Iblai Vibe Security Dependency Audit

/iblai-vibe-security-dependency-audit

Audit project dependencies, frameworks, language runtimes, and dev tools for known CVEs, security anti-patterns, and supply-chain risks.

Do NOT trust a CVE listing without verifying it applies to the installed version. Every finding ships with a fix version or remediation step.

Step 1: Inventory the Stack

Catalog everything in use — direct deps and the chain below them.

Package manifests — read and catalog:

Node/JS:    package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml
Python:     requirements.txt, Pipfile.lock, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock
Ruby:       Gemfile, Gemfile.lock
Go:         go.mod, go.sum
Rust:       Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock
Java:       pom.xml, build.gradle
PHP:        composer.json, composer.lock
.NET:       *.csproj, packages.config

Framework and runtime versions:

• Framework version (Next.js, Django, Rails, Spring, Laravel, Express, etc.)
• Language/runtime version (Node.js, Python, Ruby, Go, Java, PHP, .NET)
• Infrastructure tools (Docker base images, Terraform providers, Kubernetes versions)

Dev tools and CI/CD:

• CI/CD pipeline configs (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, Jenkinsfile)
• Pre-commit hooks, linters, formatters
• Container base images and their update status
• IaC tool versions (Terraform, Pulumi, CDK)

Step 2: Run Automated Audit Tools

Pick the right command for the stack:

# Node.js
npm audit
npm audit --json  # For structured output

# Python
pip audit          # If pip-audit installed
safety check       # If safety installed

# Ruby
bundle audit

# Go
govulncheck ./...

# Rust
cargo audit

# PHP
composer audit

# .NET
dotnet list package --vulnerable

# Docker
docker scout cves <image>
trivy image <image>

# General (if Trivy is available)
trivy fs .

Step 3: Framework-Specific Known Issues

CVEs in packages are only half the story. Each framework ships its own common-misconfiguration foot-guns. Search for recent advisories and check these patterns by stack:

Next.js / React:

• Server Actions exposing internal endpoints (pre-14.1.1 middleware bypass CVE-2025-29927)
• dangerouslySetInnerHTML without sanitization
• SSRF through image optimization (next/image with unrestricted domains)
• Exposed .env files in public directory or client bundle (NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix leaking secrets)
• Middleware auth bypass — check middleware.ts matches every protected route
• Server Component / Client Component boundary leaking server-only data
• Outdated next.config.js security headers

Django:

• DEBUG=True in production
• ALLOWED_HOSTS misconfigured (wildcard *)
• Missing CSRF middleware or @csrf_exempt on state-changing views
• Raw SQL via extra(), raw(), or RawSQL without parameterization
• Pickle deserialization in sessions (use JSON serializer)
• Secret key committed to source control

Rails:

• Mass assignment without strong parameters
• SQL injection via where("column = '#{input}'")
• Unpatched Action Pack, Action View, or Active Record CVEs
• Insecure deserialization in cookies (verify secret_key_base rotation)
• CSRF token bypass in API-only mode

Express / Node.js:

• Prototype pollution through Object.assign, lodash.merge, deep-extend
• ReDoS in validation regex patterns
• Path traversal through req.params in file-serving routes
• Missing rate limiting on auth endpoints
• eval() or Function() with user input
• Event loop blocking on synchronous operations

Spring / Java:

• Spring4Shell and related RCE vulnerabilities
• Deserialization attacks (Java native serialization, Jackson polymorphic types)
• SpEL injection in Spring Expression Language
• Missing CSRF protection on state-changing endpoints
• Actuator endpoints exposed without authentication

Laravel / PHP:

• APP_DEBUG=true in production (leaks env vars in error pages)
• SQL injection via raw DB queries without bindings
• Mass assignment without $fillable / $guarded
• File upload without type validation (PHP execution via uploaded .php)
• Insecure deserialization in queued jobs

WordPress:

• Outdated core, theme, or plugin versions (most common attack vector)
• File editor enabled in wp-admin (allows code injection if admin is compromised)
• XML-RPC enabled (brute-force amplification, SSRF)
• Default admin username, weak passwords
• Unpatched plugin vulnerabilities (check WPScan database)

Step 4: Supply Chain Risks

Beyond CVEs, watch for supply-chain attack indicators.

Dependency confusion / substitution:

• Private package names that could be claimed on public registries
• Missing .npmrc or pip.conf scoping to private registry
• No lockfile integrity verification

Typosquatting:

• Package names that are close misspellings of popular packages
• Recently published packages with very few downloads
• Packages that changed ownership recently

Malicious packages:

• Postinstall scripts making network requests or executing code (scripts.postinstall in package.json)
• Packages with obfuscated code
• Excessive permission requests relative to functionality

Maintenance risk:

• Unmaintained packages (no commits in 2+ years, archived repos)
• Single-maintainer packages for critical functionality
• Packages with known but unpatched vulnerabilities (maintainer unresponsive)

Lockfile integrity:

• Is the lockfile committed to source control?
• Does CI install from the lockfile (npm ci not npm install, pip install --require-hashes)?
• Are integrity hashes present and verified?

Step 5: Dev Tool and CI/CD Security

GitHub Actions:

• pull_request_target trigger with checkout of PR code (code-injection risk)
• Secrets accessible in forked PR workflows
• Unpinned action versions (uses: actions/checkout@main vs @v4.1.0 or SHA pin)
• Script injection via ${{ github.event.issue.title }} in run: blocks

Docker:

• Running as root in container (missing USER directive)
• Base image with known CVEs (check with trivy or docker scout)
• Secrets baked into image layers (visible via docker history)
• latest tag instead of pinned version

Terraform / IaC:

• Hardcoded secrets in .tf files
• Unpinned provider versions
• Missing state file encryption
• Over-permissive IAM in provider configuration

Output Format

# Dependency & Stack Security Audit
## Project: [name]
## Stack: [language, framework, key tools]
## Date: [date]

### Stack Inventory
| Component | Version | Latest | Status |
|-----------|---------|--------|--------|

### Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
| Package | Installed | Vuln | Severity | CVE | Fix Version |
|---------|-----------|------|----------|-----|-------------|

### Framework-Specific Issues
#### [SEVERITY] [Title]
**Component:** [framework/tool name and version]
**Issue:** [description]
**Evidence:** [code or config snippet]
**Remediation:** [specific fix]

### Supply Chain Risks
| Risk | Package/Component | Details | Remediation |
|------|-------------------|---------|-------------|

### Dev Tool / CI Security
| Tool | Issue | Severity | Remediation |
|------|-------|----------|-------------|

### Prioritized Action Plan
1. [Critical — actively exploited CVEs, RCE vulnerabilities]
2. [High — known CVEs with public exploits, supply chain risks]
3. [Medium — framework misconfigurations, outdated dependencies]
4. [Low — maintenance risks, best practice improvements]

Boundaries

• Audit only code and configurations the user provides.
• For every CVE, verify it applies to the actual installed version.
• Provide specific fix versions or remediation steps for every finding.
• Note when a vulnerability requires specific conditions to exploit (reduces effective severity).
• Refuse to help exploit found vulnerabilities against unauthorized targets.

References

• OWASP Dependency-Check
• National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
• GitHub Advisory Database
• Snyk Vulnerability Database
• npm audit / pip-audit / bundler-audit documentation
• SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) framework