Audit a DAO treasury signer set
The treasury multisig is only as legitimate as the signer set governance approved. A signer silently swapped in, or a threshold lowered by one, changes who controls the funds without a vote.
Procedure
Read the current owners and threshold:
cast call $SAFE "getOwners()(address[])" --rpc-url $RPCcast call $SAFE "getThreshold()(uint256)" --rpc-url $RPCFetch the governance-approved roster: the proposal that last set the signer set, decoded from its calldata.
cast call $GOV "getActions(uint256)(address[],uint256[],bytes[],bytes32)" $ID --rpc-url $RPCDiff the two sets: any owner not in the approved list, or a missing approved owner, is a finding.
Check no two owners are controlled by one key: compare against a known cluster map, and flag duplicate hardware-wallet addresses or an owner that is an EOA of a current signer's hot key.
Verify the threshold still matches the approved value; a threshold reduced from 4/7 to 3/7 is a governance change even if the owners are identical.
Confirm the Safe is the timelock's beneficiary, not a rogue parallel treasury: the address the governor pays must equal this Safe.
Re-run after every
AddedOwner/RemovedOwner/ChangedThresholdevent; alert on any that does not trace to an executed proposal.Check each owner is still an active signer, not a departed member or a revoked key; a stale owner is a standing point of compromise.
Confirm no owner is a contract that cannot sign (e.g. the governor's own timelock); a non-signing owner quietly lowers the effective threshold.
Record the audit block and the proposal id that last authorised the set, so the check is reproducible later.
Pitfalls
Auditing owners but not the threshold; the same owners with a lower threshold is a weaker control.
Assuming the owners are the governance council when the founding team holds the keys from before the DAO existed.
Missing a signer module: a Safe with an enabled module (e.g. a recovery or spending-limit module) can move funds without the normal threshold.
Treating the Safe address as canonical without checking the governor's target; a proposal to pay a different, similarly-named Safe is the attack.
Ignoring signer rotation history; a signer added and removed within a term may still hold a copy of the config.
A Safe whose owners include the deployer EOA from before governance existed still grants that key standing weight.
Trusting the Safe UI's owner list; read
getOwners()on-chain, since a pending owner change is not yet applied.A module-enabled Safe can be drained through the module without any owner signing; check
getModulesPaginated.
Verification
cast call $SAFE "getOwners()(address[])" --rpc-url $RPC && cast call $SAFE "getThreshold()(uint256)" --rpc-url $RPC
# owners set and threshold must equal the decoded roster from the executed proposal
Report the owner set, the threshold, the approved roster, and any diff or non-governance signer change, with the events cited.