Rails Security
Step 0 — Detect
rg -n "^\s*gem ['\"]rails" -g 'Gemfile'
ls app/controllers config 2>/dev/null
Record Rails version (Gemfile.lock), auth stack (Devise/etc.), deployment hints.
Step 1 — SQL injection
rg -n "where\([\"'].*#\{|order\(params|find_by_sql|group\(params|pluck\(params|select\(params" app/
where("name = '#{params[:name]}'")→ Criticalorder(params[:sort])/pluck(params[:col])— column names can't be bound → High (allowlist required)- Safe counterparts:
where(name: params[:name]),where("name = ?", ...)→ note as positives
Step 2 — Mass assignment
rg -n "permit!|params\[:user\]$|\.update_attributes" app/
params.permit!(or raw params hash) intonew/updateon models with role columns (admin,role,credits) → Critical- Narrow
permit(:name, :email)→ safe; check listed columns for role leakage
Step 3 — XSS
rg -n "<%=\s*raw\b|\.html_safe|<%==" app/ app/views/
raw/.html_safe/<%==on user-derived values → direction-triaged (ERB<%= %>escapes by default)
Census, don't sample: disposition every hit. Severity by privilege direction per ../injection-flaws/SKILL.md (XSS table) — raw @user.bio where the bio is student-authored and the view is staff-facing = Critical.
Step 4 — CSRF & authz
rg -n "protect_from_forgery" app/controllers/application_controller.rb
rg -n "skip_before_action :verify_authenticity|skip_forgery_protection" app/
rg -n "before_action :authenticate|before_action :authorize" app/controllers/ | head
- No
protect_from_forgeryin ApplicationController (and Rails new-app default absent in API mode with cookie sessions) → High skip_before_action :verify_authenticity_tokenon non-webhook controllers → High- Controllers with mutations but no
authenticate_*!before_action → High - Devise
current_userabsent +Model.find(params[:id])in show/edit → IDOR, High
Step 5 — Files, redirects, dispatch
rg -n "send_file|File\.read|IO\.foreach|File\.open" app/
rg -n "redirect_to\s+(params|request\.referer)" app/
rg -n "\bsend\(|public_send\(" app/ | rg "params" | head
send_file(params[:path])→ traversal, Highrender file: params[:path]→ arbitrary file read (CVE-2019-5418 pattern — Action View reads and returns the file); fixed rails versions still make this a design bug → Highrender file:with a first-party literal (Rails.root.join(...)) is fineredirect_to(params[:return_to])→ open redirect (phishing/SSRF in OAuth flows), Medium/Highsend(params[:method])→ arbitrary method dispatch, High
Step 6 — Deserialization & config
rg -n "Marshal\.load|Oj\.load|YAML\.load\(" app/ config/
rg -n "secret_key_base" config/ -g '!*.lock' | head
rg -n "force_ssl" config/environments/
Marshal.load/Oj.load(mode: :object)/YAML.load(non-safe) on external data → Criticalsecret_key_basecommitted in secrets.yml/initializers → Critical (session forgery)config.force_ssl = falsein production.rb → Medium
Reporting
Severity table above; fixes are idiomatic one-liners (where(hash:), permit lists, redirect_to allowlist). Note strong-params/ORM positives. Dependency CVEs via ../dependency-vulns/SKILL.md.