Veto a malicious proposal
The window between voting and execution exists so a harmful payload can be stopped. Cancel it from the governance path, not by front-running, and publish the reason so the veto is not itself an act of censorship.
Procedure
- Decode every calldata in the queued proposal and compare to the stated intent:
cast calldata-decode "<sig>" <data>for each entry. Look for transfers to an unknown address,upgradeToon the treasury proxy,grantRoleto a fresh key, or an unlimitedapprove. - Confirm the proposal is still queued and not executed:
cast call $GOV "state(uint256)(uint8)" $ID --rpc-url $RPC(5 = Queued is the last cancellable state). - Cancel through the governor if you are the proposer:
cast send $GOV "cancel(address[],uint256[],bytes[],bytes32)" $TARGETS $VALUES $CALLDATAS $DESC_HASH --rpc-url $RPC --private-key $KEY - If you are not the proposer, use the guardian veto if the governor exposes one, or
cancelthe timelock operation withCANCELLER_ROLE:cast send $TIMELOCK "cancel(bytes32)" $OP_ID --rpc-url $RPC --private-key $KEY - Verify the operation can no longer execute:
isOperationPending(id)returns false and the id is marked done/cancelled. - Publish the veto with the decoded payload diff and the deployment-wide impact, then file a postmortem.
Pitfalls
- Waiting for the vote to conclude before reviewing calldata; the review must happen before the snapshot, and again at queue time.
- Cancelling without decoding: a veto based on a social-media rumour erodes the emergency power's legitimacy.
- Assuming
cancelis available to anyone; on many governors only the proposer or guardian can cancel, and the wrong caller reverts. - Front-running an execute with a cancel transaction and hoping to win the block; route through the guardian path instead of racing.
- Missing a second proposal carrying the same payload; compare the calldata hash across all pending ids, not just the flagged one.
- Cancelling a benign proposal and calling it malicious; verify the diff against the intent before acting.
Verification
cast call $GOV "state(uint256)(uint8)" $ID --rpc-url $RPC && cast call $TIMELOCK "isOperationPending(bytes32)(bool)" $OP_ID --rpc-url $RPC
# state 2 (Canceled) and isOperationPending false prove the payload cannot run
Report the decoded malicious calldata, the cancel transaction hash, and the post-cancel state, with the commands behind them.