CTF Hardware & Firmware
Most "hardware" CTF challenges never need a soldering iron: they hand you a dump, a capture, or an IQ file. Decide which of those you have before touching a pinout.
Scope and safety
Only work on hardware the challenge or the user owns. Do not connect to live production devices, and never reflash a device you cannot afford to brick. Keep dumps and scripts under ctf-solver/workspaces/<challenge>/.
Step 1: Identify the artifact
| Artifact | Path |
|---|---|
firmware.bin, .img, vendor update file |
Firmware extraction |
.sr / .sal / .vcd, sigrok/PulseView capture |
Logic analysis |
.iq, .cf32, .cs16, .cu8, .wav from SDR |
SDR — see ../ctf-misc/rf-sdr.md |
.log, candump output, DBC file |
CAN bus |
| Photo of a board, "find the UART" | UART / JTAG |
| "power trace", CSV of samples, timing measurements | Side channel |
.elf for ARM/MIPS/Xtensa, no hardware given |
Firmware reversing — ../ctf-reverse/platforms.md |
Firmware extraction
file firmware.bin
binwalk firmware.bin # signatures first
binwalk -Me firmware.bin # recursive extract (installed in the image)
unsquashfs -l squashfs-root.sqfs # SquashFS listing
jefferson -d out jffs2.img # JFFS2 (pip install jefferson)
ubidump ubi.img --extract-file # UBI volumes (pip install ubidump)
7z x firmware.bin -oextracted # catches many vendor containers
Then mine the filesystem, which is where the flag usually is:
grep -rniE 'flag|passwd|secret|token|admin' squashfs-root/etc 2>/dev/null | head
cat squashfs-root/etc/shadow # crack weak hashes with hashcat -m 1800/500
cat squashfs-root/etc/init.d/* # boot scripts reveal services and keys
find squashfs-root -name '*.conf' -o -name 'nvram*' -o -name '*.pem'
Watch for: encrypted or XOR-obfuscated sections (entropy near 8 means compressed or encrypted), a header with a key, nvram defaults containing Wi-Fi PSKs, and firmware that ships its own private key.
Architecture check before emulating:
readelf -h ./bin/busybox | grep -E 'Machine|Class|Data'
qemu-arm -L /usr/arm-linux-gnueabihf ./bin 2>/dev/null
qemu-mipsel -L /usr/mipsel-linux-gnu ./bin
apt install qemu-user qemu-user-static gdb-multiarch gives you the cross-arch path. The container currently has no qemu at all (binwalk and unsquashfs are present), so install before planning an emulation step.
UART
- Find the pads — usually a 3- or 4-pin header near the SoC. GND is continuous with the shield/ground plane; VCC reads ~3.3 V. TX/RX are the remaining two.
- Sniff first, do not transmit. Connect only GND and the pad that emits data at boot. A USB-TTL adapter at 3.3 V, never 5 V.
- Baud — 115200 8N1 is the default on most routers; 57600 and 9600 are next. If you see garbage, try the neighbouring rates before rewiring.
ls /dev/tty.usbserial* /dev/ttyUSB*
picocom -b 115200 /dev/ttyUSB0 # Ctrl-A Ctrl-X to exit
screen /dev/ttyUSB0 115200
What you are looking for in the boot log: a U-Boot prompt (=>), a login prompt, or a shell. From U-Boot:
printenv
setenv bootargs 'console=ttyS0,115200 init=/bin/sh'
boot
A U-Boot prompt with fatload/md can also read raw flash without a shell. If the boot log prints the flag during init, you only needed the sniff.
JTAG / SWD / SPI flash
openocd -f interface/ftdi/ft2232h.cfg -f target/stm32f1x.cfg
# in the openocd console:
# halt; dump_image flash.bin 0x08000000 0x100000
- SWD (Cortex-M) needs SWDIO, SWCLK, GND, and often NRST — four wires, more reliable than JTAG on small boards.
- SPI flash in-circuit with a SOIC-8 clip and CH341A:
flashrom -p ch341a_spi -r dump.bin, thenbinwalk -Me dump.bin. Read-only first; writing risks bricking. - If the chip is read-protected, look for the flag in the bootloader's UART output or in a second, unprotected chip instead of attacking the lock bits.
