dependency-audit Stinger
Procedural arsenal for dependency-audit-wasp-drone. Start with the target repository's real ecosystem, package manager, lockfiles, dependency graph and publish boundary. The retained @deeplake/hivemind material is a worked npm case; its tree-sitter scripts, npm lockfile and OpenClaw publish guards are not requirements for other repositories.
First action when this stinger is loaded: Read Target repository audit. Inventory current source and authorized scope before selecting ecosystem-specific methods. Then consult the retained guides only where their case facts match the target and verify any vendor/version claim against current primary documentation.
Preserved Hivemind case facts (not target ground truth)
@deeplake/hivemind is an ESM, TypeScript ^6, Node >=22 npm package. The supply-chain facts that matter:
- Lockfile:
package-lock.json (npm - NOT pnpm or yarn). CI installs with npm ci.
- Runtime deps:
deeplake, @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, @anthropic-ai/sdk, zod, js-yaml, just-bash, yargs-parser.
- optionalDependencies + native ABI risk:
@huggingface/transformers plus the full tree-sitter grammar set (c/cpp/go/java/javascript/python/ruby/rust/typescript). Three grammars are version-pinned in overrides (tree-sitter-c, tree-sitter-python, tree-sitter-rust). The postinstall hook runs scripts/ensure-tree-sitter.mjs, which heals native ABI / arm64 build failures. This native-dependency surface is the single biggest supply-chain risk on this package - a compromised or broken grammar build runs install-time code on every consumer's machine.
- Publish guards:
prepack builds; the files allowlist controls what ships; scripts/pack-check.mjs (npm run pack:check) blocks publishing secrets; scripts/audit-openclaw-bundle.mjs (npm run audit:openclaw) replicates ClawHub's static scan of the OpenClaw bundle.
- CI:
.github/workflows/ - ci.yaml runs a cross-node install; codeql.yaml scans javascript-typescript. CodeRabbit profile is chill.
When this stinger applies
Load this stinger when dependency-audit-wasp-drone is invoked. Typical triggers:
- "Set up Renovate for Hivemind / Renovate vs Dependabot for this repo"
- "Our dependency-update PRs are noisy"
- "npm audit returns findings - help me triage"
- "npm audit shows clean but I don't trust it"
- "The tree-sitter postinstall is failing / is it safe?"
- "We need an SBOM for the published package"
- "Generate an SBOM and attest it in CI"
- "Set up socket.dev to catch malicious packages"
- "Should we publish with --provenance?"
- "Is our npm publish safe? / what guards the published bundle?"
- "package-lock.json keeps changing unexpectedly"
- "Explain package.json and lockfiles to me"
- "Which dependencies are direct or indirect?"
- "Tie our SBOM to the exact release artifact"
- "Upgrade this major dependency without hiding breaking changes"
Do NOT load it for:
- Application-code CVEs requiring code changes ->
security-wasp-drone
- Container image scanning ->
ci-release-wasp-drone
- License compatibility legal opinions -> legal counsel
- CI/CD pipeline architecture beyond the dependency scanning step ->
ci-release-wasp-drone
Critical directives
These are the non-negotiables. The full rationale lives in each guide.
- Never recommend ignoring a CVE without requiring an expiry date and a tracking issue link. See
guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md.
- Always differentiate direct vs transitive exposure before recommending an upgrade. Most
npm audit findings on this package are transitive and unreachable. See guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md.
- Identify the target's actual install-time execution risks. In the Hivemind case, tree-sitter/optionalDependencies and
scripts/ensure-tree-sitter.mjs were relevant; preserve those controls only if the inspected target actually has them. See guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md and guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md.
- Choose an update tool from the target's requirements. The retained Hivemind case preferred Renovate; grouping alone does not rule out Dependabot, which also supports grouped updates. See
guides/00-scanner-decision-matrix.md.
- Validate the target's actual lockfile and frozen-install procedure after a dependency change. Use
package-lock.json/npm ci only for an npm target; do not replace pnpm, Yarn, uv, Cargo or Go tooling with this example. See guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md.
- Do not gate CI on
low/moderate npm audit findings. Gate only on high and critical. See guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md.
