Screen DeFi interactions against sanctioned protocols
Designations have landed on protocols and on individual addresses inside them. The control point is the address, but the risk surface is any path that routes value through a designated contract, including relayers and aggregators that hide the hop.
Procedure
Resolve the transaction's full call path, not just its top-level
to. An aggregator or router can carry a designated pool address in calldata while the outer target looks clean.cast tx $HASH --rpc-url $RPC --json | jq -r '.to, .input' cast calldata-decode "swapExactTokensForTokens(uint256,uint256,address[],address,uint256)" \ 0x38ed1739...Extract every address the call touches — the router, each pool, the recipient, any relayer — and screen each one, not the protocol name:
for a in $(cast tx $HASH --rpc-url $RPC --json | jq -r '.to'); do grep -iq "${a#0x}" sdn.csv && echo "HIT $a" doneCheck inbound as well as outbound. Value withdrawn from a designated pool is as reportable as value sent in, and a faucet-style claim can pull from a designated contract.
Distinguish the protocol from the address. A designated individual address inside an otherwise unsanctioned protocol does not sanction the whole protocol, and vice versa; record which one you actually matched.
For integrations, pin the allow-list of contracts the app will route through, so a new aggregator cannot silently introduce a designated hop:
grep -v '^#' allowlist.txt | wc -l # every entry reviewed and datedLog the screen per transaction with the addresses checked and the list digest, and block on a hit before broadcast.
Pitfalls
- Blocking by protocol name in a UI string while the contract address is a clone that is not designated — or the reverse, letting a designated address through because the name looked familiar.
- Screening only the sender's wallet and missing the recipient or the pool in calldata.
- Assuming a front-end block is a compliance control; direct contract calls and private transactions bypass the UI entirely. The control is at the transaction-relay boundary you own.
- Treating "the protocol was delisted" as universal. Delisting can be jurisdiction-specific and does not retroactively clear historical flows.
- Ignoring gas relayers and paymasters, which can be the designated party even when the user is not.
Verification
for a in $(cat touched-addresses.txt); do grep -iq "${a#0x}" sdn.csv || echo "clear $a"; done
Every touched address must appear either as a HIT or as a clear line; an address missing from the list entirely means the extraction missed a hop.
Report the touched addresses with per-address results, the list digest, and the blocking action taken. Whether a particular interaction is prohibited is a legal question that requires qualified counsel's determination given the current designation and any licence.