Logic analysis (sigrok / PulseView)
A .sr capture is usually SPI, I2C, or UART between an MCU and a peripheral.
sigrok-cli -i capture.sr -P uart:baudrate=115200:rx=D0 -A uart=rx_data
sigrok-cli -i capture.sr -P spi:cs=D0:clk=D1:mosi=D2:miso=D3 -A spi=mosi-data
sigrok-cli -i capture.sr -P i2c:scl=D0:sda=D1 -A i2c=data-read
sigrok-cli -d fx2lafw --config samplerate=1m --channels D0,D1 -o live.sr # live capture
sigrok-cli is not installed in the container — apt install sigrok-cli (or use PulseView locally) before promising a decode. Practical order: guess the protocol from the channel count and clock regularity, decode with defaults, then adjust baud/polarity/bit order until the bytes look like ASCII. A flag written to an LCD or EEPROM shows up as a run of printable bytes in the decode.
CAN bus
candump -L can0 # log with timestamps
candump can0,7DF:7FF # filter an ID range
cansend can0 123#DEADBEEF # raw frame
python3 -c "import cantools; db=cantools.database.load_file('x.dbc'); print(db.messages)"
Look for a challenge that replays a "locked" frame: capture the unlock exchange, find the counter or checksum, and replay with the payload you want. can-utils is not in the container — install it, or parse the log text directly if the challenge only gives you candump output.
Side channel and fault injection
- Power/timing traces: align traces, compute the Hamming weight of the key guess, correlate. For AES the standard target is the first S-box output; peak correlation at the right key byte beats noise.
- Simple attacks first — if the challenge prints timing for a comparison, it is usually a byte-by-byte oracle, not a real DPA.
- Fault injection: single-bit ROM flips (see ../ctf-reverse/platforms-hardware.md for the XOR-constant pattern), voltage glitches to skip an auth branch, and clock glitches to misread a compare. A
chipwhisperer/glitchkitsetup is only worth modelling when the challenge hands you measurements.
Embedded reversing pointers
- ESP32/Xtensa with no IDA support: load the ESP-IDF ROM linker script in radare2 — ../ctf-reverse/patterns-ctf-3.md
- ARM/MIPS userland binaries: ../ctf-reverse/unicorn-emulation.md for MMIO-heavy firmware
- UEFI and bootkits: ../ctf-reverse/languages.md
- Android APK on a device: ../ctf-reverse/tools.md
Common flag locations
- Firmware filesystem:
/etc/flag,/root/flag, a config value, NVRAM defaults - Raw flash at a fixed offset (
strings dump.bin | grep -i flag) - UART boot log, U-Boot environment, a shell after
init=/bin/sh - A decoded SPI/I2C/UART transaction headed for a display or EEPROM
- A demodulated SDR frame or a CAN payload
When to pivot
- The dump is just a binary to reverse, no hardware semantics →
/ctf-reverse - The device exposes a network service you can attack →
/ctf-webor/ctf-pwn - The capture is audio (SSTV, Morse, DTMF) rather than digital → ../ctf-misc/audio.md
- The signal is RF modulation analysis (QAM/PSK, IQ formats) → ../ctf-misc/rf-sdr.md
Verify
binwalk --help | head -3
command -v sigrok-cli picocom openocd flashrom ubidump jefferson
file firmware.bin && binwalk -Me firmware.bin
State plainly which steps you could not run because the tool or the hardware was absent — a firmware conclusion based on strings alone is a hypothesis, not a result.
Saleae .sal captures (Logic 2)
- A
.salfile is a zip of digital/analog captures. Open in Saleae Logic 2, or extract and decode with sigrok:sigrok-cli -i capture.sal -P uart:baudrate=115200:rx=D0 -A uart=rx_data. If sigrok is unavailable, unzip the.saland parse the binary sample streams manually. - Guess the protocol from channel count and clock regularity, decode with defaults, then adjust baud/polarity/bit order until the bytes look like ASCII. A flag written to an LCD or EEPROM shows up as a run of printable bytes.