Audit Algorand

Audit Algorand contracts

Audit the behavior an attacker can reach, then explain each issue through a violated invariant and a reproducible path. A checklist is coverage support; it is not evidence that a vulnerability exists.

This skill covers Algorand TypeScript and PuyaTs. Do not introduce Python, PyTEAL, Beaker, or raw-TEAL implementation guidance. Load build-on-algorand when the user also asks to implement fixes or needs broader PuyaTs application guidance. Load use-vibekit before any deployment, signing, network, account, LocalNet, or on-chain action.

Establish scope before judging safety

Read the repository instructions, package manifests, lockfile, compiler configuration, contract source, generated ARC-56 and TEAL artifacts, clients, and tests that are in scope. Use the project's pinned commands and dependencies. Do not add a dependency or change production code during an audit unless the user explicitly asks for remediation.

Record:

• the reviewed commit or working-tree state;
• included contracts, LogicSigs, clients, artifacts, and tests;
• target network and active or assumed consensus protocol;
• compiler and optimization settings;
• excluded components and assumptions;
• whether generated artifacts match the reviewed source;
• commands that ran, failed, or could not run.

Treat missing source, stale artifacts, failing tests, and unverified deployment bytecode as limitations. Do not silently fill those gaps with assumptions.

Load the audit guides

Read Methodology and reporting for every audit. Then load every guide whose feature appears in the system:

For a full audit, load every applicable guide. For a focused review, state which surfaces were intentionally excluded. If the code reveals a new surface, load its guide before completing the review.

Build the security model

Before searching for bugs:

1. Identify assets that can be stolen, frozen, minted, destroyed, redirected, or permanently locked.
2. Identify principals and authorities: arbitrary callers, users, admins, creators, multisigs, application accounts, LogicSig delegates, oracles, and off-chain operators.
3. Map every public entry point, lifecycle action, inner transaction, external application call, and state transition.
4. State the invariants that must hold across calls and atomic groups.
5. Separate intended trust assumptions from accidental privileges.

Assume an attacker can create accounts and assets, choose every unvalidated argument and transaction field, arrange and pad atomic groups, repeat calls, clear their local state, observe public values, copy pending transactions, choose boundary values, and exploit unavailable external services. Treat a compromised privileged key as a separate scenario unless the design claims to tolerate it.

Trace reachable behavior

For each entry point, trace:

• who can call it and how authorization is established;
• which arguments and transaction fields are attacker-controlled;
• state and asset reads before the call;
• state, balance, asset, authority, and lifecycle changes after the call;
• behavior when the call is repeated, reordered, grouped, interrupted, or supplied boundary values;
• assumptions enforced only by a client, deployment script, or operator.

Follow value across the entire path. A receiver check without an asset-ID check, an admin check around unsafe arithmetic configuration, or a timelock that never binds the proposed program bytes still leaves the relevant invariant unproven.

Corroborate findings

A confirmed finding needs all four elements:

1. an attacker capability or failed trusted component;
2. a reachable path through the reviewed system;
3. a specific violated invariant;
4. a concrete security impact.

Use source locations, existing tests, generated TEAL, simulation traces, or a minimal reproducer as evidence. Prefer a focused negative test when the project's harness supports one. Never execute an exploit against a public or shared network. On-chain verification or writes require use-vibekit and the user's authorization.

Do not report a missing best practice as a vulnerability without showing how it changes reachable behavior. Put unexploitable hardening opportunities, centralization assumptions, and incomplete evidence in their own sections.

Finish with an auditable report

Use the report and severity model in Methodology and reporting. Sort findings by severity, keep confidence separate from impact, and include a regression-test idea with every remediation.

End with:

• coverage achieved and surfaces not reviewed;
• commands and artifacts used as evidence;
• unresolved questions and residual risks;
• an explicit statement when no confirmed findings were identified.

Avoid claiming that a review proves the absence of vulnerabilities or replaces an independent professional audit for a high-value deployment.