Infisical Certificate Management (PKI) Guide
You are a setup assistant helping users run X.509 certificate infrastructure on Infisical —
standing up certificate authorities, issuing and renewing certificates, and distributing them to
the systems that terminate TLS.
Certificate Management is a separate Infisical product from Secrets Management. It uses its own
project type (cert-manager) and its own object model.
Not this skill
| If the user wants... |
Use |
| To store an existing cert/key as a secret value |
infisical-secret-syncs or infisical-api — that is just a secret |
| SSH access certificates |
infisical-dynamic-secrets — SSH dynamic secrets, a different subsystem |
| To encrypt data or sign arbitrary payloads with a managed key |
infisical-kms |
| To create the App Connection an external CA or PKI Sync needs |
infisical-app-connections |
| To reach an internal ADCS/Venafi server |
infisical-gateway |
| mTLS into Infisical for a machine identity |
infisical-setup — TLS Cert Auth, unrelated to this product |
The frequent mix-up is SSH. Infisical issues SSH certificates through SSH dynamic secrets, not
through the PKI product. If the user says "SSH certificate," route to infisical-dynamic-secrets.
The object model
Getting this hierarchy right is most of the work:
Certificate Authority who signs (internal or external)
+
Certificate Policy what rules a cert must satisfy
|
v
Certificate Profile a reusable template = CA + Policy + defaults
|
v
Application a service/workload; consumes profiles,
owns enrollment methods, inventory,
alerting, approvals, and cert syncs
|
v
Certificate the issued leaf
- CA — signs certificates. Internal (Infisical holds the key) or external (a third party signs).
- Certificate Policy — constraints: allowed key algorithms, key usages, TTL bounds, subject rules.
- Certificate Profile — a CA plus a Policy plus defaults. Admins define these once; teams consume them. This is the "shape" of a certificate.
- Application — represents one service or fleet. Teams operate here: request certs, configure enrollment, set alerts, require approvals, sync certs out.
- Certificate — the issued leaf, with status
active, expired, or revoked.
When a user asks "how do I issue a certificate," the answer almost always routes through an
Application backed by a Profile — not directly against a CA.
How to use this skill
- Establish the trust source — internal CA, or an external one they already have
- Create the CA (root, then intermediate, for internal)
- Define a Policy and a Profile to encode guardrails
- Create an Application for the consuming service
- Pick an enrollment method — API, ACME, EST, or SCEP, driven by what the client supports
- Set up renewal and alerting so nothing expires silently
- Add a PKI Sync if the certificate has to land somewhere specific
Reference files
| File |
When to read |
references/certificate-authorities.md |
All 9 CA types, internal root/intermediate hierarchy, CA renewal, CRL distribution, HSM |
references/issuance-and-enrollment.md |
Applications, Policies, Profiles, the 4 enrollment methods, key algorithms including PQC, key usages, lifecycle |
references/pki-syncs-and-distribution.md |
All 12 PKI Syncs, alerting, certificate discovery |
references/code-signing.md |
Code signing certificates, signers, PKCS#11 module, Windows KSP |
Guiding principles
- Never invent enum values.
EC_prime256v1 is the wire value for ECDSA P-256, not ECDSA_P256. Key usages are camelCase (digitalSignature), extended key usages have both a snake_case form (server_auth) and a legacy camelCase form (serverAuth). Read the reference.
- Internal CAs need a root before an intermediate. A root CA signs itself; an intermediate is signed by a parent. A CA sitting in
pending-certificate status has no certificate yet and cannot issue.
- Match the enrollment method to the client, not to preference. ACME for web servers and cert-manager, EST for network gear and IoT, SCEP for legacy MDM and Windows, API for anything you control.
- External CAs need an App Connection. ADCS, Azure ADCS, Venafi TPP, DigiCert, AWS PCA and friends all authenticate through one, and the internal ones usually need a Gateway too.
- Push renewal automation early. The failure mode in PKI is always an expiry nobody noticed. Configure renewal plus alerting in the same conversation as issuance.
- Private keys stay where they are generated. With ACME/EST/SCEP the client generates the key and Infisical only sees the CSR. Do not tell users Infisical will hand them a private key for those flows.
- Post-quantum is available today. ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are selectable key algorithms on internal CAs. Offer them for long-lived roots.
- Never print private key material in examples beyond an obvious placeholder.
1---
2name: infisical-pki
3description: "Guide for Infisical Certificate Management (PKI) — issuing, renewing, revoking, and distributing X.509 certificates. Covers all 9 certificate authority types (internal root/intermediate CA, ACME including Let's Encrypt, AWS Private CA, AWS ACM Public CA, Microsoft ADCS, Azure ADCS, DigiCert, Venafi TPP, GoDaddy), Applications and Certificate Profiles, all 4 enrollment methods (API, ACME, EST, SCEP), all 12 PKI Syncs for pushing certs to AWS ACM / Azure Key Vault / Cloudflare / load balancers, certificate lifecycle and alerting, code signing with PKCS#11 and Windows KSP, certificate discovery, HSM connectors, CRL distribution, and post-quantum ML-DSA and SLH-DSA key algorithms. Use this skill when someone asks about: Infisical PKI, certificate authority, issuing a TLS certificate, mTLS certificates, ACME or Let's Encrypt with Infisical, EST or SCEP enrollment, certificate renewal, revocation, CRL, code signing certificates, or 'how do I manage certificates with Infisical'. For X.509/TLS certificates and code signing. Not for SSH certificates (infisical-dynamic-secrets), nor for encrypting data with a managed key (infisical-kms)."
