NextAuth.js / Auth.js Security Audit
Audit applications using NextAuth.js (now Auth.js). Covers v4 (next-auth) and v5 (Auth.js).
When this skill applies
- Reviewing the auth configuration object (providers, callbacks, pages)
- Auditing JWT vs database session setup
- Reviewing callbacks for safety (jwt, session, signIn, redirect)
- Checking OAuth client credentials and provider config
- Auditing custom adapters
Workflow
Follow ../_shared/audit-workflow.md. Companion: nextjs-security for Next-specific concerns.
Phase 1: Stack detection
grep -E '"(next-auth|@auth/.+)":' package.json
# Find the auth config file
find . -path '*/api/auth/[*nextauth*].ts*' 2>/dev/null
find . -name 'auth.ts' -o -name 'auth.config.ts' 2>/dev/null | head
Detect: v4 (next-auth) vs v5 (@auth/* modular). API differs.
Phase 2: Inventory
# Auth config
cat src/auth.ts auth.config.ts app/api/auth/\[...nextauth\]/route.ts 2>/dev/null
# Callbacks
grep -rn 'callbacks:\|async jwt\|async session\|async signIn\|async redirect' . --include='*.ts' --include='*.js'
# Providers
grep -rn 'GoogleProvider\|GitHubProvider\|CredentialsProvider\|EmailProvider' .
# Env vars
grep -E '^NEXTAUTH_|^AUTH_' .env* 2>/dev/null
Phase 3: Detection — the checks
Environment / secrets
- NXA-SEC-1
NEXTAUTH_SECRET (v4) or AUTH_SECRET (v5) set — required for JWT signing and cookie encryption. Generate with openssl rand -base64 32.
- NXA-SEC-2
NEXTAUTH_URL (v4) set in production to actual URL — without it, callback redirects break or behave unexpectedly.
- NXA-SEC-3 OAuth client secrets (
GITHUB_SECRET, GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET, etc.) in env, never committed.
- NXA-SEC-4 Production and dev clients separate (different OAuth apps with different secrets, different callback URLs).
Session strategy
- NXA-SS-1 Strategy explicitly set (
session: { strategy: 'jwt' } or 'database'). Default behavior changes between versions.
- NXA-SS-2 JWT strategy: sessions are stateless; logout doesn't immediately invalidate tokens (token lifetime trade-off). Acceptable for most apps; not for high-sensitivity (banking, admin tools) where revocation matters.
- NXA-SS-3 Database strategy: session row deleted on signOut; revocation works immediately.
- NXA-SS-4
maxAge reasonable (default 30 days; reduce for sensitive apps).
Callbacks — jwt
callbacks: {
async jwt({ token, user, account, profile }) {
if (user) {
token.id = user.id;
token.role = user.role;
}
return token;
},
}
- NXA-CB-JWT-1 Initial sign-in copies safe claims to token. Don't store secrets (refresh tokens may be stored but encrypted by NextAuth in v4 / handled in v5).
- NXA-CB-JWT-2 Token NOT used to store mutable user state — DB lookups in subsequent requests for role changes.
- NXA-CB-JWT-3 Returning data unaltered when no refresh needed.
Callbacks — session
async session({ session, token }) {
session.user.id = token.id;
session.user.role = token.role;
return session;
}
- NXA-CB-SES-1 Session callback projects safe fields. Don't expose raw
token to the client — session is what the browser sees via useSession().
- NXA-CB-SES-2 Sensitive fields (e.g.,
accessToken for downstream API calls) included only if the client truly needs them. Better: client uses cookie session, server makes downstream calls with stored token.
Callbacks — signIn
async signIn({ user, account, profile, credentials }) {
// Run checks before allowing sign-in
if (account.provider === 'github' && !profile.email_verified) return false;
if (!isAllowedEmail(user.email)) return false;
return true;
}
- NXA-CB-SIG-1 signIn callback used to reject specific accounts (banned users, unallowed email domains).
- NXA-CB-SIG-2 Don't return
true unconditionally for security-sensitive apps that should restrict sign-ups.
- NXA-CB-SIG-3 Email-based signups verify
profile.email_verified (some providers don't verify).
