Prerequisites
- Target system, dependencies and environment configured.
Usage
Purpose
Phones hold as much evidence as any computer — messages, location, app activity, photos, communications — but getting to it is far harder. Modern phones are encrypted by default, locked, and controlled by the OS, so acquisition is the central challenge in a way it isn't for a PC. This skill covers the realities of mobile forensics: the acquisition levels, what evidence phones hold, and the iOS/Android specifics, so you know what's obtainable and how.
When to use it
Investigations where a phone is evidence — many modern cases, since so much activity happens on mobile. It differs enough from computer forensics (acquisition-dominated, heavily tool-dependent, encryption-limited) that it's worth understanding as its own discipline.
The acquisition challenge
Unlike a PC where you image the disk, phone acquisition is constrained by encryption, the lock, and OS restrictions — and comes in levels of completeness:
- Manual — scrolling through the phone and photographing what's visible. Last resort; limited and hard to defend.
- Logical — extracting data the device/backup API exposes (contacts, messages, call logs, some app data). Broadly available, but incomplete — you get what the API gives.
- File system — access to the filesystem, more app data and databases; needs more privileged access.
- Physical — a full bit-for-bit image; the most complete, but often impossible on modern encrypted devices without specialised tooling or exploits.
Modern encryption means physical/full access frequently isn't achievable without commercial tools (Cellebrite, GrayKey) or a supported exploit, and even then it's device/OS-version dependent.
Procedure
- Preserve the device state — isolate it from networks. A connected phone can be remotely wiped or altered; put it in a Faraday bag / airplane mode immediately to prevent remote commands and preserve evidence. Keep it charged (a dead phone may re-lock/re-encrypt).
- Determine what acquisition is possible for this exact device and OS version — this dominates everything. Lock state (is it unlocked/known passcode?), OS version, and available tooling decide whether you get logical, file-system, or physical.
- Acquire at the highest level achievable, using validated tools, and document the method (mobile evidence is heavily tool-mediated, so the tool and its version are part of the record).
- Analyse the extracted data — where the evidence is:
- Communications: SMS/iMessage, and third-party messengers (WhatsApp, Signal, etc.) stored in app databases (often SQLite).
- Location: GPS in photos, app location history, cell/Wi-Fi records.
- App activity, browser history, photos/media, call logs, and account data.
- Handle iOS vs Android differences — iOS is more locked-down with strong encryption (acquisition often via backups or specialised tools); Android is fragmented (many vendors/versions), so techniques vary by device. Know which you're dealing with.
- Consider cloud backups — much phone data syncs to iCloud/Google, which may be obtainable (with legal authority) and can fill gaps when the device itself is inaccessible.
- Maintain chain of custody and legal authority — mobile evidence is highly personal and privacy-sensitive; ensure proper authorisation, and preserve/hash extractions as evidence.
Cheatsheet
acquisition DOMINATES mobile forensics (encryption + lock + OS restrictions)
levels (least -> most complete)
manual photograph the screen (last resort)
logical API/backup data (contacts, msgs, calls) — common, incomplete
file system filesystem + app DBs (needs privileged access)
physical full bit-for-bit image — often impossible on modern encrypted devices
without commercial tools (Cellebrite/GrayKey) or an exploit
FIRST: isolate from networks (Faraday/airplane) -> stop remote wipe; keep charged
then: determine what's POSSIBLE for this exact device+OS+lock state -> acquire highest
document the tool + version (evidence is tool-mediated)
evidence: messages (SMS + app SQLite: WhatsApp/Signal...), location (GPS/history),
app activity, browser, media, call logs, accounts
iOS = locked/encrypted (backups/specialised tools) | Android = fragmented (varies)
cloud backups (iCloud/Google) may fill gaps — with legal authority
chain of custody + authorisation (highly privacy-sensitive)
Reading the situation
- A locked, modern, encrypted device with no passcode = acquisition may be limited to logical or blocked entirely; the achievable level dictates the whole investigation. This constraint is the defining reality of mobile forensics.
