GraphQL Security
Step 0 — Detect the stack
rg --files -g '*.graphql' -g '*.graphqls' | head
rg -n "apollo-server|@apollo/server|graphql-yoga|express-graphql|mercurius|graphene|strawberry-graphql|ariadne|gqlgen|hasura" -g 'package.json' -g 'requirements*.txt' -g 'pyproject.toml' -g '*.go' -g 'docker-compose*.yml' | head
Record: server library + version, whether schema is code-first or SDL, where resolvers live, how auth reaches context (header token vs session cookie).
Step 1 — Server configuration checks
Per-framework config locations: references/frameworks.md. Checks and default
severities (adjust with context):
| Check | Finding if present/absent | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Introspection enabled in prod config | full attack-surface disclosure | Medium (High if admin/internal types visible) |
| GraphiQL / Playground / Apollo Sandbox reachable in prod | interactive query console for attackers | Medium |
| No query depth or complexity limit | nested-query DoS ({a{b{c{...}}}} bombs) |
High |
formatError returns originalError/stacktrace; Apollo includeStacktraceInErrorResponses/debug on |
internal error leakage | Medium |
| Field suggestions not masked in prod ("Did you mean..." hints) | schema oracle for attackers | Low/Medium |
Query batching enabled unbounded (shouldBatch, array bodies) |
auth-brute-force in one request | Medium |
Aliasing amplification — no cost/depth limit while the schema allows repeated aliases ({a: user(id:1) b: user(id:2) ...} x N in one query) |
batching DoS + brute-force vector bypassing rate limits | Medium/High |
Cookie-session auth + no CSRF protection (Apollo v4 csrfPrevention: false/absent) |
cross-site mutation execution | High |
| Mutations accepted over GET (express-graphql) | CSRF + logging of creds in URLs | High |
| No persisted operations / allowlist for public clients | arbitrary query crafting | Low (note) |
Step 2 — Resolver authorization (the #1 GraphQL bug source)
rg -n "Query:|Mutation:|Subscription:|resolve\(|fieldResolver|@auth|@hasRole|context\.user|ctx\.user" --type js --type ts --type py --type go | head -40
For every resolver returning or mutating objects:
- Field-level authz missing:
User.passwordHash,User.email, admin/internal types returned to unauthenticated callers → HIGH (CRITICAL for credentials/PII) - IDOR:
user(id)resolved without ownership/scope check → same class as REST IDOR, HIGH - Subscription auth:
subscribehandlers skipping auth → Medium/High - Trust of client args:
role,isAdmin,price,userIdtaken from args without server-side derivation → HIGH
Step 3 — Schema & input review
rg -n -i "admin|secret|token|impersonate|delete|export|password" -g '*.graphql' -g '*.graphqls' | head -30
- Sensitive-named types/mutations without a guard (directive or resolver check) → flag per Step 2
- Custom scalars without
validation(unboundedInt/Stringinto loops/DBLIMIT) → Medium - Login/reset/signup mutations without rate limiting (GraphQL bypasses REST limiters!) → High
- Default pagination
first/lastunbounded (allUsersreturns everything) → Medium
Reporting
Evidence = config lines + resolver code + schema lines. Fixes are one-liners in
most frameworks — give the exact snippet from references/frameworks.md
(introspection: false, validationRules: [depthLimit(10)], csrfPrevention: true,
masked formatError). Note positives (allowlists, persisted queries, field-level directives).