Mobile Security
Step 0 — Detect
rg --files -g 'AndroidManifest.xml' -g 'Info.plist' -g '*.kt' -g '*.java' -g '*.swift' -g '*.m' -g '*.dart' -g 'pubspec.yaml' -g 'Podfile' -g 'app/build.gradle*' | head
Step 1 — Android manifest
rg -n "android:exported|allowBackup|debuggable|usesCleartextTraffic|networkSecurityConfig|protectionLevel|grantUriPermissions" -g 'AndroidManifest.xml' -g '*.xml'
Component census (don't eyeball): enumerate exported components BY TYPE — agents reliably spot activities and providers while services/receivers get skipped. Four separate passes, one table row each:
rg -n "<activity[^>]*android:exported=\"true\"" -g 'AndroidManifest.xml'
rg -n "<service[^>]*android:exported=\"true\"" -g 'AndroidManifest.xml'
rg -n "<receiver[^>]*android:exported=\"true\"" -g 'AndroidManifest.xml'
rg -n "<provider[^>]*android:exported=\"true\"" -g 'AndroidManifest.xml'
| Flag | Finding | Severity |
|---|---|---|
android:allowBackup="true" (or omitted — it's the default) |
data extractable via adb backup |
Medium |
android:debuggable="true" in release manifest |
debug bridge on prod devices | High |
exported activity/service/receiver/provider without android:permission |
component hijacking — any app invokes it | High |
component with <intent-filter> and no explicit exported |
filters imply exported (API ≤30 rules) | High |
usesCleartextTraffic="true" / cleartextTrafficPermitted="true" |
HTTP downgrade/MITM | Medium |
custom permission protectionLevel="normal" guarding sensitive ops |
any app can request it | Medium |
exported provider + grantUriPermissions |
URI grant to malicious apps | High |
Note: cleartext is blocked by default since API 28 — check minSdkVersion; below 28
without a network_security_config = de facto cleartext allowed.
Step 2 — Android code
rg -n "addJavascriptInterface|setJavaScriptEnabled|setAllowFileAccess|loadUrl|setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs" -g '*.kt' -g '*.java'
rg -n -i "(api[_-]?key|secret|token)\s*=\s*[\"'][^\"']{8,}" -g '*.kt' -g '*.java' -g 'strings.xml' -g 'build.gradle*'
addJavascriptInterface+ JS enabled → classic RCE bridge (High; Critical with file access + user URL)loadUrl(intent.dataString)/ loadinghttp://update URLs with JS on → High- Hardcoded keys in code/
strings.xml/BuildConfig→ Critical (decompiling is trivial) sharedPreferencesstoring tokens unencrypted → Medium
Step 3 — iOS
rg -n "NSAllowsArbitraryLoads|NSAllowsLocalNetworking|NSExceptionDomains" -g 'Info.plist'
rg -n "UserDefaults|kSecAttrAccessible|Keychain" -g '*.swift' -g '*.m' | head -20
NSAllowsArbitraryLoads=true(ATS off) → Medium;NSExceptionDomainslist → review each- Tokens/PII in
UserDefaults(plist, unencrypted, included in backups) → Medium/High - Keychain items without
kSecAttrAccessible...ThisDeviceOnlyfor sensitive items → Low/Medium - Hardcoded secrets in Swift/ObjC → Critical
Step 4 — Cross-platform
- React Native: tokens in
AsyncStorage(unencrypted) → Medium; dev deps (flipper,react-devtools-core) reachable in release builds → Medium - Flutter: tokens outside
flutter_secure_storage→ Medium; disabling certificate validation (badCertificateCallback => true) → High. Full Dart-side shapes (storage census, dio/adapter cert bypass, WebView channels, platform channels, deep-link routes,--dart-definesecrets, Random()/md5):../flutter-security/SKILL.md— this skill keeps the platform/manifest half - Kotlin/Java app-code shapes (EncryptedSharedPreferences, execSQL/rawQuery, TrustManager/HostnameVerifier bypass,
@JavascriptInterfacebodies, PendingIntent immutability, Keystore/ECB, logcat tokens, google-services.json):../android-code-security/SKILL.md— this skill keeps the manifest half; the WebView-bridge greps above stop at existence, that skill opens the method bodies
Reporting
Manifest findings cite the XML line; code findings cite file:line. Fixes are usually
one attribute (allowBackup="false", exported="false" + permission) — give the exact line.
Cross-reference hardcoded keys with ../secrets-detection/SKILL.md for rotation guidance.