Forge Supply Chain

forge-supply-chain: Software supply chain

Engine: Hybrid — Forge + Addy Osmani Agent Skills

Purpose

Inspect dependencies, build integrity, provenance, releases, licenses, actions, and secret exposure across the delivery chain.

Deterministic runtime composition

Before loading any provider procedure, run:

Resolve ../../runtime/cli/src/composition-entry.js relative to this SKILL.md, then run:

node "<resolved-absolute-runner-path>" supply-chain compose --workflow audit --root "<repository-root>" --dry-run --json

Add one repeatable --request <provider-or-source> flag for each explicit user request. Add --condition <task-condition> or --risk-surface <surface> only for a task fact you directly proved; never infer one from generic wording. The command above is the default for this audit-oriented module; for implementation use --workflow build, and for a fix, retest, or release gate use --workflow fix, verify, or ship respectively. Read the JSON response, keep the Forge contract at index zero, and resolve paths against the absolute runtime_root reported in that response. Read eager[].runtimePath when entering the module. The full selected[] list is availability/provenance; load only deferred[].runtimePath when the task reaches that concern, in tier order. Refuse any path that escapes the root. Respect every reported suppression and context budget. If missing is non-empty, stop and report the installation as damaged; do not improvise a prose fallback. The runner and specialist content may live in a plugin cache or global installation; never assume they are inside the audited repository.

Resolve and read ../fullstack-forge/references/shared/module-contract.md (applicability, execution, mutation, verification, completion) and ../fullstack-forge/references/shared/evidence-rules.md (statuses, standards, tools, findings via ../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md) relative to this module SKILL.md before reporting.

Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.

Automatic activation signals

Activate when a request or direct repository evidence involves software supply chain, when the user explicitly names forge-supply-chain, or when discovery proves an applicable boundary.

• Any project consuming or publishing software artifacts

When not to activate

• No exemption for executable release artifacts

Automated support

Relevant discovery inputs are:

• lockfiles
• build and release workflows
• artifact and license inventory

Deterministic support, bounded evidence only:

• inspect-dependencies
• inspect-ci
• scan-secret-patterns

Agent inspection procedure

1. Audit dependencies with the lockfile: known vulnerabilities, abandoned packages, and unexpected install scripts.
2. Verify lockfile consistency, pinning strategy, and provenance for critical packages, including typosquat review for recent additions.
3. Inspect CI workflows for action pinning, least-privilege tokens, fork safety, and secret exposure in logs.
4. Trace release-artifact integrity: reproducibility, checksums, and signing or provenance attestation.
5. Check container base images, the update strategy, and license compatibility across the dependency tree.

Manual inspection requirements:

• Triage vulnerabilities for actual reachability and compensating controls
• Review maintainer and registry trust for critical dependencies

Stack-specific guidance:

• Disable or isolate install scripts where compatible and use least-privilege CI tokens

Evidence to collect

Standards used as criteria:

• SLSA 1.2
• NIST SSDF
• OpenSSF Scorecard concepts

Common production failures

• Verify lockfile integrity, direct and transitive dependency review, vulnerability output, lifecycle scripts, and abandoned packages
• Inspect CI action pinning, token permissions, untrusted build inputs, artifact signing, provenance, checksums, reproducibility, and protected release flow
• Validate declared licenses, notices, source attribution, generated-file provenance, and secret scanning

Missing-control checks

Each item needs direct evidence or one reasoned status.

• Vulnerable dependencies
• Abandoned packages
• Unexpected install scripts
• Lockfile consistency
• Dependency pinning
• Package provenance
• Build reproducibility
• CI action pinning
• Generated artifacts
• Secrets in build logs
• SBOM generation
• License compatibility
• Typosquatting
• Container base images
• Update strategy
• Compromised transitive dependencies
• Release provenance
• SLSA concepts where appropriate

Commands and tools

• Run forge supply-chain audit --json or fullstack-forge supply-chain audit --json when an explicit audit is requested and the CLI is installed. Normal feature work does not require it.

Safe fixes

• Pin action commits and compatible dependency patches after tests
• Correct license inventory and checksums

Approval-required changes

• Major dependency upgrades, replacing registries, rotating tokens, or changing release authority

Verification

• Rebuild from a clean checkout with the lockfile
• Compare artifacts, checksums, SBOM, and provenance

Completion contract

Follow fullstack-forge/references/shared/completion.md and the limitations below.

Known limitations

• A vulnerability identifier alone does not prove exploitability or safety