Integrate Product Compliance
Build compliance into the product loop without turning it into a late document
gate. Agents may trace, propose, implement, test, and collect evidence; named
humans retain interpretation, scope, risk acceptance, and assurance authority.
For ordinary security engineering without a confirmed control, contractual, or
assessment scope, use the target's security practices and relevant engineering
Skills directly.
1. Confirm Scope and Authority
Read the target's current ISMS or control system, policies, risk register,
Statement of Applicability or equivalent, data and system inventories,
contracts, assessment scope, prior findings, exceptions, and evidence store.
Confirm with named owners:
- applicable organization, products, locations, systems, data, suppliers, and
contractual commitments
- exact standard, scheme, version, assessment objective, and assessment period
- control, risk, evidence, exception, release, and certification owners
- required assessor, auditor, QSA, legal, privacy, or security involvement
Do not infer applicability, certification status, TISAX objectives, PCI scope or
SAQ eligibility, control interpretation, or acceptable risk. If these are
unresolved, present options and stop the dependent branch.
Read references/frameworks.md when ISO/IEC 27001,
TISAX, or PCI DSS applies. Re-check official sources because standards,
assessment catalogs, FAQs, and effective dates change.
2. Classify the Product Change
Trace what changes across:
- data categories, flows, retention, residency, and deletion
- identities, roles, privileges, authentication, and administrative actions
- services, infrastructure, endpoints, payment pages, and trust boundaries
- suppliers, processors, libraries, agents, models, and external tools
- locations, teams, operating procedures, support, and incident response
- customer promises, assessment boundaries, and evidence obligations
Prefer scope reduction and simpler architecture when it preserves the intended
outcome. A compliance label is not a reason to maximize controls or artifacts.
3. Map Risk, Controls, and Evidence
Use the target's existing identifiers and GRC system. For each affected risk or
control record:
- requirement or obligation source and current version
- product or system behavior being protected
- implementation and control owner
- preventive, detective, and recovery mechanism
- deterministic test, policy gate, or manual review
- evidence source, provenance, retention, and access
- effectiveness signal and review trigger
- exception, expiry, compensating action, and risk owner when applicable
Do not copy copyrighted standards into the repository. Reference licensed
sources and record only the target's interpretation, implementation, and
evidence.
4. Encode Enforceable Controls
Turn a control into code only when its meaning, inputs, owner, and expected
decision are stable enough to test. The named control owner retains the policy
semantics. An agent may implement the approved rule; it must not translate an
entire standard, contract, or policy into enforcement by inference.
For each executable control keep:
- the owned requirement, interpretation, control ID, version, and owner
- the structured input and the system or change boundary it covers
- the executable decision or invariant plus conforming and violating examples
- the enforcement point, failure behavior, exception path, and expiry
- the policy, data, engine, and test versions that produced the result
- the evidence destination and a check that the control runs where claimed
Use the target's existing schema validator, test framework, linter, CI gate, or
platform control first. A small deterministic check is enough for a local
invariant. Add a policy engine only when shared structured decisions, reuse, or
runtime enforcement justify its operation and removal cost.
Machine-readable control and evidence formats may improve interchange and
traceability when the target or assessor supports them. They do not prove
applicability, effectiveness, or compliance by themselves.
5. Integrate the Product Loop
Use run-product-engineering and add compliance where it changes a decision:
| State |
Compliance contribution |
| Signal and triage |
customer requirement, finding, incident, data or scope change |
| Problem and discovery |
data flow, threat, control, supplier, auditability, and scope risk |
| Bet and focus |
control impact, evidence cost, deadline, owner, and risk boundary |
| Build and validate |
secure design, least privilege, tests, logging, configuration, and traceability |
| Release |
locally defined risk class, approval, rollback, and evidence package |
| Production and outcome |
control effectiveness, incidents, exceptions, customer trust, and improvement |
Use threat modeling, abuse cases, data-flow review, architecture evidence,
security testing, and assessor input only when the risk justifies them.
6. Generate Evidence from the System
Prefer evidence emitted by normal work:
- version control, reviews, signed or attributable changes
- CI/CD tests, policy results, provenance, and release records
- configuration, asset, access, vulnerability, and dependency state
- correlated audit events, traces, metrics, logs, and alerts
- incident, recovery, backup, restore, and continuity exercises
- supplier due diligence and contractual records
- training or manual evidence only where the control genuinely depends on it
Keep control mappings, implementation decisions, evidence references, and
review history in version control when their sensitivity and owning system
allow it. Generate audit views from those sources instead of maintaining a
second Word, wiki, or ticket narrative by hand.
Git is an evidence source, not a substitute for a required assurance format.
Use the current official TISAX/ISA, PCI ROC/AOC/SAQ, customer, assessor, or
certification-body forms when the applicable route requires them, and link or
generate them from the owned evidence where practical.
Evidence must identify scope, source, time, owner, version, and result. Protect
it according to sensitivity and retention policy. An agent may assemble an
evidence view but must not fabricate missing evidence or declare control
effectiveness from file presence.
