FSI Compliance Checker
Map a concrete change (code diff, architecture design, IaC, pipeline config) to the specific controls it touches in financial services compliance frameworks, and report gaps with actionable remediation. This is engineering-level compliance triage — it helps teams catch violations before audit, but it does not replace a qualified assessor (QSA) or the institution's compliance function. Say so in every report.
Framework Selection
Load only the reference file(s) the engagement needs:
| Situation |
Load |
| Payment card data is stored, processed, or transmitted (PAN, CVV, track data) |
references/pci-dss.md |
| Singapore-regulated financial institution (bank, insurer, capital markets, major payment institution) |
references/mas-trm.md |
| Both apply (e.g. Singapore bank handling cards) |
Both files |
| Other jurisdictions/frameworks (SOX, GDPR, HKMA, APRA) |
State that they are out of scope of this skill's bundled references; offer general secure-engineering review instead |
If the user hasn't said which applies, ask one question: what data does the change touch, and is the institution Singapore-regulated?
Review Process
- Scope the change. Identify what the diff/design actually touches: data elements (card data? customer PII? credentials?), trust boundaries, environments (production? DR?), and third parties.
- Select applicable controls from the loaded reference file(s) — typically 5-15 controls, not the whole framework. List what you ruled out and why (one line each) so the scoping is auditable.
- Assess each applicable control against the change:
Compliant / Gap / Needs evidence (can't tell from the artifact — name the evidence required).
- Write findings using the report format below. Every Gap gets: the control ID, what's wrong in this specific change, concrete remediation, and severity (Critical = violation involving live regulated data; High = control absent; Medium = control partial/undocumented).
- Recommend story conversion: offer to turn findings into backlog items (via the security-story-writing skill if available) with the control ID in each story for traceability.
Report Format
# Compliance Review: [change title]
**Frameworks:** [PCI-DSS v4.0 / MAS TRM 2021] · **Date:** [YYYY-MM-DD]
**Scope:** [what was reviewed: files, design doc, pipeline]
> Engineering triage only — not a substitute for QSA assessment or the compliance function.
## Data & Boundary Analysis
- Data elements touched: [e.g. PAN (masked), customer NRIC, none]
- Environments/boundaries: [e.g. CDE-adjacent service, public API]
## Findings
| # | Control | Status | Severity | Finding | Remediation |
|---|---------|--------|----------|---------|-------------|
| 1 | [PCI 3.5.1] | Gap | Critical | [specific issue in this change] | [specific fix] |
## Ruled Out (not applicable)
- [Control area] — [one-line reason]
## Evidence Needed
- [Control]: [what artifact would demonstrate compliance]
Common FSI Engineering Triggers
Changes that almost always have compliance impact — check these proactively when they appear in a diff:
- Logging statements near payment or authentication flows (PAN/CVV must never be logged; MAS TRM requires security event logging — both directions matter)
- New data stores or caches receiving customer or card data (encryption at rest, retention, residency)
- Authentication/session changes (MFA requirements, session timeout, credential storage)
- New third-party SDKs or API integrations (outsourcing/vendor controls, data flows leaving the boundary)
- Infrastructure changes touching network segmentation, security groups, or public exposure
- CI/CD changes that alter who/what can deploy to production (change management, segregation of duties)
Guidelines
- Cite control IDs precisely (e.g. "PCI-DSS 8.3.6", "MAS TRM 9.1.1") so findings are traceable in audit tooling; the reference files carry the ID schemes.
- Severity discipline: don't inflate. A missing comment is not a Critical; unencrypted PAN at rest is.
- When the change is compliant, say so affirmatively per control — "no findings" plus the checked-control list is a useful audit artifact.
- Never output real card numbers, even as examples; use the standard test PANs (e.g. 4111 1111 1111 1111) when illustrating.
Common Rationalizations
| Rationalization |
Reality |
| "It's just a dev environment, PCI doesn't apply there" |
If the dev environment touches real card data or mirrors production CDE boundaries, it is in scope. Scope exclusions must be explicit in the compliance program. |
| "We're not storing PAN, so we're compliant" |
Transmission of PAN (in memory, over the wire) is still regulated. Logging, caching, or error messages containing card data are all violations. |
| "We use a third-party payment processor, so card data never touches us" |
Verify this at the architectural level. Many integrations receive raw PAN at some point (webhook payloads, redirect back URLs, iframe parent-communication). |
| "The compliance team will catch this later" |
The compliance team reviews policy. Engineering changes are invisible to them unless surfaced. This review is the surface. |
| "It's just a small change, compliance review is overkill" |
Compliance impact is about the data touched, not the diff size. A one-line logging change can be a Critical PCI violation. |
| "We handle PII, so PCI doesn't apply" |
PII regulations (GDPR, PDPA) are separate from PCI-DSS. Card data has its own framework regardless of PII compliance. |
| "The other frameworks aren't in the reference files, so I can ignore compliance entirely" |
State which frameworks are out of scope and why. Don't silently skip — silence looks like an oversight. |
Verification