- An unlocked device or known passcode = far more is obtainable (file-system/physical via tools); the lock state is the single biggest factor.
- Third-party messenger databases recovered = the substantive evidence in many cases — chats, media, contacts in app SQLite stores.
- Location artefacts (photo GPS, app history) = often decisive for placing a person/device; a rich source unique to mobile.
- A device that got network access before isolation = risk of remote wipe/alteration; isolating first is why the evidence survived (or a warning if it didn't).
- Data only in cloud backup = when the device is inaccessible, iCloud/Google backups (with legal authority) may be the path — the account, not just the device.
Pitfalls
- Not isolating the device immediately. A networked phone can be remotely wiped or altered, destroying evidence. Faraday bag / airplane mode first, always.
- Assuming you can "just image it". Modern encryption often makes full physical acquisition impossible without specialised tools/exploits; set expectations by what's actually achievable for that device and OS.
- Letting it power down / re-lock. A dead or rebooted phone may re-encrypt and become harder to access; keep it charged and in its current state.
- Ignoring the iOS/Android divergence. They differ fundamentally in acquisition; applying one's techniques to the other fails.
- Overlooking cloud backups. When the device won't yield, the synced account may — with proper legal authority.
- Neglecting authorisation/privacy. Phones are intensely personal; proper legal authority and chain of custody are non-negotiable.
References
- NIST SP 800-101 (Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics)
- Cellebrite / GrayKey / mobile-forensics tool documentation
- SANS mobile forensics (FOR585)
- The disk-imaging-and-hashing, chain-of-custody, and cloud-forensics skills
Inputs
- Relevant source code, logs, network traces, or system specifications.
Outputs
- Analysis findings, security audit report, or generated code artifacts.
1---2name: mobile-forensics3description: Use when investigating a smartphone — the acquisition challenges, app data, and artefacts unique to iOS and Android, where the evidence is locked and encrypted differently than a PC.4---5678## Prerequisites9- Target system, dependencies and environment configured.1011## Usage12### Purpose1314Phones hold as much evidence as any computer — messages, location, app activity, photos, communications — but getting to it is far harder. Modern phones are encrypted by default, locked, and controlled by the OS, so acquisition is the central challenge in a way it isn't for a PC. This skill covers the realities of mobile forensics: the acquisition levels, what evidence phones hold, and the iOS/Android specifics, so you know what's obtainable and how.1516### When to use it1718Investigations where a phone is evidence — many modern cases, since so much activity happens on mobile. It differs enough from computer forensics (acquisition-dominated, heavily tool-dependent, encryption-limited) that it's worth understanding as its own discipline.1920### The acquisition challenge2122Unlike a PC where you image the disk, phone acquisition is constrained by encryption, the lock, and OS restrictions — and comes in levels of completeness:2324- **Manual** — scrolling through the phone and photographing what's visible. Last resort; limited and hard to defend.25- **Logical** — extracting data the device/backup API exposes (contacts, messages, call logs, some app data). Broadly available, but incomplete — you get what the API gives.26- **File system** — access to the filesystem, more app data and databases; needs more privileged access.27- **Physical** — a full bit-for-bit image; the most complete, but often impossible on modern encrypted devices without specialised tooling or exploits.2829Modern encryption means physical/full access frequently isn't achievable without commercial tools (Cellebrite, GrayKey) or a supported exploit, and even then it's device/OS-version dependent.3031### Procedure32331. **Preserve the device state — isolate it from networks.