- Preserve and check the target's existing publish guards. The
files allowlist, pack-check.mjs, and audit:openclaw belong to the retained Hivemind case; do not invent those scripts in another target. See guides/04-provenance-verification.md.
- Defer to
security-wasp-drone for any CVE that requires patching application code, not just upgrading a package.
Retained npm case toolchain (recheck current vendor behavior)
| Tool |
Role for this package |
Limit |
| npm audit |
CVE compliance baseline, zero-config, built into the npm ci toolchain |
Does not catch supply-chain attacks without a CVE (axios-style account hijack, tree-sitter build tampering) |
| Renovate |
Grouped update PRs + minimumReleaseAge delay; right fit for this single-package npm repo |
More config than Dependabot; needs a renovate.json |
| Dependabot |
GitHub-native update PRs with configurable groups |
Compare the target's ecosystem, update-delay and grouping requirements against current documentation |
| socket.dev |
Behavioral threat intel for npm: typosquatting, malicious install scripts, account takeover - the control for the tree-sitter postinstall risk |
Not a CVE scanner; complements npm audit, does not replace it |
| Snyk (optional) |
Richer CVE DB + reachability + IDE integration for npm |
Paid tiers for some features; npm audit + socket.dev cover the baseline |
| Syft + CycloneDX |
SBOM for the published npm package in CycloneDX 1.6 JSON; CI-ready with Sigstore attestation |
Does not scan vulnerabilities; pairs with Grype for that |
npm --provenance |
Sigstore-backed provenance on publish; verifiable with npm audit signatures |
Transport guarantee only - does not vouch for source-code trust |
Key 2026 insight: npm audit is a CVE compliance tool, not a supply-chain security tool. The March 2026 axios maintainer account hijack published a backdoor in 40 minutes with no CVE at time of attack - npm audit showed clean throughout. For this package the equivalent nightmare is a tampered tree-sitter grammar running install-time code via postinstall. socket.dev behavioral analysis and Renovate minimumReleaseAge are the controls that address this class. See research/external/04-npm-provenance-sigstore-2026.md (source-repository research, not shipped with the plugin).
Guide map
Read the guide matching your task:
| Task |
Guide |
| Identify target ecosystem, lockfiles, checks and permission boundaries |
guides/05-target-repository-audit.md |
| Explain actual manifests and lockfiles to a beginner |
guides/06-explain-manifest-and-lockfile.md |
| Pick tooling for a target that matches the retained npm case |
guides/00-scanner-decision-matrix.md |
Triage an npm audit finding (noise vs real, native-dep risk) |
guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md |
| Qualify exact release artifact inventory and SBOM binding |
guides/07-bind-sbom-to-release-artifact.md |
| Prepare a bounded major upgrade with baseline/candidate contracts |
guides/08-upgrade-major-dependency-safely.md |
| Retained published-package SBOM case |
guides/02-sbom-workflow.md |
Harden package-lock.json + tree-sitter discipline |
guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md |
| Verify npm provenance + the publish-time guards |
guides/04-provenance-verification.md |
Template map
| Template |
Use case |
templates/renovate-base-config.json |
Drop-in Renovate config for this npm repo: grouping, minimumReleaseAge, automerge for devDependencies, and a guarded rule for the pinned tree-sitter grammars |
templates/github-actions-sbom-workflow.yml |
SBOM generation + Sigstore attestation for the published @deeplake/hivemind tarball on tag push |
templates/release-artifact-evidence.md |
Artifact/graph coverage, schema, subject, signature and identity evidence |
templates/major-upgrade-evidence.md |
Exact versions, consumer contracts, canary and rollback proof |
templates/manifest-reading-ledger.md |
Preserve declarations, recorded graph edges and unproved runtime/security facts; see worked fixture |
templates/dependency-triage-report.md |
Markdown template for recording an npm audit triage pass on this package |
Folder layout
dependency-audit-stinger/
+- SKILL.md (this file)
+- README.md (one-page human overview)
+- guides/
