Find secrets that should never be in source control, then advise on remediation. Default scope: the staged diff if there is one, otherwise the working tree. Scan history or a specific path only when asked.
What to look for
- Known credential patterns: cloud keys (AWS
AKIA…, GCP, Azure), provider API tokens (Stripe, GitHub ghp_…, Slack, OpenAI, etc.), OAuth client secrets, JWTs.
- Private keys & certs:
-----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY----- blocks, .pem / .p12 / keystore contents.
- Credentials in URLs/config: connection strings and URLs with embedded passwords (
scheme://user:pass@host), basic-auth headers.
- Generic secrets: assignments to names like
password, secret, token, api_key, access_key, client_secret, plus high-entropy strings that look like keys.
- Risky files committed by mistake:
.env, credential JSON, *.key, and their presence in history.
Reduce false positives
Distinguish real secrets from example/placeholder values (xxxxx, your-key-here, changeme), test fixtures, public keys, and sample docs. When genuinely unsure, label a finding "review" rather than asserting a leak, but err toward reporting over silence.
Report and remediate
For each finding give: the file and line, the kind of secret, and a confidence (high / review). Then recommend remediation:
- Rotate the credential immediately. Assume anything committed (even briefly, even if later removed) is compromised. Deleting it from the latest commit is not enough; it remains in history.
- Move the value to an environment variable or a secrets manager and reference it instead of inlining.
- Add the offending file pattern to
.gitignore; consider a pre-commit hook or scanner to prevent recurrence.
This is a defensive check. Report findings so the owner can secure their own project; do not exfiltrate, store, or transmit any secret you find.
1---2name: secret-scan-23description: Scan code or a diff for hardcoded secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys, and other exposed credentials) before they get committed or shipped. Use before committing, during review, or when auditing a repository.4---56Find secrets that should never be in source control, then advise on remediation. Default scope: the staged diff if there is one, otherwise the working tree. Scan history or a specific path only when asked.78## What to look for910- **Known credential patterns**: cloud keys (AWS `AKIA…`, GCP, Azure), provider API tokens (Stripe, GitHub `ghp_…`, Slack, OpenAI, etc.), OAuth client secrets, JWTs.11- **Private keys & certs**: `-----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY-----` blocks, `.pem` / `.p12` / keystore contents.12- **Credentials in URLs/config**: connection strings and URLs with embedded passwords (`scheme://user:pass@host`), basic-auth headers.13- **Generic secrets**: assignments to names like `password`, `secret`, `token`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, plus high-entropy strings that look like keys.14- **Risky files committed by mistake**: `.env`, credential JSON, `*.key`, and their presence in history.1516## Reduce false positives1718Distinguish real secrets from example/placeholder values (`xxxxx`, `your-key-here`, `changeme`), test fixtures, public keys, and sample docs. When genuinely unsure, label a finding "review" rather than asserting a leak, but err toward reporting over silence.1920## Report and remediate2122For each finding give: the file and `line`, the kind of secret, and a confidence (high / review). Then recommend remediation:2324- **Rotate the credential immediately.** Assume anything committed (even briefly, even if later removed) is compromised. Deleting it from the latest commit is not enough; it remains in history.25- Move the value to an environment variable or a secrets manager and reference it instead of inlining.26- Add the offending file pattern to `.gitignore`; consider a pre-commit hook or scanner to prevent recurrence.2728This is a defensive check. Report findings so the owner can secure their own project; do not exfiltrate, store, or transmit any secret you find.
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