Django Security
Step 0 — Detect
rg -n "^[Dd]jango" -g 'requirements*.txt' -g 'pyproject.toml' -g 'Pipfile*' -g 'poetry.lock'
ls manage.py **/settings.py 2>/dev/null || rg --files -g 'settings.py' | head -3
Record Django version, auth setup (django.contrib.auth vs custom), and deployment target hints.
Step 1 — Settings
rg -n "DEBUG|ALLOWED_HOSTS|SECRET_KEY|CSRF_COOKIE|SESSION_COOKIE|SECURE_" -g 'settings*.py' -g 'settings/*.py'
| Finding | Severity |
|---|---|
Hardcoded SECRET_KEY (not env) |
High (Critical if repo is public — session forgery, password-reset tokens) |
DEBUG = True in prod settings |
High (stack traces; historically settings disclosure) |
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*'] |
Medium → host-header poisoning of password-reset links (High when reset flows exist) |
CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE / SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE False/absent |
Medium |
SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT absent behind plain HTTP |
Medium |
PASSWORD_HASHERS with MD5/SHA1 hasher |
Critical (weak password storage) |
django-cors-headers: CORS_ALLOW_ALL_ORIGINS=True (+ credentials) |
Medium/Critical |
Step 2 — SQL injection
rg -n "\.raw\(|\.extra\(|cursor\.execute" --type py
Model.objects.raw(f"...{request...}")/.raw("... %s" % var)→ Critical.extra(where=[f"...{...}"])→ Critical- ORM field lookups (
filter(name__icontains=q)) → safe, note as positive
Step 3 — XSS / template injection
rg -n "mark_safe\s*\(" --type py
rg -n "\|safe\b" -g '*.html' -g '*.htm'
rg -n "Template\(|Engine\(\)\.from_string" --type py
Census, don't sample: count and disposition EVERY hit. (Do not combine these into one command — --type py and a -g '*.html' glob in the same invocation silently drop the .py hits, i.e. every mark_safe in views.) Severity by privilege direction per ../injection-flaws/SKILL.md (XSS table): unprivileged author → privileged viewer = Critical.
mark_safe(user_data)→ reflected High; stored unprivileged→staff (moderation/support/grading) Critical{{ var|safe }}in templates on user-derived vars → same triageautoescape=FalseinTemplate()/loader options → HighTemplate(user_string)(string built from input) → SSTI, Critical
Step 4 — Mass assignment
rg -n "fields = '__all__'|exclude = .*ModelForm|modelform_factory" --type py
ModelFormwithfields = '__all__'on models with role/flag columns (is_superuser,is_staff,role,balance) → High/CriticalModel(**request.POST.dict())/ manualform = X(request.POST)without restricting → same- Fix: explicit field allowlists;
request.POSTis user-controlled wholesale.
Step 5 — Authorization
rg -n "login_required|LoginRequiredMixin|permission_required|@user_passes_test" --type py
rg -n "def (view|detail|edit|delete)" --type py | head -20
- Object views without ownership check (
Model.objects.get(pk=request.GET['id'])returned directly) → IDOR, High - Class-based views missing
LoginRequiredMixinon data mutation → High @staff_member_requiredon endpoints exposing PII → verify minimum role
Step 6 — Files & misc
rg -n "request\.FILES|FileField|MEDIA" --type py
rg -n "pickle|eval\(|exec\(" --type py | head
- Uploads with original filenames served from MEDIA (executable content + Apache/nginx PHP exec) → Medium/High
picklein custom session/queue serialization → Criticaldjango-debug-toolbarin non-dev requirements → Medium- File responses built from request paths → traversal, High
Reporting
Severity table above; fixes are one-liners mostly (field allowlists, decorators, settings flags). Note ORM usage as a positive control. Dependency CVEs via ../dependency-vulns/SKILL.md.