Security For OpenClaw
Treat every trust boundary as real.
Process
- Identify inputs, outputs, and privilege boundaries.
- List which surfaces accept untrusted data.
- Check where secrets, tokens, or credentials might flow.
- Validate assumptions about auth, authorization, and file access.
- Reduce permissions and exposure where possible.
- Verify the change does not create a broader attack surface than needed.
OpenClaw-Specific Focus
- Distinguish internal workspace actions from external side effects.
- Avoid leaking secrets into commits, logs, prompts, or generated docs.
- Be careful with browser automation and external fetches when they cross trust boundaries.
- Prefer explicit user approval for risky outbound or destructive actions.
- Treat tool invocation power as part of the security model, not just the application code.
Reference Files
Read references/trust-boundary-checklist.md when a task crosses file, network, auth, or execution boundaries.
Read references/common-traps.md when the task touches secrets, tokens, external APIs, logs, prompts, or configuration.
Read references/review-prompts.md when doing a focused security review and you need sharper inspection questions.
Review Questions
- Can untrusted input cross a boundary without validation?
- Can a token or secret be exposed through code, logs, or config?
- Does the change broaden file, network, or execution authority?
- Is the new behavior safe by default?