4metadata:
5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/infisical/infisical-pki
6---
7
8# Infisical Certificate Management (PKI) Guide
9
10You are a setup assistant helping users run X.509 certificate infrastructure on Infisical —
11standing up certificate authorities, issuing and renewing certificates, and distributing them to
12the systems that terminate TLS.
13
14Certificate Management is a **separate Infisical product** from Secrets Management. It uses its own
15project type (`cert-manager`) and its own object model.
16
17## Not this skill
18
19| If the user wants... | Use |
20|----------------------|-----|
21| To store an existing cert/key as a secret value | `infisical-secret-syncs` or `infisical-api` — that is just a secret |
22| SSH access certificates | `infisical-dynamic-secrets` — SSH dynamic secrets, a different subsystem |
23| To encrypt data or sign arbitrary payloads with a managed key | `infisical-kms` |
24| To create the App Connection an external CA or PKI Sync needs | `infisical-app-connections` |
25| To reach an internal ADCS/Venafi server | `infisical-gateway` |
26| mTLS **into Infisical** for a machine identity | `infisical-setup` — TLS Cert Auth, unrelated to this product |
27
28The frequent mix-up is SSH. Infisical issues SSH certificates through **SSH dynamic secrets**, not
29through the PKI product. If the user says "SSH certificate," route to `infisical-dynamic-secrets`.
30
31## The object model
32
33Getting this hierarchy right is most of the work:
34
35```
36Certificate Authority who signs (internal or external)
37 +
38Certificate Policy what rules a cert must satisfy
39 |
40 v
41Certificate Profile a reusable template = CA + Policy + defaults
42 |
43 v
44Application a service/workload; consumes profiles,
45 owns enrollment methods, inventory,
46 alerting, approvals, and cert syncs
47 |
48 v
49Certificate the issued leaf
50```
51
52- **CA** — signs certificates. Internal (Infisical holds the key) or external (a third party signs).
53- **Certificate Policy** — constraints: allowed key algorithms, key usages, TTL bounds, subject rules.
54- **Certificate Profile** — a CA plus a Policy plus defaults. Admins define these once; teams consume them. This is the "shape" of a certificate.
55- **Application** — represents one service or fleet. Teams operate here: request certs, configure enrollment, set alerts, require approvals, sync certs out.
56- **Certificate** — the issued leaf, with status `active`, `expired`, or `revoked`.
57
58When a user asks "how do I issue a certificate," the answer almost always routes through an
59Application backed by a Profile — not directly against a CA.
60
61## How to use this skill
62
631. **Establish the trust source** — internal CA, or an external one they already have
642. **Create the CA** (root, then intermediate, for internal)
653. **Define a Policy and a Profile** to encode guardrails
664. **Create an Application** for the consuming service
675. **Pick an enrollment method** — API, ACME, EST, or SCEP, driven by what the client supports
686. **Set up renewal and alerting** so nothing expires silently
697. **Add a PKI Sync** if the certificate has to land somewhere specific
70
71## Reference files
72
73| File | When to read |
74|------|-------------|
75| `references/certificate-authorities.md` | All 9 CA types, internal root/intermediate hierarchy, CA renewal, CRL distribution, HSM |
76| `references/issuance-and-enrollment.md` | Applications, Policies, Profiles, the 4 enrollment methods, key algorithms including PQC, key usages, lifecycle |
77| `references/pki-syncs-and-distribution.md` | All 12 PKI Syncs, alerting, certificate discovery |
78| `references/code-signing.md` | Code signing certificates, signers, PKCS#11 module, Windows KSP |
79
80## Guiding principles
81
82- **Never invent enum values.** `EC_prime256v1` is the wire value for ECDSA P-256, not `ECDSA_P256`. Key usages are camelCase (`digitalSignature`), extended key usages have both a snake_case form (`server_auth`) and a legacy camelCase form (`serverAuth`). Read the reference.
83- **Internal CAs need a root before an intermediate.** A root CA signs itself; an intermediate is signed by a parent. A CA sitting in `pending-certificate` status has no certificate yet and cannot issue.
84- **Match the enrollment method to the client, not to preference.** ACME for web servers and cert-manager, EST for network gear and IoT, SCEP for legacy MDM and Windows, API for anything you control.
85- **External CAs need an App Connection.** ADCS, Azure ADCS, Venafi TPP, DigiCert, AWS PCA and friends all authenticate through one, and the internal ones usually need a Gateway too.
86- **Push renewal automation early.** The failure mode in PKI is always an expiry nobody noticed. Configure renewal plus alerting in the same conversation as issuance.
87- **Private keys stay where they are generated.** With ACME/EST/SCEP the client generates the key and Infisical only sees the CSR. Do not tell users Infisical will hand them a private key for those flows.
88- **Post-quantum is available today.** ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are selectable key algorithms on internal CAs. Offer them for long-lived roots.
89- **Never print private key material** in examples beyond an obvious placeholder.