Callbacks — redirect
async redirect({ url, baseUrl }) {
// Default behavior is to only allow relative URLs or same-origin
if (url.startsWith('/')) return `${baseUrl}${url}`;
if (new URL(url).origin === baseUrl) return url;
return baseUrl;
}
- NXA-CB-RED-1 redirect callback returns to base URL or relative paths only. Without the callback, default allows same-origin only — fine. But custom callbacks must preserve the restriction; common bug returns
url unchanged → open redirect.
Providers
NXA-PR-CRD-1 CredentialsProvider (username/password) — authorize function uses constant-time password comparison (bcrypt.compare), not string equality.
NXA-PR-CRD-2 CredentialsProvider returns null on failed auth — never throws with sensitive details that propagate to client.
NXA-PR-CRD-3 Email enumeration: same response time for "user doesn't exist" vs "wrong password". Adding a sleep or always running bcrypt comparison helps.
NXA-PR-OAUTH-1 OAuth providers configured with prompt: 'consent' for sensitive permissions (forces re-consent).
NXA-PR-OAUTH-2 Scopes minimized — request only what's needed.
NXA-PR-OAUTH-3 Provider-specific gotchas: GitHub requires explicit email scope; Google's prompt: 'consent' to refresh tokens.
NXA-PR-EML-1 EmailProvider (magic link): SMTP credentials in env. Email content uses templates that don't reveal user data.
NXA-PR-EML-2 Magic link tokens have short TTL (10-15 min); single-use enforced.
Pages
- NXA-PG-1 Custom sign-in page (if defined) preserves CSRF token and uses Auth.js's API correctly.
- NXA-PG-2 Custom error pages don't echo back arbitrary query parameters (XSS risk).
CSRF
- NXA-CSRF-1 NextAuth applies CSRF protection on credential sign-in (double-submit cookie). Verify not disabled.
- NXA-CSRF-2 Custom routes that act as sign-in pages include
csrfToken from getCsrfToken() (v4) or equivalent (v5).
Database adapter
If using a database adapter (Prisma, Drizzle, etc.):
- NXA-ADP-1 Adapter's tables (
User, Account, Session, VerificationToken) protected by RLS or app-level scoping. No raw user list endpoint shipping these tables.
- NXA-ADP-2 Adapter version matches NextAuth/Auth.js version.
Cookie configuration
- NXA-CK-1 Cookie config sets
secure: true, httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax'. Defaults are usually right; verify not overridden.
- NXA-CK-2 Production deployment serves over HTTPS so the
secure flag is effective.
Webhook / event handlers
If using events: { signIn, signOut, ... }:
- NXA-EV-1 Event handlers don't throw errors that interrupt the auth flow — wrap in try/catch.
- NXA-EV-2 Event handlers don't perform synchronous I/O that delays auth response.
Client-side patterns
- NXA-CL-1
useSession() calls in components don't leak session data to third parties.
- NXA-CL-2 Server-side
getServerSession() used in Server Components / API routes; not relying on client session for security.
Dependencies
- NXA-DEP-1 NextAuth v4 (next-auth) or Auth.js v5 (@auth/* packages). v5 is current.
- NXA-DEP-2 Adapter version matches NextAuth major.
Phase 4: Triage
Critical: NEXTAUTH_SECRET empty / default; redirect callback returning unchecked url; CredentialsProvider with string equality on password; OAuth client secret committed.
Phase 5: Report
Use ../_shared/findings-schema.md. Prefix IDs with NXA-.