1---2name: fsi-compliance-checker3description: >-4 Use this skill when mapping code, architecture, or infrastructure changes to5 specific control IDs in financial services compliance frameworks — PCI-DSS6 v4.0 for payment card data and MAS TRM for Singapore-regulated institutions —7 producing an audit-traceable findings report with per-control remediation. Use8 this instead of a general security review whenever a compliance framework9 (PCI-DSS, MAS TRM), regulator, audit, or cardholder-data scope is mentioned,10 even if the request is phrased as a code review or a yes/no compliance11 question. Triggers on: "PCI-DSS check", "MAS TRM", "is this compliant",12 "compliance review", "audit this change for banking regulations", "does13 logging this violate PCI", "cardholder data handling review".14category: compliance-legal15metadata:16 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/jpeetz/fsi-compliance-checker17---1819# FSI Compliance Checker2021Map a concrete change (code diff, architecture design, IaC, pipeline config) to the specific controls it touches in financial services compliance frameworks, and report gaps with actionable remediation. This is engineering-level compliance triage — it helps teams catch violations before audit, but it does not replace a qualified assessor (QSA) or the institution's compliance function. Say so in every report.2223## Framework Selection2425Load only the reference file(s) the engagement needs:2627| Situation | Load |28|-----------|------|29| Payment card data is stored, processed, or transmitted (PAN, CVV, track data) | [references/pci-dss.md](references/pci-dss.md) |30| Singapore-regulated financial institution (bank, insurer, capital markets, major payment institution) | [references/mas-trm.md](references/mas-trm.md) |31| Both apply (e.g. Singapore bank handling cards) | Both files |32| Other jurisdictions/frameworks (SOX, GDPR, HKMA, APRA) | State that they are out of scope of this skill's bundled references; offer general secure-engineering review instead |3334If the user hasn't said which applies, ask one question: what data does the change touch, and is the institution Singapore-regulated?3536## Review Process37381. **Scope the change.** Identify what the diff/design actually touches: data elements (card data? customer PII? credentials?), trust boundaries, environments (production? DR?), and third parties.392. **Select applicable controls** from the loaded reference file(s) — typically 5-15 controls, not the whole framework. List what you ruled out and why (one line each) so the scoping is auditable.403. **Assess each applicable control** against the change: `Compliant` / `Gap` / `Needs evidence` (can't tell from the artifact — name the evidence required).414. **Write findings** using the report format below. Every Gap gets: the control ID, what's wrong in this specific change, concrete remediation, and severity (Critical = violation involving live regulated data; High = control absent; Medium = control partial/undocumented).425. **Recommend story conversion**: offer to turn findings into backlog items (via the security-story-writing skill if available) with the control ID in each story for traceability.4344## Report Format4546```markdown47# Compliance Review: [change title]48**Frameworks:** [PCI-DSS v4.0 / MAS TRM 2021] · **Date:** [YYYY-MM-DD]49**Scope:** [what was reviewed: files, design doc, pipeline]50> Engineering triage only — not a substitute for QSA assessment or the compliance function.5152## Data & Boundary Analysis53- Data elements touched: [e.g. PAN (masked), customer NRIC, none]54- Environments/boundaries: [e.g. CDE-adjacent service, public API]5556## Findings57| # | Control | Status | Severity | Finding | Remediation |58|---|---------|--------|----------|---------|-------------|59| 1 | [PCI 3.5.1] | Gap | Critical | [specific issue in this change] | [specific fix] |6061## Ruled Out (not applicable)62- [Control area] — [one-line reason]6364## Evidence Needed65- [Control]: [what artifact would demonstrate compliance]66```6768## Common FSI Engineering Triggers6970Changes that almost always have compliance impact — check these proactively when they appear in a diff:7172- Logging statements near payment or authentication flows (PAN/CVV must never be logged; MAS TRM requires security event logging — both directions matter)73- New data stores or caches receiving customer or card data (encryption at rest, retention, residency)74- Authentication/session changes (MFA requirements, session timeout, credential storage)75- New third-party SDKs or API integrations (outsourcing/vendor controls, data flows leaving the boundary)76- Infrastructure changes touching network segmentation, security groups, or public exposure77- CI/CD changes that alter who/what can deploy to production (change management, segregation of duties)7879## Guidelines8081- Cite control IDs precisely (e.g. "PCI-DSS 8.3.6", "MAS TRM 9.1.1") so findings are traceable in audit tooling; the reference files carry the ID schemes.82- Severity discipline: don't inflate. A missing comment is not a Critical; unencrypted PAN at rest is.83- When the change is compliant, say so affirmatively per control — "no findings" plus the checked-control list is a useful audit artifact.84- Never output real card numbers, even as examples; use the standard test PANs (e.g. 4111 1111 1111 1111) when illustrating.8586## Common Rationalizations8788| Rationalization | Reality |89|----------------|---------|90| "It's just a dev environment, PCI doesn't apply there" | If the dev environment touches real card data or mirrors production CDE boundaries, it is in scope. Scope exclusions must be explicit in the compliance program. |91| "We're not storing PAN, so we're compliant" | Transmission of PAN (in memory, over the wire) is still regulated. Logging, caching, or error messages containing card data are all violations. |92| "We use a third-party payment processor, so card data never touches us" | Verify this at the architectural level. Many integrations receive raw PAN at some point (webhook payloads, redirect back URLs, iframe parent-communication). |93| "The compliance team will catch this later" | The compliance team reviews policy. Engineering changes are invisible to them unless surfaced. This review is the surface. |94| "It's just a small change, compliance review is overkill" | Compliance impact is about the data touched, not the diff size. A one-line logging change can be a Critical PCI violation. |95| "We handle PII, so PCI doesn't apply" | PII regulations (GDPR, PDPA) are separate from PCI-DSS. Card data has its own framework regardless of PII compliance. |96| "The other frameworks aren't in the reference files, so I can ignore compliance entirely" | State which frameworks are out of scope and why. Don't silently skip — silence looks like an oversight. |9798## Verification99100- [ ] Did you scope the data elements before selecting controls?101- [ ] Is every finding mapped to a specific control ID?102- [ ] Does each finding include a concrete remediation, not a general principle?103- [ ] Is the QSA disclaimer present in the report?104- [ ] Are ruled-out controls listed with reasons (not silently skipped)?105- [ ] Did you flag any evidence gaps separately from compliance findings?106- [ ] Did you offer to convert findings into backlog stories?