Incident Response Rules
1. Severity Classification
Severity Levels
| Level |
Name |
Definition |
Response Time |
Update Cadence |
| SEV1 |
Critical |
Service-wide outage, data loss, security breach |
15 min |
Every 15 min |
| SEV2 |
Major |
Significant feature degraded, partial outage |
30 min |
Every 30 min |
| SEV3 |
Minor |
Minor feature degraded, workaround available |
4 hours |
Every 2 hours |
| SEV4 |
Low |
Cosmetic issue, no user impact |
Next business day |
On resolution |
Severity Examples
| Scenario |
Severity |
| All users cannot log in |
SEV1 |
| Payment processing failing for 30% of transactions |
SEV1 |
| Search results returning stale data |
SEV2 |
| Dashboard loading slowly (>10s) |
SEV2 |
| CSV export timing out for large datasets |
SEV3 |
| Tooltip displaying wrong timezone |
SEV4 |
Escalation Path
SEV1: On-call → Team Lead → Engineering Manager → VP Eng (within 30 min)
SEV2: On-call → Team Lead → Engineering Manager (within 1 hour)
SEV3: On-call → Team Lead (within 4 hours)
SEV4: Ticket in backlog
2. Incident Lifecycle
Phases
Detection → Triage → Mitigation → Resolution → Postmortem
│ │ │ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
Alert Assess Stop the Fix root Learn and
fires impact bleeding cause improve
Role Assignments
| Role |
Responsibility |
| Incident Commander (IC) |
Owns the incident, coordinates response, makes decisions |
| Communications Lead |
Updates stakeholders, status page, internal channels |
| Technical Lead |
Leads investigation and mitigation efforts |
| Scribe |
Documents timeline, decisions, and actions in real-time |
Role Assignment Rules
- IC is the first responder until explicitly handed off
- For SEV1/SEV2, assign all four roles within 15 minutes
- IC should NOT be debugging — they coordinate
- Rotate IC during long incidents (>4 hours)
3. Communication Protocol
Status Update Template
[Incident #1234] [SEV1] [UPDATE 3] [2024-01-15 14:30 UTC]
Status: MITIGATING
Impact: 100% of users unable to complete checkout
Root cause: Database connection pool exhausted due to connection leak
Mitigation: Rolling restart of affected services in progress
ETA: 15 minutes to full recovery
Next update: 14:45 UTC
Stakeholder Notification Matrix
| Severity |
Engineering Team |
Engineering Manager |
Product Manager |
Executive |
External (Status Page) |
| SEV1 |
Immediate |
Immediate |
Immediate |
Within 30 min |
Within 15 min |
| SEV2 |
Immediate |
Within 30 min |
Within 1 hour |
If >2 hours |
If user-facing |
| SEV3 |
Within 4 hours |
Daily summary |
Daily summary |
No |
No |
| SEV4 |
Ticket created |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Communication Channels
| Channel |
Purpose |
| Incident Slack channel |
Real-time coordination (create per SEV1/SEV2 incident) |
| Status page |
External user communication |
| Email |
Executive and stakeholder updates |
| War room (video call) |
SEV1 coordination when needed |
4. Triage Checklist
Initial Assessment (First 5 Minutes)
- What is broken? — Identify the affected service/feature
- Who is affected? — Estimate user impact (all users, specific region, specific plan)
- When did it start? — Check monitoring for the onset time
- What changed? — Review recent deployments, config changes, infrastructure events
- Is it getting worse? — Check if error rate is increasing or stable
Blast Radius Estimation
| Factor |
Questions |
| Users affected |
What percentage? All or specific segment? |
| Revenue impact |
Is payment/checkout/billing affected? |
| Data integrity |
Is data being corrupted or lost? |
| Cascading risk |
Are other services at risk? |
| Security exposure |
Is sensitive data exposed? |
Quick Diagnostic Commands
# Check recent deployments
kubectl rollout history deployment/<app> -n <namespace>
# Check pod health
kubectl get pods -n <namespace> -o wide | grep -v Running
# Check recent logs for errors
kubectl logs -n <namespace> -l app=<app> --since=10m | grep -i error | tail -20
# Check resource pressure
kubectl top pods -n <namespace>
# Check events
kubectl get events -n <namespace> --sort-by='.lastTimestamp' | tail -20
5. Mitigation Strategies
Decision Tree
Is the issue caused by a recent deployment?