7. Apply Risk-Based Release and Exceptions
Use the target's existing risk classes. If none exist, propose a minimal model
for human approval; do not silently impose a universal table.
Low-risk changes may use automated checks and ordinary review. Authentication,
authorization, sensitive data, security logging, regulated payment flows, or
assessment-scope changes usually require stronger targeted review, testing,
evidence, rollback, and explicit release authority.
Emergency response may defer nonessential ceremony to restore safety or
service. Preserve evidence, use the documented emergency authority, and
complete post-change review and remediation.
Only the named risk owner may accept an exception. Record reason, scope,
compensating controls, expiry, review trigger, and approval.
8. Review Effectiveness and Currentness
Feed control failures, incidents, false positives, audit findings, customer
requirements, supplier changes, standard updates, and operational evidence back
into risk, product, and harness decisions.
Agents may monitor evidence freshness, find gaps, propose remediation, prepare
reviews, and execute approved bounded changes. Humans or qualified specialists
retain:
- legal and contractual interpretation
- certification or assessment claims
- TISAX objectives and assessment scope
- PCI scoping, SAQ or ROC route, and QSA decisions
- risk acceptance and material release exceptions
- expansion from human-in-the-loop to human-on-the-loop
The integration is complete when scope and authority are explicit, affected
risks and controls map to real product behavior, evidence arises from normal
delivery, release follows the approved risk policy, effectiveness is observed,
and no agent-generated claim exceeds verified assurance.
Related Skills
- run-product-engineering - operate the enclosing signal-to-outcome loop
- product-craft - shape trust, customer value, and viable bets
- scaffold-harness - assess governance and L5-L7 autonomy evidence
- coding-discipline and completion-gate - implement and verify controls
- build-autonomous-agents - constrain agent runtime data, tools, and effects
- manage-infrastructure-as-code - plan, policy-check, apply, and reconcile
infrastructure desired state
- documentation-and-adrs - record accepted consequential trade-offs
Sources
- NIST OSCAL - machine-readable control,
implementation, assessment, and result models
- Open Policy Agent in CI/CD -
executable policy checks for configuration and infrastructure data
1---2name: integrate-product-compliance3description: Integrates confirmed security, trust, and compliance scope into product engineering through risk, controls and policy as code, evidence, release policy, and effectiveness review. Use when work touches ISO/IEC 27001, TISAX or VDA ISA, PCI DSS, customer security commitments, regulated or sensitive data, payment flows, compliance as code, policy as code, machine-readable controls, audit evidence, control exceptions, or risk-based delivery.4---56# Integrate Product Compliance78Build compliance into the product loop without turning it into a late document9gate. Agents may trace, propose, implement, test, and collect evidence; named10humans retain interpretation, scope, risk acceptance, and assurance authority.1112For ordinary security engineering without a confirmed control, contractual, or13assessment scope, use the target's security practices and relevant engineering14Skills directly.1516## 1. Confirm Scope and Authority1718Read the target's current ISMS or control system, policies, risk register,19Statement of Applicability or equivalent, data and system inventories,20contracts, assessment scope, prior findings, exceptions, and evidence store.2122Confirm with named owners:2324- applicable organization, products, locations, systems, data, suppliers, and25 contractual commitments26- exact standard, scheme, version, assessment objective, and assessment period27- control, risk, evidence, exception, release, and certification owners28- required assessor, auditor, QSA, legal, privacy, or security involvement2930Do not infer applicability, certification status, TISAX objectives, PCI scope or31SAQ eligibility, control interpretation, or acceptable risk. If these are32unresolved, present options and stop the dependent branch.3334Read [references/frameworks.md](./references/frameworks.md) when ISO/IEC 27001,35TISAX, or PCI DSS applies. Re-check official sources because standards,36assessment catalogs, FAQs, and effective dates change.3738## 2. Classify the Product Change3940Trace what changes across:4142- data categories, flows, retention, residency, and deletion43- identities, roles, privileges, authentication, and administrative actions44- services, infrastructure, endpoints, payment pages, and trust boundaries45- suppliers, processors, libraries, agents, models, and external tools46- locations, teams, operating procedures, support, and incident response47- customer promises, assessment boundaries, and evidence obligations4849Prefer scope reduction and simpler architecture when it preserves the intended50outcome. A compliance label is not a reason to maximize controls or artifacts.5152## 3. Map Risk, Controls, and Evidence5354Use the target's existing identifiers and GRC system. For each affected risk or55control record:5657- requirement or obligation source and current version58- product or system behavior being protected59- implementation and control owner60- preventive, detective, and recovery mechanism61- deterministic test, policy gate, or manual review62- evidence source, provenance, retention, and access63- effectiveness signal and review trigger64- exception, expiry, compensating action, and risk owner when applicable6566Do not copy copyrighted standards into the repository. Reference licensed67sources and record only the target's interpretation, implementation, and68evidence.6970## 4. Encode Enforceable Controls7172Turn a control into code only when its meaning, inputs, owner, and expected73decision are stable enough to test. The named control owner retains the policy74semantics. An agent may implement the approved rule; it must