabled on tables that hold per-tenant or per-user rows and are reached by a non-superuser/anon/authenticated role? RLS off on such a table is severity:5, fail. (Tenant isolation logic lives in M9; M10 owns the on/off state.)
2. PII exposure — columns whose names/types imply personal data (email, ssn, phone, dob, address, card/pan) stored without encryption/tokenization, or logged.
3. Plaintext secrets in schema — passwords, API keys, tokens stored as text/varchar with no hashing note, or literal credentials embedded in DDL/migrations/defaults. severity:5.
4. Encryption in transit — connection config forcing sslmode=disable (or no TLS on a remote host) is severity:4. Encryption at-rest absence is flagged where statically visible.
5. SQL injection — raw string concatenation / f-strings / template literals building SQL with user input (visible in ORM source or migration helpers). severity:5, design.

Score / axis

Feeds design only (category Seguridad, relational weight 14 shared with M9/M20/M21; analogous Seguridad category in every NoSQL profile).

Tier-0 (static)

Parse DDL/migrations/ORM source and connection config: detect text-typed secret columns, literal credentials (cross-checked against redactSecrets()), sslmode=disable, raw-concat SQL, and PII-named columns. RLS enablement (ALTER TABLE … ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY) is detectable in declarative DDL; when RLS state cannot be confirmed from files it is needs_api (never a silent pass).

Tier-1 (verification query, Postgres)

SELECT c.relname,
       c.relrowsecurity  AS rls_enabled,
       c.relforcerowsecurity AS rls_forced,
       (SELECT count(*) FROM pg_policies p WHERE p.tablename = c.relname) AS policy_count
FROM pg_class c JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND c.relkind = 'r';

Method schema_introspect/constraint_check. A table with rls_enabled = false that holds tenant/ user rows confirms M10.rls.* as established and capping. Runtime-only checks (actual at-rest encryption, live TLS negotiation) are needs_api at Tier-0.

Findings

Emit findings per schema/finding.schema.json. Examples:

• M10.tenants.rls_disabled — RLS off on a per-tenant table (severity:5, fail, axis design, confidence established at Tier-1 / directional from DDL, fixable: proposed).
• M10.users.password_plaintext — secret stored as text with no hash (severity:5, fail, established, fixable: advisory).
• M10.conn.sslmode_disable — sslmode=disable on a remote host (severity:4, warn, fixable: proposed).
• M10.repo.sql_string_concat — user input concatenated into SQL (severity:5, fail, directional from source, fixable: advisory).

Each finding: evidence.observed quotes the DDL/connection line/query verbatim with secrets redacted; verification.reproduce is the catalog query above (referencing $DATABASE_URL) or a grep for the offending pattern; expected_impact is banded + confidence-tagged (no naked %).

Honesty

• "PII present" is not automatically a fail — flag unprotected PII; many columns are legitimately plaintext. Scope the recommendation to encryption/tokenization, not deletion.
• At-rest encryption is usually a platform setting (cloud KMS/volume) invisible in files: report needs_api, never assert it is missing.
• A directional source-only RLS/injection signal never raises the severity-5 cap — confirm via Tier-1 or generated DDL first.