├── Yes → Rollback deployment
│ └── Still broken? → Check config changes
└── No
├── Is traffic volume abnormal?
│ ├── Yes → Scale up / enable rate limiting
│ └── No → Continue investigation
├── Is a dependency down?
│ ├── Yes → Enable circuit breaker / failover
│ └── No → Continue investigation
└── Is data corrupted?
├── Yes → Stop writes, assess damage, plan recovery
└── No → Deep investigation needed
Mitigation Techniques
| Technique |
When to Use |
Command/Action |
| Deployment rollback |
Bad code deployed |
kubectl rollout undo deployment/<app> |
| Feature flag kill switch |
Feature-specific issue |
Disable flag in feature management system |
| Traffic shifting |
Partial failure |
Route traffic to healthy instances/regions |
| Horizontal scaling |
Capacity issue |
kubectl scale deployment/<app> --replicas=N |
| Circuit breaker |
Dependency failure |
Enable circuit breaker for failing dependency |
| Rate limiting |
Traffic spike/abuse |
Tighten rate limits at ingress or API gateway |
| DNS failover |
Zone/region failure |
Update DNS to healthy region |
| Database rollback |
Bad migration |
Restore from backup or run rollback script |
Mitigation Rules
- Prefer reversible actions (rollback, feature flag) over forward fixes during active incidents
- Communicate mitigation actions before executing them
- Document every action taken with timestamps
- If mitigation does not work within 15 minutes, escalate
6. Runbook Authoring
Runbook Template
# Runbook: [Service] — [Scenario]
## Overview
- **Service**: [service name]
- **Alert**: [alert name that triggers this runbook]
- **Severity**: [typical severity]
- **Last updated**: [date]
- **Owner**: [team name]
## Prerequisites
- [ ] Access to [environment/tool]
- [ ] Permissions: [required roles]
## Diagnosis Steps
1. Check [metric/dashboard] at [URL]
2. Run: `[diagnostic command]`
3. Expected output: [description]
4. If [condition], proceed to Mitigation A
5. If [other condition], proceed to Mitigation B
## Mitigation A: [Name]
1. Run: `[command]`
2. Verify: `[verification command]`
3. Expected result: [description]
## Mitigation B: [Name]
1. Run: `[command]`
2. Verify: `[verification command]`
## Escalation
- If neither mitigation works within [time], escalate to [team/person]
- Contact: [escalation contact info]
## Post-Mitigation Verification
1. Confirm error rate returns to baseline
2. Confirm no data loss or corruption
3. Monitor for [time period] before declaring resolved
Runbook Rules
- Every SEV1-capable alert MUST have a linked runbook
- Runbooks must be tested quarterly (dry run)
- Include exact commands, not vague instructions
- Include verification steps after each action
- Link to relevant dashboards and documentation
7. Postmortem Process
Timing
| Severity |
Postmortem Required |
Deadline |
| SEV1 |
Yes |
Within 3 business days |
| SEV2 |
Yes |
Within 5 business days |
| SEV3 |
Optional |
Within 2 weeks |
| SEV4 |
No |
— |
Blameless Postmortem Template
# Postmortem: [Incident Title]
## Metadata
- **Incident #**: [ID]
- **Date**: [YYYY-MM-DD]
- **Duration**: [start — end, total duration]
- **Severity**: [SEV level]
- **Author**: [name]
- **Reviewers**: [names]
## Summary
[2-3 sentence summary of what happened and the impact]
## Impact
- **Users affected**: [number/percentage]
- **Revenue impact**: [if applicable]
- **Data impact**: [if applicable]
- **Duration**: [time from detection to resolution]
## Timeline (all times UTC)
| Time | Event |
| --- | --- |
| 09:00 | Deployment X rolled out |
| 09:15 | Alert fired: error rate >5% |
| 09:18 | IC assigned, triage started |
| 09:25 | Root cause identified: connection leak |
| 09:30 | Rollback initiated |
| 09:35 | Error rate returning to baseline |
| 09:45 | Incident resolved |
## Root Cause
[Detailed technical explanation of what went wrong and why]
## Detection
- How was the incident detected? [alert / user report / manual check]
- Could we have detected it sooner? [yes/no, explain]
## Resolution
[What actions were taken to resolve the incident]
## Lessons Learned
### What went well
- [item]
### What went poorly
- [item]
### Where we got lucky
- [item]
## Action Items
| Action | Owner | Priority | Deadline | Ticket |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Add connection pool monitoring | @engineer | P1 | 2024-01-22 | JIRA-123 |
| Update runbook with new scenario | @oncall | P2 | 2024-01-29 | JIRA-124 |
Root Cause Analysis Techniques
