Forge Authorization

forge-authorization: Authorization

Engine: Forge native

Purpose

Verify deny-by-default function, object, role, tenant, and administrative authorization on every path.

Deterministic runtime composition

Before loading any provider procedure, run:

Resolve ../../runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js relative to this SKILL.md, then run:

node "<resolved-absolute-runner-path>" authorization compose --workflow audit --root "<repository-root>" --dry-run --json

Add one repeatable --request <provider-or-source> flag for each explicit user request. Add --condition <task-condition> or --risk-surface <surface> only for a task fact you directly proved; never infer one from generic wording. The command above is the default for this audit-oriented module; for implementation use --workflow build, and for a fix, retest, or release gate use --workflow fix, verify, or ship respectively. Read the JSON response, keep the Forge contract at index zero, and resolve paths against the absolute runtime_root reported in that response. Read eager[].runtimePath when entering the module. The full selected[] list is availability/provenance; load only deferred[].runtimePath when the task reaches that concern, in tier order. Refuse any path that escapes the root. Respect every reported suppression and context budget. If missing is non-empty, stop and report the installation as damaged; do not improvise a prose fallback. The runner and specialist content may live in a plugin cache or global installation; never assume they are inside the audited repository.

Resolve and read ../fullstack-forge/references/shared/module-contract.md (applicability, execution, mutation, verification, completion) and ../fullstack-forge/references/shared/evidence-rules.md (statuses, standards, tools, findings via ../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md) relative to this module SKILL.md before reporting.

Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.

Automatic activation signals

Activate when a request or direct repository evidence involves authorization, when the user explicitly names forge-authorization, or when discovery proves an applicable boundary.

• Any private, role-gated, owned, tenant, or administrative resource

When not to activate

• Public read-only content with no hidden data or action

Automated support

Relevant discovery inputs are:

• role inventory
• private and admin routes
• policy code and tests

Deterministic support, bounded evidence only:

• inspect-authorization

Agent inspection procedure

1. Build the access-control matrix: subjects, roles, resources, and operations, derived from code rather than documentation.
2. Trace each protected route to the final data query and locate the authorization predicate at the last boundary, not only in middleware.
3. Test object-level access: substitute another subject's identifier at every ID-taking endpoint and record the enforcement evidence.
4. Check non-HTTP paths: exports, downloads, background jobs, scheduled tasks, WebSocket subscriptions, and admin interfaces for the same predicates.
5. Verify default-deny: enumerate what an unauthenticated and a minimally privileged caller can reach, and demand negative tests for every privileged operation.

Manual inspection requirements:

• Confirm intended role semantics and ownership transitions
• Review break-glass and support impersonation controls

Stack-specific guidance:

• Never rely on UI visibility as authorization; test final data access

Evidence to collect

Standards used as criteria:

• OWASP ASVS 5.0
• OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet
• OWASP API1 and API5

Common production failures

• Build a subject-action-resource-context matrix for critical resources
• Trace enforcement at server boundaries, jobs, exports, uploads, websockets, and indirect identifiers
• Test horizontal, vertical, tenant, stale-role, bulk, and confused-deputy cases

Missing-control checks

Each item needs direct evidence or one reasoned status.

• Role definitions
• Permission definitions
• Default-deny behavior
• Server-side enforcement
• Resource ownership
• Object-level authorization
• Field-level authorization
• Tenant isolation
• Admin boundaries
• Staff impersonation
• Privilege escalation
• Direct object references
• Exports
• File downloads
• Background jobs
• Scheduled jobs
• WebSocket subscriptions
• API keys
• Service accounts
• Access-control matrix
• Negative tests for unauthorized reads and writes

Commands and tools

• Run forge authorization audit --json or fullstack-forge authorization audit --json when an explicit audit is requested and the CLI is installed. Normal feature work does not require it.

Safe fixes

• Centralize an existing repeated policy check without semantic change
• Add negative authorization tests

Approval-required changes

• Changing roles, policy semantics, tenant isolation, or administrative access

Verification

• Run the matrix with allowed and denied principals
• Verify denied attempts are safely logged without sensitive data

Completion contract

Follow fullstack-forge/references/shared/completion.md and the limitations below.

Known limitations

• Policy intent requires an authoritative owner