| +- 00-scanner-decision-matrix.md (Renovate vs Dependabot + npm audit + socket.dev for this package)
| +- 01-vulnerability-triage.md (npm audit noise vs real, direct vs transitive, tree-sitter native-dep risk)
| +- 02-sbom-workflow.md (Syft + CycloneDX 1.6 + Sigstore for the published tarball)
| +- 03-lockfile-discipline.md (npm ci + package-lock.json + minimumReleaseAge + optionalDependencies pins)
| +- 04-provenance-verification.md (npm --provenance + audit signatures + files allowlist / pack-check / audit-openclaw / CodeQL)
+- examples/
| +- happy-path-node-scanner-setup.md (Renovate + npm audit + socket.dev for @deeplake/hivemind)
| +- edge-case-critical-cve-triage.md (triaging a transitive CVE pulled through a Hivemind dependency)
+- templates/
| +- renovate-base-config.json (ready-to-use Renovate config for this repo)
| +- github-actions-sbom-workflow.yml (SBOM + attestation workflow)
| +- dependency-triage-report.md (npm audit triage report template)
+- reports/
| +- README.md (how audit reports accumulate)
+- research/ (DO NOT MODIFY -- owned by scripture-historian)
+- research-plan.md
+- research-summary.md
+- index.md
+- internal/01-command-brief.md
+- external/ (5 source files)
Pairing
| Role |
Artifact |
| This stinger |
. |
| Paired Drone |
../../agents/dependency-audit-wasp-drone.md |
Forged by stinger-forge, retargeted to the @deeplake/hivemind npm package. Part of The Wasp Nest, curated by Mario Aldayuz a.k.a @thenotoriousllama.
1---2name: dependency-audit-stinger-33description: "Audit dependencies for the target repository's ecosystem: lockfiles, vulnerability triage, SBOM and provenance. Use for supply-chain or publish safety; Hivemind is a worked npm example."4license: AGPL-3.0-or-later5metadata:6 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/legioncodeinc/dependency-audit-stinger-37---89# dependency-audit Stinger1011Procedural arsenal for `dependency-audit-wasp-drone`. Start with the target repository's real ecosystem, package manager, lockfiles, dependency graph and publish boundary. The retained `@deeplake/hivemind` material is a worked npm case; its tree-sitter scripts, npm lockfile and OpenClaw publish guards are not requirements for other repositories.1213**First action when this stinger is loaded:** Read [Target repository audit](guides/05-target-repository-audit.md). Inventory current source and authorized scope before selecting ecosystem-specific methods. Then consult the retained guides only where their case facts match the target and verify any vendor/version claim against current primary documentation.1415## Preserved Hivemind case facts (not target ground truth)1617`@deeplake/hivemind` is an ESM, TypeScript ^6, Node `>=22` npm package. The supply-chain facts that matter:1819- **Lockfile:** `package-lock.json` (npm - NOT pnpm or yarn). CI installs with `npm ci`.20- **Runtime deps:** `deeplake`, `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk`, `@anthropic-ai/sdk`, `zod`, `js-yaml`, `just-bash`, `yargs-parser`.21- **optionalDependencies + native ABI risk:** `@huggingface/transformers` plus the full tree-sitter grammar set (c/cpp/go/java/javascript/python/ruby/rust/typescript). Three grammars are version-pinned in `overrides` (`tree-sitter-c`, `tree-sitter-python`, `tree-sitter-rust`). The `postinstall` hook runs `scripts/ensure-tree-sitter.mjs`, which heals native ABI / arm64 build failures. This native-dependency surface is the single biggest supply-chain risk on this package - a compromised or broken grammar build runs install-time code on every consumer's machine.22- **Publish guards:** `prepack` builds; the `files` allowlist controls what ships; `scripts/pack-check.mjs` (`npm run pack:check`) blocks publishing secrets; `scripts/audit-openclaw-bundle.mjs` (`npm run audit:openclaw`) replicates ClawHub's static scan of the OpenClaw bundle.23- **CI:** `.github/workflows/` - `ci.yaml` runs a cross-node install; `codeql.yaml` scans `javascript-typescript`. CodeRabbit profile is `chill`.2425---2627## When this stinger applies2829Load this stinger when `dependency-audit-wasp-drone` is invoked. Typical triggers:3031- "Set up Renovate for Hivemind / Renovate vs Dependabot for this repo"32- "Our dependency-update PRs are noisy"33- "npm audit returns findings - help me triage"34- "npm audit shows clean but I don't trust