| Technique |
When to Use |
| 5 Whys |
Simple causal chains |
| Fishbone (Ishikawa) |
Multiple contributing factors |
| Fault Tree Analysis |
Complex system failures with multiple paths |
| Timeline Analysis |
Time-sensitive cascading failures |
Postmortem Rules
- MUST be blameless — focus on systems, not individuals
- All action items must have owners and deadlines
- Review action items in the next sprint/iteration
- Share postmortem with the broader engineering team
- Track recurring root causes to identify systemic issues
8. On-Call Best Practices
Rotation Design
| Element |
Recommendation |
| Rotation length |
1 week (handoff on weekday mornings) |
| Team size |
Minimum 4-5 people per rotation |
| Shadow on-call |
Pair new team members for 1-2 rotations |
| Compensation |
Follow company policy (time off, pay premium) |
| Handoff |
Sync meeting: open incidents, recent changes, known risks |
Alert Fatigue Reduction
- Review alert signal-to-noise ratio monthly
- Suppress alerts during planned maintenance windows
- Group related alerts to reduce notification volume
- Set appropriate thresholds — avoid alerting on transient spikes
- Every alert must be actionable — if no action needed, remove it
- Target: <5 pages per on-call shift (excluding false positives)
Escalation Policy
Level 1: Primary on-call (immediate)
Level 2: Secondary on-call (after 15 min no-ack)
Level 3: Team lead (after 30 min no-ack)
Level 4: Engineering manager (after 45 min no-ack)
9. Metrics and KPIs
Key Incident Metrics
| Metric |
Definition |
Target |
| MTTD (Mean Time to Detect) |
Time from issue start to alert firing |
<5 min |
| MTTA (Mean Time to Acknowledge) |
Time from alert to first responder |
<5 min |
| MTTR (Mean Time to Resolve) |
Time from detection to resolution |
<1 hour (SEV1) |
| MTTF (Mean Time to Failure) |
Time between incidents |
Increasing trend |
| Change Failure Rate |
% of deployments causing incidents |
<5% |
SLO / SLI / SLA Relationships
| Concept |
Definition |
Example |
| SLI (Indicator) |
Measurable metric |
Request success rate: 99.95% |
| SLO (Objective) |
Internal target for SLI |
Availability ≥ 99.9% per month |
| SLA (Agreement) |
External contractual commitment |
99.5% uptime with penalty clause |
- SLO should be stricter than SLA — internal buffer
- Error budget = 1 - SLO (e.g., 0.1% = 43.2 min/month downtime budget)
- When error budget is exhausted, freeze non-critical deployments
10. Anti-Patterns
- Blaming individuals in postmortems — destroys psychological safety
- No runbooks for critical alerts — responders waste time investigating from scratch
- Skipping postmortems for SEV1/SEV2 — same incidents will recur
- IC also debugging — coordination suffers, nobody has the full picture
- Alerting on symptoms without context — responders cannot triage quickly
- Not tracking action items from postmortems — lessons are not learned
- Over-escalating every issue to SEV1 — severity inflation erodes urgency
- No handoff documentation between on-call shifts — context is lost
- Deploying during active incidents — adds more variables to troubleshoot
- No regular gameday drills — team discovers process gaps during real incidents
Additional References
- For detailed severity classification criteria and escalation guidelines, see references/severity-classification.md
- For structured postmortem template and blameless review guidelines, see references/postmortem-template.md
Related Skills
1---2name: incident-response3description: Incident response workflow including severity classification, communication protocols, triage, mitigation strategies, runbook authoring, postmortem process, and on-call best practices. Covers MTTD, MTTA, MTTR metrics and SLO/SLI/SLA relationships. Use when handling production incidents, writing runbooks, or establishing incident response procedures.4license: MIT5---67# Incident Response Rules89## 1. Severity Classification1011### Severity Levels1213| Level | Name | Definition | Response Time | Update Cadence |14| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |15| SEV1 | Critical | Service-wide outage, data loss, security breach | 15 min | Every 15 min |16| SEV2 | Major | Significant feature degraded, partial outage | 30 min | Every 30 min |17| SEV3 | Minor | Minor feature degraded, workaround available | 4 hours | Every 2 hours |18| SEV4 | Low | Cosmetic issue, no user impact | Next business day | On resolution |1920### Severity Examples2122| Scenario | Severity |23| --- | --- |24| All users cannot log in | SEV1 |25| Payment processing failing for 30% of transactions | SEV1 |26| Search results returning stale data | SEV2 |27| Dashboard loading slowly (>10s) | SEV2 |28| CSV export timing out for large datasets | SEV3 |29| Tooltip displaying wrong timezone | SEV4 |3031### Escalation Path3233```text34SEV1: On-call → Team Lead → Engineering Manager → VP Eng (within 30 min)35SEV2: On-call → Team Lead → Engineering Manager (within 1 hour)36SEV3: On-call → Team Lead (within 4 hours)37SEV4: Ticket in backlog38```3940---4142## 2. Incident Lifecycle4344### Phases4546```text47Detection → Triage → Mitigation → Resolution → Postmortem48 │ │ │ │ │49 ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼50 Alert Assess Stop the Fix root Learn and51 fires impact bleeding cause improve52```5354### Role Assignments5556| Role | Responsibility |57| --- | --- |58| Incident Commander (IC) | Owns the incident, coordinates response, makes decisions |59| Communications Lead | Updates stakeholders, status page, internal channels |60| Technical Lead | Leads investigation and mitigation efforts |61| Scribe | Documents timeline, decisions, and actions in real-time |6263### Role Assignment Rules6465- IC is the first responder until explicitly handed off66- For SEV1/SEV2, assign all four roles within 15 minutes67- IC should NOT be debugging — they coordinate68- Rotate IC during long incidents (>4 hours)6970---7172## 3. Communication Protocol7374### Status Update Template7576```text77[Incident #1234] [SEV1] [UPDATE 3] [2024-01-15 14:30 UTC]7879Status: MITIGATING80Impact: 100% of users unable to complete checkout81Root cause: Database connection pool exhausted due to connection leak82Mitigation: Rolling restart of affected services in progress83ETA: 15 minutes to full recovery84Next update: 14:45 UTC85```8687### Stakeholder Notification Matrix8889| Severity | Engineering Team | Engineering Manager | Product Manager | Executive | External (Status Page) |90| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |91| SEV1 | Immediate | Immediate | Immediate | Within 30 min | Within 15 min |92| SEV2 | Immediate | Within 30 min | Within 1 hour | If >2 hours | If user-facing |93| SEV3 | Within 4 hours | Daily summary | Daily summary | No | No |94| SEV4 | Ticket created | No | No | No | No |9596### Communication Channels9798| Channel | Purpose |99| --- | --- |100| Incident Slack channel | Real-time coordination (create per SEV1/SEV2 incident) |101| Status page | External user communication |102| Email | Executive and stakeholder updates |103| War room (video call) | SEV1 coordination when needed |104105---106107## 4. Triage Checklist108109### Initial Assessment (First 5 Minutes)1101111. **What is broken?** — Identify the affected service/feature1122. **Who is affected?** — Estimate user impact (all users, specific region, specific plan)1133. **When did it start?** — Check monitoring for the onset time1144. **What changed?** — Review recent deployments, config changes, infrastructure events1155. **Is it getting worse?** — Check if error rate is increasing or stable116117### Blast Radius Estimation118119| Factor | Questions |120| --- | --- |121| Users affected | What percentage? All or specific segment? |122| Revenue impact | Is payment/checkout/billing affected? |123| Data integrity | Is data being corrupted or lost? |124| Cascading risk | Are other services at risk? |125| Security exposure | Is sensitive data exposed? |126127### Quick Diagnostic Commands128129```bash130# Check recent deployments131kubectl rollout history deployment/<app> -n <namespace>132133# Check pod health134kubectl get pods -n <namespace> -o wide | grep -v Running135136# Check recent logs for errors137kubectl logs -n <namespace> -l app=<app> --since=10m | grep -i error | tail -20138139# Check resource pressure140kubectl top pods -n <namespace>141142# Check events143kubectl get events -n <namespace> --sort-by='.lastTimestamp' | tail -20144```145146---147148## 5. Mitigation Strategies149150### Decision Tree151152```text153Is the issue caused by a recent deployment?154├── Yes → Rollback deployment155│ └── Still broken? → Check config changes156└── No157 ├── Is traffic volume abnormal?158 │ ├── Yes → Scale up / enable rate limiting159 │ └── No → Continue investigation160 ├── Is a dependency down?161 │ ├── Yes → Enable circuit breaker / failover162 │ └── No → Continue investigation163 └── Is data corrupted?164 ├── Yes → Stop writes, assess damage, plan recovery165 └── No → Deep investigation needed166```167168### Mitigation Techniques169170| Technique | When to Use | Command/Action |171| --- | --- | --- |172| Deployment rollback | Bad code deployed | `kubectl rollout undo deployment/<app>` |173| Feature flag kill switch | Feature-specific issue | Disable flag in feature management system |174| Traffic shifting | Partial failure | Route traffic to healthy instances/regions |175| Horizontal scaling | Capacity issue | `kubectl scale deployment/<app> --replicas=N` |176| Circuit breaker | Dependency failure | Enable circuit breaker for failing dependency |177| Rate limiting | Traffic spike/abuse | Tighten rate limits at ingress or API gateway |178| DNS failover | Zone/region failure | Update DNS to healthy region |179| Database rollback | Bad migration | Restore from backup or run rollback script |180181### Mitigation Rules182183- Prefer reversible actions (rollback, feature flag) over forward fixes during active incidents184- Communicate mitigation actions before executing them185- Document every action taken with timestamps186- If mitigation does not work within 15 minutes, escalate187188---189190## 6. Runbook Authoring191192### Runbook Template193194```markdown195# Runbook: [Service] — [Scenario]196197## Overview198- **Service**: [service name]199- **Alert**: [alert name that triggers this runbook]200- **Severity**: [typical severity]201- **Last updated**: [date]202- **Owner**: [team name]203204## Prerequisites205- [ ] Access to [environment/tool]206- [ ] Permissions: [required roles]207208## Diagnosis Steps2091. Check [metric/dashboard] at [URL]2102. Run: `[diagnostic command]`2113. Expected output: [description]2124. If [condition], proceed to Mitigation A2135. If [other condition], proceed to Mitigation B214215## Mitigation A: [Name]2161. Run: `[command]`2172. Verify: `[verification command]`2183. Expected result: [description]219220## Mitigation B: [Name]2211. Run: `[command]`2222. Verify: `[verification command]`223224## Escalation225- If neither mitigation works within [time], escalate to [team/person]226- Contact: [escalation contact info]227228## Post-Mitigation Verification2291. Confirm error rate returns to baseline2302. Confirm no data loss or corruption2313. Monitor for [time period] before declaring resolved232```233234### Runbook Rules235236- Every SEV1-capable alert MUST have a linked runbook237- Runbooks must be tested quarterly (dry run)238- Include exact commands, not vague instructions239- Include verification steps after each action240- Link to relevant dashboards and documentation241242---243244## 7. Postmortem Process245246### Timing247248| Severity | Postmortem Required | Deadline |249| --- | --- | --- |250| SEV1 | Yes | Within 3 business days |251| SEV2 | Yes | Within 5 business days |252| SEV3 | Optional | Within 2 weeks |253| SEV4 | No | — |254255### Blameless Postmortem Template256257```markdown258# Postmortem: [Incident Title]259260## Metadata261- **Incident #**: [ID]262- **Date**: [YYYY-MM-DD]263- **Duration**: [start — end, total duration]264- **Severity**: [SEV level]265- **Author**: [name]266- **Reviewers**: [names]267268## Summary269[2-3 sentence summary of what happened and the impact]270271## Impact272- **Users affected**: [number/percentage]273- **Revenue impact**: [if applicable]274- **Data impact**: [if applicable]275- **Duration**: [time from detection to resolution]276277## Timeline (all times UTC)278| Time | Event |279| --- | --- |280| 09:00 | Deployment X rolled out |281| 09:15 | Alert fired: error rate >5% |282| 09:18 | IC assigned, triage started |283| 09:25 | Root cause identified: connection leak |284| 09:30 | Rollback initiated |285| 09:35 | Error rate returning to baseline |286| 09:45 | Incident resolved |287288## Root Cause289[Detailed technical explanation of what went wrong and why]290291## Detection292- How was the incident detected? [alert / user report / manual check]293- Could we have detected it sooner? [yes/no, explain]294295## Resolution296[What actions were taken to resolve the incident]297298## Lessons Learned299### What went well300- [item]301302### What went poorly303- [item]304305### Where we got lucky306- [item]307308## Action Items309| Action | Owner | Priority | Deadline | Ticket |310| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |311| Add connection pool monitoring | @engineer | P1 | 2024-01-22 | JIRA-123 |312| Update runbook with new scenario | @oncall | P2 | 2024-01-29 | JIRA-124 |313```314315### Root Cause Analysis Techniques316317| Technique | When to Use |318| --- | --- |319| 5 Whys | Simple causal chains |320| Fishbone (Ishikawa) | Multiple contributing factors |321| Fault Tree Analysis | Complex system failures with multiple paths |322| Timeline Analysis | Time-sensitive cascading failures |323324### Postmortem Rules325326- MUST be blameless — focus on systems, not individuals327- All action items must have owners and deadlines328- Review action items in the next sprint/iteration329- Share postmortem with the broader engineering team330- Track recurring root causes to identify systemic issues331332---333334## 8. On-Call Best Practices335336### Rotation Design337338| Element | Recommendation |339| --- | --- |340| Rotation length | 1 week (handoff on weekday mornings) |341| Team size | Minimum 4-5 people per rotation |342| Shadow on-call | Pair new team members for 1-2 rotations |343| Compensation | Follow company policy (time off, pay premium) |344| Handoff | Sync meeting: open incidents, recent changes, known risks |345346### Alert Fatigue Reduction347348- Review alert signal-to-noise ratio monthly349- Suppress alerts during planned maintenance windows350- Group related alerts to reduce notification volume351- Set appropriate thresholds — avoid alerting on transient spikes352- Every alert must be actionable — if no action needed, remove it353- Target: <5 pages per on-call shift (excluding false positives)354355### Escalation Policy356357```text358Level 1: Primary on-call (immediate)359Level 2: Secondary on-call (after 15 min no-ack)360Level 3: Team lead (after 30 min no-ack)361Level 4: Engineering manager (after 45 min no-ack)362```363364---365366## 9. Metrics and KPIs367368### Key Incident Metrics369370| Metric | Definition | Target |371| --- | --- | --- |372| MTTD (Mean Time to Detect) | Time from issue start to alert firing | <5 min |373| MTTA (Mean Time to Acknowledge) | Time from alert to first responder | <5 min |374| MTTR (Mean Time to Resolve) | Time from detection to resolution | <1 hour (SEV1) |375| MTTF (Mean Time to Failure) | Time between incidents | Increasing trend |376| Change Failure Rate | % of deployments causing incidents | <5% |377378### SLO / SLI / SLA Relationships379380| Concept | Definition | Example |381| --- | --- | --- |382| SLI (Indicator) | Measurable metric | Request success rate: 99.95% |383| SLO (Objective) | Internal target for SLI | Availability ≥ 99.9% per month |384| SLA (Agreement) | External contractual commitment | 99.5% uptime with penalty clause |385386- SLO should be stricter than SLA — internal buffer387- Error budget = 1 - SLO (e.g., 0.1% = 43.2 min/month downtime budget)388- When error budget is exhausted, freeze non-critical deployments389390---391392## 10. Anti-Patterns393394- Blaming individuals in postmortems — destroys psychological safety395- No runbooks for critical alerts — responders waste time investigating from scratch396- Skipping postmortems for SEV1/SEV2 — same incidents will recur397- IC also debugging — coordination suffers, nobody has the full picture398- Alerting on symptoms without context — responders cannot triage quickly399- Not tracking action items from postmortems — lessons are not learned400- Over-escalating every issue to SEV1 — severity inflation erodes urgency401- No handoff documentation between on-call shifts — context is lost402- Deploying during active incidents — adds more variables to troubleshoot403- No regular gameday drills — team discovers process gaps during real incidents404405## Additional References406407- For detailed severity classification criteria and escalation guidelines, see [references/severity-classification.md](references/severity-classification.md)408- For structured postmortem template and blameless review guidelines, see [references/postmortem-template.md](references/postmortem-template.md)409410## Related Skills411412- For secret leakage incidents and credential rotation procedures, see [secrets-management](../secrets-management/) skill413- For general debugging and diagnosis patterns, see [troubleshooting](../troubleshooting/) skill414- For chaos engineering and gameday practices, see [chaos-engineering](../chaos-engineering/) skill