1---2name: nextauth-security3description: Security audit for NextAuth.js / Auth.js applications including provider configuration, JWT vs database session strategy, callback safety (jwt, session, signIn, redirect), CSRF, NEXTAUTH_SECRET handling, OAuth client secrets, custom adapters, and Auth.js-specific patterns. Use this skill whenever the user mentions NextAuth, NextAuth.js, Auth.js, next-auth, @auth/core, authjs, NEXTAUTH_SECRET, [...nextauth].ts, providers, callbacks, signIn/signOut, or asks "audit my NextAuth setup", "Auth.js security review". Trigger when the codebase contains `next-auth` or `@auth/*` packages.4---56# NextAuth.js / Auth.js Security Audit78Audit applications using NextAuth.js (now Auth.js). Covers v4 (next-auth) and v5 (Auth.js).910## When this skill applies1112- Reviewing the auth configuration object (providers, callbacks, pages)13- Auditing JWT vs database session setup14- Reviewing callbacks for safety (jwt, session, signIn, redirect)15- Checking OAuth client credentials and provider config16- Auditing custom adapters1718## Workflow1920Follow `../_shared/audit-workflow.md`. Companion: `nextjs-security` for Next-specific concerns.2122### Phase 1: Stack detection2324```bash25grep -E '"(next-auth|@auth/.+)":' package.json26# Find the auth config file27find . -path '*/api/auth/[*nextauth*].ts*' 2>/dev/null28find . -name 'auth.ts' -o -name 'auth.config.ts' 2>/dev/null | head29```3031Detect: v4 (`next-auth`) vs v5 (`@auth/*` modular). API differs.3233### Phase 2: Inventory3435```bash36# Auth config37cat src/auth.ts auth.config.ts app/api/auth/\[...nextauth\]/route.ts 2>/dev/null3839# Callbacks40grep -rn 'callbacks:\|async jwt\|async session\|async signIn\|async redirect' . --include='*.ts' --include='*.js'4142# Providers43grep -rn 'GoogleProvider\|GitHubProvider\|CredentialsProvider\|EmailProvider' .4445# Env vars46grep -E '^NEXTAUTH_|^AUTH_' .env* 2>/dev/null47```4849### Phase 3: Detection — the checks5051#### Environment / secrets5253- **NXA-SEC-1** `NEXTAUTH_SECRET` (v4) or `AUTH_SECRET` (v5) set — required for JWT signing and cookie encryption. Generate with `openssl rand -base64 32`.54- **NXA-SEC-2** `NEXTAUTH_URL` (v4) set in production to actual URL — without it, callback redirects break or behave unexpectedly.55- **NXA-SEC-3** OAuth client secrets (`GITHUB_SECRET`, `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET`, etc.) in env, never committed.56- **NXA-SEC-4** Production and dev clients separate (different OAuth apps with different secrets, different callback URLs).5758#### Session strategy5960- **NXA-SS-1** Strategy explicitly set (`session: { strategy: 'jwt' }` or `'database'`). Default behavior changes between versions.61- **NXA-SS-2** JWT strategy: sessions are stateless; logout doesn't immediately invalidate tokens (token lifetime trade-off). Acceptable for most apps; not for high-sensitivity (banking, admin tools) where revocation matters.62- **NXA-SS-3** Database strategy: session row deleted on signOut; revocation works immediately.63- **NXA-SS-4** `maxAge` reasonable (default 30 days; reduce for sensitive apps).6465#### Callbacks — `jwt`6667```ts68callbacks: {69 async jwt({ token, user, account, profile }) {70 if (user) {71 token.id = user.id;72 token.role = user.role;73 }74 return token;75 },76}77```7879- **NXA-CB-JWT-1** Initial sign-in copies safe claims to token. Don't store secrets (refresh tokens may be stored but encrypted by NextAuth in v4 / handled in v5).80- **NXA-CB-JWT-2** Token NOT used to store mutable user state — DB lookups in subsequent requests for role changes.81- **NXA-CB-JWT-3** Returning data unaltered when no refresh needed.8283#### Callbacks — `session`8485```ts86async session({ session, token }) {87 session.user.id = token.id;88 session.user.role = token.role;89 return session;90}91```9293- **NXA-CB-SES-1** Session callback projects safe fields. Don't expose raw `token` to the client — `session` is what the browser sees via `useSession()`.94- **NXA-CB-SES-2** Sensitive fields (e.g., `accessToken` for downstream API calls) included only if the client truly needs them. Better: client uses cookie session, server makes downstream calls with stored token.9596#### Callbacks — `signIn`9798```ts99async signIn({ user, account, profile, credentials }) {100 // Run checks before allowing sign-in101 if (account.provider === 'github' && !profile.email_verified) return false;102 if (!isAllowedEmail(user.email)) return false;103 return true;104}105```106107- **NXA-CB-SIG-1** signIn callback used to reject specific accounts (banned users, unallowed email domains).108- **NXA-CB-SIG-2** Don't return `true` unconditionally for security-sensitive apps that should restrict sign-ups.109- **NXA-CB-SIG-3** Email-based signups verify `profile.email_verified` (some providers don't verify).110111#### Callbacks — `redirect`112113```ts114async redirect({ url, baseUrl }) {115 // Default behavior is to only allow relative URLs or same-origin116 if (url.startsWith('/')) return `${baseUrl}${url}`;117 if (new URL(url).origin === baseUrl) return url;118 return baseUrl;119}120```121122- **NXA-CB-RED-1** redirect callback returns to base URL or relative paths only. Without the callback, default allows same-origin only — fine. But custom callbacks must preserve the restriction; common bug returns `url` unchanged → open redirect.123124#### Providers125126- **NXA-PR-CRD-1** `CredentialsProvider` (username/password) — authorize function uses constant-time password comparison (`bcrypt.compare`), not string equality.127- **NXA-PR-CRD-2** `CredentialsProvider` returns `null` on failed auth — never throws with sensitive details that propagate to client.128- **NXA-PR-CRD-3** Email enumeration: same response time for "user doesn't exist" vs "wrong password". Adding a sleep or always running bcrypt comparison helps.129130- **NXA-PR-OAUTH-1** OAuth providers configured with `prompt: 'consent'` for sensitive permissions (forces re-consent).131- **NXA-PR-OAUTH-2** Scopes minimized — request only what's needed.132- **NXA-PR-OAUTH-3** Provider-specific gotchas: GitHub requires explicit `email` scope; Google's `prompt: 'consent'` to refresh tokens.133134- **NXA-PR-EML-1** EmailProvider (magic link): SMTP credentials in env. Email content uses templates that don't reveal user data.135- **NXA-PR-EML-2** Magic link tokens have short TTL (10-15 min); single-use enforced.136137#### Pages138139- **NXA-PG-1** Custom sign-in page (if defined) preserves CSRF token and uses Auth.js's API correctly.140- **NXA-PG-2** Custom error pages don't echo back arbitrary query parameters (XSS risk).141142#### CSRF143144- **NXA-CSRF-1** NextAuth applies CSRF protection on credential sign-in (double-submit cookie). Verify not disabled.145- **NXA-CSRF-2** Custom routes that act as sign-in pages include `csrfToken` from `getCsrfToken()` (v4) or equivalent (v5).146147#### Database adapter148149If using a database adapter (Prisma, Drizzle, etc.):150151- **NXA-ADP-1** Adapter's tables (`User`, `Account`, `Session`, `VerificationToken`) protected by RLS or app-level scoping. No raw user list endpoint shipping these tables.152- **NXA-ADP-2** Adapter version matches NextAuth/Auth.js version.153154#### Cookie configuration155156- **NXA-CK-1** Cookie config sets `secure: true, httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax'`. Defaults are usually right; verify not overridden.157- **NXA-CK-2** Production deployment serves over HTTPS so the `secure` flag is effective.158159#### Webhook / event handlers160161If using `events: { signIn, signOut, ... }`:162163- **NXA-EV-1** Event handlers don't throw errors that interrupt the auth flow — wrap in try/catch.164- **NXA-EV-2** Event handlers don't perform synchronous I/O that delays auth response.165166#### Client-side patterns167168- **NXA-CL-1** `useSession()` calls in components don't leak session data to third parties.169- **NXA-CL-2** Server-side `getServerSession()` used in Server Components / API routes; not relying on client session for security.170171#### Dependencies172173- **NXA-DEP-1** NextAuth v4 (next-auth) or Auth.js v5 (@auth/* packages). v5 is current.174- **NXA-DEP-2** Adapter version matches NextAuth major.175176### Phase 4: Triage177178Critical: `NEXTAUTH_SECRET` empty / default; redirect callback returning unchecked `url`; CredentialsProvider with string equality on password; OAuth client secret committed.179180### Phase 5: Report181182Use `../_shared/findings-schema.md`. Prefix IDs with `NXA-`.