not translate an75entire standard, contract, or policy into enforcement by inference.7677For each executable control keep:7879- the owned requirement, interpretation, control ID, version, and owner80- the structured input and the system or change boundary it covers81- the executable decision or invariant plus conforming and violating examples82- the enforcement point, failure behavior, exception path, and expiry83- the policy, data, engine, and test versions that produced the result84- the evidence destination and a check that the control runs where claimed8586Use the target's existing schema validator, test framework, linter, CI gate, or87platform control first. A small deterministic check is enough for a local88invariant. Add a policy engine only when shared structured decisions, reuse, or89runtime enforcement justify its operation and removal cost.9091Machine-readable control and evidence formats may improve interchange and92traceability when the target or assessor supports them. They do not prove93applicability, effectiveness, or compliance by themselves.9495## 5. Integrate the Product Loop9697Use **run-product-engineering** and add compliance where it changes a decision:9899| State | Compliance contribution |100|---|---|101| Signal and triage | customer requirement, finding, incident, data or scope change |102| Problem and discovery | data flow, threat, control, supplier, auditability, and scope risk |103| Bet and focus | control impact, evidence cost, deadline, owner, and risk boundary |104| Build and validate | secure design, least privilege, tests, logging, configuration, and traceability |105| Release | locally defined risk class, approval, rollback, and evidence package |106| Production and outcome | control effectiveness, incidents, exceptions, customer trust, and improvement |107108Use threat modeling, abuse cases, data-flow review, architecture evidence,109security testing, and assessor input only when the risk justifies them.110111## 6. Generate Evidence from the System112113Prefer evidence emitted by normal work:114115- version control, reviews, signed or attributable changes116- CI/CD tests, policy results, provenance, and release records117- configuration, asset, access, vulnerability, and dependency state118- correlated audit events, traces, metrics, logs, and alerts119- incident, recovery, backup, restore, and continuity exercises120- supplier due diligence and contractual records121- training or manual evidence only where the control genuinely depends on it122123Keep control mappings, implementation decisions, evidence references, and124review history in version control when their sensitivity and owning system125allow it. Generate audit views from those sources instead of maintaining a126second Word, wiki, or ticket narrative by hand.127128Git is an evidence source, not a substitute for a required assurance format.129Use the current official TISAX/ISA, PCI ROC/AOC/SAQ, customer, assessor, or130certification-body forms when the applicable route requires them, and link or131generate them from the owned evidence where practical.132133Evidence must identify scope, source, time, owner, version, and result. Protect134it according to sensitivity and retention policy. An agent may assemble an135evidence view but must not fabricate missing evidence or declare control136effectiveness from file presence.137138## 7. Apply Risk-Based Release and Exceptions139140Use the target's existing risk classes. If none exist, propose a minimal model141for human approval; do not silently impose a universal table.142143Low-risk changes may use automated checks and ordinary review. Authentication,144authorization, sensitive data, security logging, regulated payment flows, or145assessment-scope changes usually require stronger targeted review, testing,146evidence, rollback, and explicit release authority.147148Emergency response may defer nonessential ceremony to restore safety or149service. Preserve evidence, use the documented emergency authority, and150complete post-change review and remediation.151152Only the named risk owner may accept an exception. Record reason, scope,153compensating controls, expiry, review trigger, and approval.154155## 8. Review Effectiveness and Currentness156157Feed control failures, incidents, false positives, audit findings, customer158requirements, supplier changes, standard updates, and operational evidence back159into risk, product, and harness decisions.160161Agents may monitor evidence freshness, find gaps, propose remediation, prepare162reviews, and execute approved bounded changes. Humans or qualified specialists163retain:164165- legal and contractual interpretation166- certification or assessment claims167- TISAX objectives and assessment scope168- PCI scoping, SAQ or ROC route, and QSA decisions169- risk acceptance and material release exceptions170- expansion from human-in-the-loop to human-on-the-loop171172The integration is complete when scope and authority are explicit, affected173risks and controls map to real product behavior, evidence arises from normal174delivery, release follows the approved risk policy, effectiveness is observed,175and no agent-generated claim exceeds verified assurance.176177## Related Skills178179- **run-product-engineering** - operate the enclosing signal-to-outcome loop180- **product-craft** - shape trust, customer value, and viable bets181- **scaffold-harness** - assess governance and L5-L7 autonomy evidence182- **coding-discipline** and **completion-gate** - implement and verify controls183- **build-autonomous-agents** - constrain agent runtime data, tools, and effects184- **manage-infrastructure-as-code** - plan, policy-check, apply, and reconcile185 infrastructure desired state186- **documentation-and-adrs** - record accepted consequential trade-offs187188## Sources189190- [NIST OSCAL](https://pages.nist.gov/OSCAL/) - machine-readable control,191 implementation, assessment, and result models192- [Open Policy Agent in CI/CD](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/cicd) -193 executable policy checks for configuration and infrastructure data