Backend Security Audit

Backend Security Audit

Purpose

Systematically check a backend against the OWASP API Security Top 10, producing findings with a concrete exploit scenario each — so the team understands the attack, not just the rule.

Universal — the OWASP API Top 10 is a vendor-neutral, exploit-oriented taxonomy that maps to any backend; only the fix syntax differs.

Procedure

Audit against the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023). For each finding, write the exploit scenario (how an attacker abuses it) — this is the differentiator from a generic checklist.

1. API1 BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization) — #1, ~40% of API attacks

   • Can a user access another's object by changing an ID? → row-level authz missing (see authorization RLS)

2. API2 Broken Authentication

   • Weak tokens, no rotation, alg confusion (see authentication)

3. API3 Broken Object Property Level Authorization (mass assignment / excessive data exposure)

   • Does the API accept/return fields the user shouldn't set/see? → explicit allow-lists, DTOs

4. API5 BFLA (Broken Function Level Authorization)

   • Can a regular user hit admin endpoints? → RBAC at every privileged route

5. API4 Unrestricted Resource Consumption

   • Rate limiting, pagination caps, payload size limits, query depth/complexity limits (GraphQL)

6. API8 Security Misconfiguration

   • CORS not wildcard for credentialed endpoints; security headers; verbose errors disabled in prod

7. Injection (cross-cutting)

   • Note: standalone "Injection" was API8:2019 — in the 2023 edition it's folded across categories rather than its own item, but still audit it
   • Parameterized queries only (ORM by default); never string-concatenate SQL; validate input (see data-validation)

8. Secrets management (cross-cutting)

   • Not a numbered Top-10 item but a practical must: no secrets in code/client-shipped env; use a secret manager; rotate; scan with gitleaks/trufflehog

9. API7 SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) — call this out explicitly

   • User-supplied URL fed into fetch / axios → attacker pivots through the server. Defenses: allowlist hosts; block cloud metadata IPs (169.254.169.254 AWS/GCP/Azure, 100.100.100.200 Alibaba, link-local + private CIDRs); validate the resolved IP, not just the input string (DNS rebinding); set a strict timeout
   • Egress firewall is the structural defense; URL validation alone is not enough

10. API10 Unsafe Consumption of APIs — trust the wire as much as the user

• Treat third-party API responses as untrusted: validate shape (see data-validation), cap response sizes, time out generously but not infinitely
• JSON-bomb / zip-bomb / oversized-payload defenses on every downstream consumer

11. CSRF (cookie-auth web apps) — outside the API Top 10 but on the same backend

• For sessions / cookie tokens: SameSite=Lax|Strict cookies + origin check on state-changing requests (header-token tokens like Authorization are immune)
• Also review remaining 2023 items not enumerated above (API6 Sensitive Business Flows, API9 Improper Inventory)

12. Validate (validation loop)

• For each Critical finding, reproduce the exploit (BOLA: actually fetch another user's record) → fix → re-attempt → verify blocked
• Run eslint-plugin-security / semgrep --config=auto + gitleaks + dependency audit; triage each hit; re-run until clean or documented

Anti-patterns

Severity tiers

Completion Criteria

• Key OWASP API Top 10 (2023) categories checked + cross-cutting concerns (injection, secrets)
• Each finding has an exploit scenario
• BOLA reproduced + fixed + re-verified blocked
• Static analysis + secret scan clean (or documented)
• All Critical fixed; all Major scheduled

Output

• Report: docs/security-audit-YYYY-MM-DD.md — per finding: OWASP category, file:line, exploit scenario, fix, severity
• Code fixes per finding
• Commit format: fix(security): <description> [OWASP-API#N, severity]

Stop & Ask (AI must pause for user approval)

• Before changing auth/authz logic to fix a finding — can lock users out if wrong
• Before rotating/removing a secret found in the repo — coordinate rotation with deploys
• Before tightening CORS/CSP in production config — verify no legitimate client breaks

Implementation

TypeScript + NestJS + Supabase (default)

• Injection: Prisma parameterizes by default; never $queryRawUnsafe with interpolation
• BOLA/BFLA: NestJS guards (RBAC) + Supabase RLS (row) — see authorization
• Mass assignment: explicit DTOs + class-validator/Zod (see data-validation)
• Scanning: eslint-plugin-security, semgrep --config=auto, gitleaks, npm audit

Other stacks

• Python / FastAPI: bandit static analysis; Pydantic prevents mass assignment; parameterized SQLAlchemy
• Go: gosec; database/sql parameterized queries
• Universal: OWASP API Top 10 categories are framework-independent; semgrep, gitleaks, trivy work across stacks

Related skills

• authorization — BOLA/BFLA findings are fixed via RBAC + RLS
• authentication — broken auth is a top OWASP category
• data-validation — input validation is the first injection defense

Reference

• Key insight encoded: BOLA is the #1 API vulnerability — function-level auth without row-level auth is the most common gap. Every finding gets a reproducible exploit scenario.