** A connected phone can be remotely wiped or altered; put it in a Faraday bag / airplane mode immediately to prevent remote commands and preserve evidence. Keep it charged (a dead phone may re-lock/re-encrypt).342. **Determine what acquisition is possible** for this exact device and OS version — this dominates everything. Lock state (is it unlocked/known passcode?), OS version, and available tooling decide whether you get logical, file-system, or physical.353. **Acquire at the highest level achievable**, using validated tools, and document the method (mobile evidence is heavily tool-mediated, so the tool and its version are part of the record).364. **Analyse the extracted data — where the evidence is:**37 - **Communications:** SMS/iMessage, and third-party messengers (WhatsApp, Signal, etc.) stored in app databases (often SQLite).38 - **Location:** GPS in photos, app location history, cell/Wi-Fi records.39 - **App activity, browser history, photos/media, call logs, and account data.**405. **Handle iOS vs Android differences** — iOS is more locked-down with strong encryption (acquisition often via backups or specialised tools); Android is fragmented (many vendors/versions), so techniques vary by device. Know which you're dealing with.416. **Consider cloud backups** — much phone data syncs to iCloud/Google, which may be obtainable (with legal authority) and can fill gaps when the device itself is inaccessible.427. **Maintain chain of custody and legal authority** — mobile evidence is highly personal and privacy-sensitive; ensure proper authorisation, and preserve/hash extractions as evidence.4344### Cheatsheet4546```47acquisition DOMINATES mobile forensics (encryption + lock + OS restrictions)4849levels (least -> most complete)50 manual photograph the screen (last resort)51 logical API/backup data (contacts, msgs, calls) — common, incomplete52 file system filesystem + app DBs (needs privileged access)53 physical full bit-for-bit image — often impossible on modern encrypted devices54 without commercial tools (Cellebrite/GrayKey) or an exploit5556FIRST: isolate from networks (Faraday/airplane) -> stop remote wipe; keep charged57then: determine what's POSSIBLE for this exact device+OS+lock state -> acquire highest58 document the tool + version (evidence is tool-mediated)5960evidence: messages (SMS + app SQLite: WhatsApp/Signal...), location (GPS/history),61 app activity, browser, media, call logs, accounts62iOS = locked/encrypted (backups/specialised tools) | Android = fragmented (varies)63cloud backups (iCloud/Google) may fill gaps — with legal authority64chain of custody + authorisation (highly privacy-sensitive)65```6667### Reading the situation6869- **A locked, modern, encrypted device with no passcode** = acquisition may be limited to logical or blocked entirely; the achievable level dictates the whole investigation. This constraint is the defining reality of mobile forensics.70- **An unlocked device or known passcode** = far more is obtainable (file-system/physical via tools); the lock state is the single biggest factor.71- **Third-party messenger databases recovered** = the substantive evidence in many cases — chats, media, contacts in app SQLite stores.72- **Location artefacts** (photo GPS, app history) = often decisive for placing a person/device; a rich source unique to mobile.73- **A device that got network access before isolation** = risk of remote wipe/alteration; isolating first is why the evidence survived (or a warning if it didn't).74- **Data only in cloud backup** = when the device is inaccessible, iCloud/Google backups (with legal authority) may be the path — the account, not just the device.7576### Pitfalls7778- **Not isolating the device immediately.** A networked phone can be remotely wiped or altered, destroying evidence. Faraday bag / airplane mode first, always.79- **Assuming you can "just image it".** Modern encryption often makes full physical acquisition impossible without specialised tools/exploits; set expectations by what's actually achievable for that device and OS.80- **Letting it power down / re-lock.** A dead or rebooted phone may re-encrypt and become harder to access; keep it charged and in its current state.81- **Ignoring the iOS/Android divergence.** They differ fundamentally in acquisition; applying one's techniques to the other fails.82- **Overlooking cloud backups.** When the device won't yield, the synced account may — with proper legal authority.83- **Neglecting authorisation/privacy.** Phones are intensely personal; proper legal authority and chain of custody are non-negotiable.8485### References8687- NIST SP 800-101 (Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics)88- Cellebrite / GrayKey / mobile-forensics tool documentation89- SANS mobile forensics (FOR585)90- The disk-imaging-and-hashing, chain-of-custody, and cloud-forensics skills9192## Inputs93- Relevant source code, logs, network traces, or system specifications.9495## Outputs96- Analysis findings, security audit report, or generated code artifacts.