Spot drainer and signature-phishing requests
The most common wallet drain is not a contract exploit: it is a signature the user is talked
into giving. Decode what is actually being requested before approving anything, and refuse
blind-signing outright.
Procedure
Classify the request before signing:
eth_sign / personal_sign over opaque bytes: the wallet shows only a hex blob. This is
the highest-risk class — refuse unless you can decode the payload to plain, non-authorising
text. A legitimate login (SIWE) shows a readable message with a Nonce and domain.
eth_signTypedData_v4 (EIP-712): decode the domain and message; check domain.chainId,
domain.verifyingContract, and every field for an approval.
- A transaction: decode with
cast calldata-decode (see decode-calldata-and-events).
For EIP-712, inspect the spender/operator and amount. An approval-style message names a
spender you have never seen, or grants uint256 max, or has a far-future deadline.
# In a wallet, read the "spender"/"operator"/"amount"/"deadline" fields directly.
# Permit2 (0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3) requests can move any approved token.
For a transaction, print the target and decoded call:
cast tx $HASH --rpc-url $RPC --json | jq -r '.to, .input' | head
cast calldata-decode "setApprovalForAll(address,bool)" 0xa22cb465...
setApprovalForAll(0xATTACKER, true) hands over your entire NFT collection.
Check existing allowances before signing more. Revoke unknown operators from a wallet you
trust, not from the site that asked.
curl -s "https://api.etherscan.io/v2/api?chainid=1&module=account&action=tokennfttx\
&address=$YOU&apikey=$ETHERSCAN_API_KEY" | jq -r '.result[0]'
- Hard refuses:
eth_sign on raw hashes, any signature over a message you cannot read, approvals
to addresses not in the project's verified docs, and any request from a link in a DM.
Pitfalls
- EIP-712 payloads look legitimate — the domain name can be spoofed to mimic a real project, and
the
verifyingContract may be an attacker's contract that merely shares the name.
- "Sign to verify you are human / to claim an airdrop" is the standard drainer pretext; signing
a permit grants spend rights, it does not prove identity.
- Permit vs Permit2 have different structures; a Permit2
permitTransferFrom lets the attacker
move tokens you previously approved to the Permit2 contract.
- Revoke sites can themselves be malicious. Verify the revoke contract address before interacting.
- A signature that grants a session key (e.g. a 4337 session) can be replayed for its whole
validity window; treat validity windows as spend limits.
- Hardware wallets show the message verbatim — if the text is a blob, that is the sign to stop.
Verification
cast calldata-decode "setApprovalForAll(address,bool)" $INPUT
# prints (operator, approved); approved==true for an unknown operator is a drainer
Report the request type (personal_sign / EIP-712 / transaction), the spender or operator address,
the amount and expiry, and whether you decoded it to a readable intent. If it is eth_sign or an
unknown spender, report "refuse" with the reason.
1---2name: spot-drainer-signature-phishing3description: Use when a wallet, site or dapp asks you to sign a message or transaction and you must decide whether it is a legitimate request or a drainer trying to take assets.4metadata:5 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/jiayaoqijia/spot-drainer-signature-phishing6---78# Spot drainer and signature-phishing requests910The most common wallet drain is not a contract exploit: it is a signature the user is talked11into giving. Decode what is actually being requested before approving anything, and refuse12blind-signing outright.1314## Procedure15161. Classify the request before signing:1718 - `eth_sign` / `personal_sign` over opaque bytes: the wallet shows only a hex blob. This is19 the highest-risk class — refuse unless you can decode the payload to plain, non-authorising20 text. A legitimate login (SIWE) shows a readable message with a `Nonce` and `domain`.21 - `eth_signTypedData_v4` (EIP-712): decode the domain and message; check `domain.chainId`,22 `domain.verifyingContract`, and every field for an approval.23 - A transaction: decode with `cast calldata-decode` (see `decode-calldata-and-events`).24252. For EIP-712, inspect the spender/operator and amount. An approval-style message names a26 `spender` you have never seen, or grants `uint256` max, or has a far-future `deadline`.2728 # In a wallet, read the "spender"/"operator"/"amount"/"deadline" fields directly.29 # Permit2 (0x000000000022D473030F116dDEE9F6B43aC78BA3) requests can move any approved token.30313. For a transaction, print the target and decoded call:3233 cast tx $HASH --rpc-url $RPC --json | jq -r '.to, .input' | head34 cast calldata-decode "setApprovalForAll(address,bool)" 0xa22cb465...3536 `setApprovalForAll(0xATTACKER, true)` hands over your entire NFT collection.37384. Check existing allowances before signing more. Revoke unknown operators from a wallet you39 trust, not from the site that asked.4041 curl -s "https://api.etherscan.io/v2/api?chainid=1&module=account&action=tokennfttx\42&address=$YOU&apikey=$ETHERSCAN_API_KEY" | jq -r '.result[0]'43445. Hard refuses: `eth_sign` on raw hashes, any signature over a message you cannot read, approvals45 to addresses not in the project's verified docs, and any request from a link in a DM.4647## Pitfalls4849- EIP-712 payloads look legitimate — the domain name can be spoofed to mimic a real project, and50 the `verifyingContract` may be an attacker's contract that merely shares the name.51- "Sign to verify you are human / to claim an airdrop" is the standard drainer pretext; signing52 a permit grants spend rights, it does not prove identity.53- Permit vs Permit2 have different structures; a Permit2 `permitTransferFrom` lets the attacker54 move tokens you previously approved to the Permit2 contract.55- Revoke sites can themselves be malicious. Verify the revoke contract address before interacting.56- A signature that grants a session key (e.g. a 4337 session) can be replayed for its whole57 validity window; treat validity windows as spend limits.58- Hardware wallets show the message verbatim — if the text is a blob, that is the sign to stop.5960## Verification6162 cast calldata-decode "setApprovalForAll(address,bool)" $INPUT63 # prints (operator, approved); approved==true for an unknown operator is a drainer6465Report the request type (personal_sign / EIP-712 / transaction), the spender or operator address,66the amount and expiry, and whether you decoded it to a readable intent. If it is `eth_sign` or an67unknown spender, report "refuse" with the reason.