it"35- "The tree-sitter postinstall is failing / is it safe?"36- "We need an SBOM for the published package"37- "Generate an SBOM and attest it in CI"38- "Set up socket.dev to catch malicious packages"39- "Should we publish with --provenance?"40- "Is our npm publish safe? / what guards the published bundle?"41- "package-lock.json keeps changing unexpectedly"42- "Explain package.json and lockfiles to me"43- "Which dependencies are direct or indirect?"44- "Tie our SBOM to the exact release artifact"45- "Upgrade this major dependency without hiding breaking changes"4647Do NOT load it for:4849- Application-code CVEs requiring code changes -> `security-wasp-drone`50- Container image scanning -> `ci-release-wasp-drone`51- License compatibility legal opinions -> legal counsel52- CI/CD pipeline architecture beyond the dependency scanning step -> `ci-release-wasp-drone`5354---5556## Critical directives5758These are the non-negotiables. The full rationale lives in each guide.5960- **Never recommend ignoring a CVE without requiring an expiry date and a tracking issue link.** See `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md`.61- **Always differentiate direct vs transitive exposure before recommending an upgrade.** Most `npm audit` findings on this package are transitive and unreachable. See `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md`.62- **Identify the target's actual install-time execution risks.** In the Hivemind case, tree-sitter/optionalDependencies and `scripts/ensure-tree-sitter.mjs` were relevant; preserve those controls only if the inspected target actually has them. See `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md` and `guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md`.63- **Choose an update tool from the target's requirements.** The retained Hivemind case preferred Renovate; grouping alone does not rule out Dependabot, which also supports grouped updates. See `guides/00-scanner-decision-matrix.md`.64- **Validate the target's actual lockfile and frozen-install procedure after a dependency change.** Use `package-lock.json`/`npm ci` only for an npm target; do not replace pnpm, Yarn, uv, Cargo or Go tooling with this example. See `guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md`.65- **Do not gate CI on `low`/`moderate` `npm audit` findings.** Gate only on `high` and `critical`. See `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md`.66- **Preserve and check the target's existing publish guards.** The `files` allowlist, `pack-check.mjs`, and `audit:openclaw` belong to the retained Hivemind case; do not invent those scripts in another target. See `guides/04-provenance-verification.md`.67- **Defer to `security-wasp-drone` for any CVE that requires patching application code, not just upgrading a package.**6869---7071## Retained npm case toolchain (recheck current vendor behavior)7273| Tool | Role for this package | Limit |74|---|---|---|75| **npm audit** | CVE compliance baseline, zero-config, built into the `npm ci` toolchain | Does not catch supply-chain attacks without a CVE (axios-style account hijack, tree-sitter build tampering) |76| **Renovate** | Grouped update PRs + `minimumReleaseAge` delay; right fit for this single-package npm repo | More config than Dependabot; needs a `renovate.json` |77| **Dependabot** | GitHub-native update PRs with configurable groups | Compare the target's ecosystem, update-delay and grouping requirements against current documentation |78| **socket.dev** | Behavioral threat intel for npm: typosquatting, malicious install scripts, account takeover - the control for the tree-sitter postinstall risk | Not a CVE scanner; complements npm audit, does not replace it |79| **Snyk (optional)** | Richer CVE DB + reachability + IDE integration for npm | Paid tiers for some features; npm audit + socket.dev cover the baseline |80| **Syft + CycloneDX** | SBOM for the published npm package in CycloneDX 1.6 JSON; CI-ready with Sigstore attestation | Does not scan vulnerabilities; pairs with Grype for that |81| **npm `--provenance`** | Sigstore-backed provenance on publish; verifiable with `npm audit signatures` | Transport guarantee only - does not vouch for source-code trust |8283> **Key 2026 insight:** `npm audit` is a CVE compliance tool, not