.NET Security (ASP.NET Core / .NET Framework)
Step 0 — Detect
rg --files -g '*.csproj' -g '*.sln' -g 'packages.lock.json' -g 'packages.config' -g 'web.config' -g 'appsettings*.json' | head -10
rg -n "Microsoft.AspNetCore|System.Web|TargetFramework" -g '*.csproj'
Record: TargetFramework (netcoreapp/net5+ = ASP.NET Core; net4x = Web Forms/MVC5), template engine (Razor .cshtml, Blazor .razor, Web Forms .aspx), data access (EF Core, Dapper, ADO.NET). Check NuGet versions against ../cve-research/vuln-db/entries/.
Step 1 — Config & secrets
rg -n "Password=|password\"|machineKey|validationKey|UseDeveloperExceptionPage" -g 'appsettings*.json' -g '*.config' -g 'launchSettings.json' -g 'Program.cs' -g 'Startup.cs'
- Connection strings with embedded passwords (
"Password=...") → Critical in public repos, High otherwise <machineKey validationKey="<literal>" decryptionKey="<literal>"/>in web.config → Critical: leaked/hardcoded machine key → forged__VIEWSTATE→ pre-auth RCE (KEV-class exploit chains).AutoGenerateis the safe formUseDeveloperExceptionPage()without environment guard, orASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT: Developmentcommitted → High (stacktrace + path leak)
Step 2 — Authorization & antiforgery
rg -n "AllowAnonymous|Authorize|ValidateAntiForgeryToken|IgnoreAntiforgery" -g '*.cs'
rg -n "AllowAnyOrigin|AllowCredentials|AddCors" -g '*.cs'
[AllowAnonymous]on any action touching data, users, or admin ops → Critical (route-census discipline: disposition EVERY controller/action,../auth-review/SKILL.md§1)- Controller classes with role-sensitive ops and no
[Authorize]→ High (verify per-handler) - Cookie-auth POST actions without
[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]→ High (state change + CSRF) .AllowAnyOrigin()combined with.AllowCredentials()→ High (reflected-origin patterns)- Mass assignment: request-bound model assigning privilege fields (
user.Role = model.Role) → Critical (CWE-915; the Umbraco GHSL class)
Step 3 — SQL injection
rg -n "FromSqlRaw|SqlQueryRaw|ExecuteSqlRaw|\.Query\(|SqlCommand\(" -g '*.cs'
- EF Core
FromSqlRaw($"... {user}")/ExecuteSqlRaw($"...")with interpolated strings → Critical. Near-miss:FromSqlInterpolated($"... {user}")is SAFE — the API parameterizes C# interpolation by design - Dapper
conn.Query("... " + user)or$"... {user}"→ Critical;conn.Query(sql, new { id })→ safe - ADO.NET
new SqlCommand("... " + user)→ Critical;Parameters.Add/SqlParameter→ safe
Step 4 — XSS / templates
rg -n "Html\.Raw|MarkupString|<%=" -g '*.cshtml' -g '*.razor' -g '*.aspx' -g '*.ascx'
rg -n "Mode=\"PassThrough\"|Literal" -g '*.aspx' -g '*.ascx' -g '*.cs'
Census, don't sample: disposition every raw sink with privilege direction (../injection-flaws/SKILL.md XSS table).
- Razor
@Html.Raw(userContent)→ direction-triaged (plain@userauto-encodes ✓) - Blazor
@((MarkupString)userContent)→ direction-triaged - Web Forms
<%= user %>(raw) vs<%: user %>(encoded ✓);<asp:Literal Mode="PassThrough">→ unencoded
Step 5 — Deserialization & XML
rg -n "BinaryFormatter|ObjectStateFormatter|LosFormatter|NetDataContractSerializer|TypeNameHandling" -g '*.cs'
rg -n "DtdProcessing\.Parse|ProhibitDtd\s*=\s*false|XmlResolver" -g '*.cs'
BinaryFormatter.Deserialize/ObjectStateFormatter/LosFormatter/NetDataContractSerializeron request/external data → Critical (gadget chains)- Newtonsoft
TypeNameHandling.All/Auto/Objectsenabled on request bodies → Critical (polymorphic gadgets; same class as Jackson defaultTyping).TypeNameHandling.Nonesafe XmlSerializerover type-controlled input → High; XXE:DtdProcessing.ParseorXmlResolvernon-null on untrusted XML → High
Step 6 — Files, commands, redirects
rg -n "Path\.Combine|PhysicalFile\(" -g '*.cs' | rg -i "request|query|param|route|input"
rg -n "Process\.Start|ProcessStartInfo" -g '*.cs'
rg -n "Redirect\(" -g '*.cs' | rg -i "request|query|param|url"
Path.Combine(root, userInput)serving/reading files → traversal, HighProcess.Start/ProcessStartInfowith concatenated single-string args → High (argument injection;ArgumentListadditive form → safe)return Redirect(Request.Query["url"])unvalidated → open redirect, High;Url.IsLocalUrlallowlist check → safe
Reporting
Severity table above; fixes localized (bound params, @ encoding, [Authorize] per-route, AutoGenerate machineKey, JSON over BinaryFormatter). Cross-reference NuGet CVEs via ../cve-research/SKILL.md and dependency reachability via ../dependency-vulns/SKILL.md.