a supply-chain security tool. The March 2026 axios maintainer account hijack published a backdoor in 40 minutes with no CVE at time of attack - `npm audit` showed clean throughout. For this package the equivalent nightmare is a tampered tree-sitter grammar running install-time code via `postinstall`. socket.dev behavioral analysis and Renovate `minimumReleaseAge` are the controls that address this class. See `research/external/04-npm-provenance-sigstore-2026.md` (source-repository research, not shipped with the plugin).8485---8687## Guide map8889Read the guide matching your task:9091| Task | Guide |92|---|---|93| Identify target ecosystem, lockfiles, checks and permission boundaries | `guides/05-target-repository-audit.md` |94| Explain actual manifests and lockfiles to a beginner | `guides/06-explain-manifest-and-lockfile.md` |95| Pick tooling for a target that matches the retained npm case | `guides/00-scanner-decision-matrix.md` |96| Triage an `npm audit` finding (noise vs real, native-dep risk) | `guides/01-vulnerability-triage.md` |97| Qualify exact release artifact inventory and SBOM binding | `guides/07-bind-sbom-to-release-artifact.md` |98| Prepare a bounded major upgrade with baseline/candidate contracts | `guides/08-upgrade-major-dependency-safely.md` |99| Retained published-package SBOM case | `guides/02-sbom-workflow.md` |100| Harden `package-lock.json` + tree-sitter discipline | `guides/03-lockfile-discipline.md` |101| Verify npm provenance + the publish-time guards | `guides/04-provenance-verification.md` |102103---104105## Template map106107| Template | Use case |108|---|---|109| `templates/renovate-base-config.json` | Drop-in Renovate config for this npm repo: grouping, `minimumReleaseAge`, automerge for devDependencies, and a guarded rule for the pinned tree-sitter grammars |110| `templates/github-actions-sbom-workflow.yml` | SBOM generation + Sigstore attestation for the published `@deeplake/hivemind` tarball on tag push |111| `templates/release-artifact-evidence.md` | Artifact/graph coverage, schema, subject, signature and identity evidence |112| `templates/major-upgrade-evidence.md` | Exact versions, consumer contracts, canary and rollback proof |113| `templates/manifest-reading-ledger.md` | Preserve declarations, recorded graph edges and unproved runtime/security facts; see [worked fixture](examples/read-manifest-fixture.md) |114| `templates/dependency-triage-report.md` | Markdown template for recording an `npm audit` triage pass on this package |115116---117118## Folder layout119120```text121dependency-audit-stinger/122+- SKILL.md (this file)123+- README.md (one-page human overview)124+- guides/125| +- 00-scanner-decision-matrix.md (Renovate vs Dependabot + npm audit + socket.dev for this package)126| +- 01-vulnerability-triage.md (npm audit noise vs real, direct vs transitive, tree-sitter native-dep risk)127| +- 02-sbom-workflow.md (Syft + CycloneDX 1.6 + Sigstore for the published tarball)128| +- 03-lockfile-discipline.md (npm ci + package-lock.json + minimumReleaseAge + optionalDependencies pins)129| +- 04-provenance-verification.md (npm --provenance + audit signatures + files allowlist / pack-check / audit-openclaw / CodeQL)130+- examples/131| +- happy-path-node-scanner-setup.md (Renovate + npm audit + socket.dev for @deeplake/hivemind)132| +- edge-case-critical-cve-triage.md (triaging a transitive CVE pulled through a Hivemind dependency)133+- templates/134| +- renovate-base-config.json (ready-to-use Renovate config for this repo)135| +- github-actions-sbom-workflow.yml (SBOM + attestation workflow)136| +- dependency-triage-report.md (npm audit triage report template)137+- reports/138| +- README.md (how audit reports accumulate)139+- research/ (DO NOT MODIFY -- owned by scripture-historian)140 +- research-plan.md141 +- research-summary.md142 +- index.md143 +- internal/01-command-brief.md144 +- external/ (5 source files)145```146147---148149## Pairing150151| Role | Artifact |152|---|---|153| This stinger | `.` |154| Paired Drone | `../../agents/dependency-audit-wasp-drone.md` |155156---157158*Forged by `stinger-forge`, retargeted to the `@deeplake/hivemind` npm package. Part of The Wasp Nest, curated by [Mario Aldayuz a.k.a @thenotoriousllama](https://github.com/thenotoriousllama).*