Liberty91LTD url-investigation
Investigate a URL end-to-end. Scan it live (URLScan), cross-reference reputation (VT, OTX), extract parent domain + resolved IP for sibling investigations.
This skill invokes: /lookup-liberty91 (first-party — run first), /lookup-urlscan, /lookup-virustotal, /lookup-otx, optionally /lookup-reversinglabs (network threat-intel from RL malware corpus), optionally /lookup-crowdstrike (IOC reputation + actor/malware links), optionally /lookup-misp and/or /lookup-opencti (internal correlation), optionally /lookup-sentinel (exposure check in your own telemetry), optionally /domain-investigation and/or /ip-investigation for the parent/resolved infrastructure, then /source-assessment, /tlp-guide, /confidence-levels.
When to invoke
- User asks to scan, check, or investigate a URL
- User pastes a suspicious link from a phishing email
/domain-investigationor another skill hands off a specific URL for live-scan evidence
Inputs
indicator: <URL>
context: <optional — phishing email? user report? hunt result?>
tlp_ceiling: <optional, default AMBER — phishing-kit URLs often warrant AMBER+STRICT>
visibility: <unlisted | public — default unlisted for operational safety>
Procedure
1. Validate
- Confirm it's a valid URL (scheme + host minimum)
- Extract parent domain — useful for later pivots
- Extract path + query params (but DON'T include in URL if it contains credentials or user-identifying tokens)
2. Primary scan
/lookup-urlscan url <value> --visibility unlisted
This takes 45-90 seconds on first submission. While waiting, run the other lookups in parallel.
Visibility default is unlisted — public submissions expose the IOC on URLScan's global feed and can tip off threat actors. Only use public if the user explicitly requests it or the URL is already publicly known.
3. Parallel reputation lookups
/lookup-virustotal url <value> # aggregate reputation
/lookup-otx url <value> # community pulses referencing this URL
Add to the same parallel batch if credentials are configured:
/lookup-reversinglabs url <value> # if $REVERSINGLABS_USER is set. Network reputation from RL's malware-analysis corpus — files seen requesting this URL, RL classification. One API call.
/lookup-crowdstrike indicator <value> # if $CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID is set. Falcon Intel view — malicious confidence, linked actors + malware families, report refs. One API call.
/lookup-liberty91 ioc-lookup <value> # if $LIBERTY91_API_KEY is set. First-party — run first: does your own platform already hold this URL, with what verdict, confidence and TLP?
/lookup-misp search-attributes --value <value> # if $MISP_URL + $MISP_KEY are set. Internal correlation against your own catalogued events.
/lookup-opencti lookup <value> # if $OPENCTI_URL + $OPENCTI_TOKEN are set. Internal correlation against your OpenCTI knowledge base (observables + indicators in one call).
Optionally (escalation):
/lookup-reversinglabs submit-url <value> --crawler local --wait
# only when you need a fresh RL crawl + sandbox detonation of the URL — slower and consumes submission budget
4. Consolidate
indicator: <url>
type: url
parent_domain: <extracted>
consolidated_verdict: malicious | suspicious | phishing | clean | unknown
live_scan:
final_url: <after redirects>
redirect_chain: [<urls>]
resolved_ip: <from urlscan>
server: <from urlscan>
screenshot_url: <...>
scan_url: <urlscan.io result page>
behaviors_observed:
- <e.g., "credential form", "JS obfuscation", "drive-by download attempt">
reputation:
vt_detection_ratio: <X/Y>
vt_categories: [<list>]
otx_pulse_count: <n>
contacted_infrastructure:
domains: [<top 10>]
ips: [<top 10>]
community_context:
attributed_campaigns: [<from OTX>]
malware_family: <if URL serves known malware>
pivot_candidates:
- type: domain
value: <parent domain>
reason: parent
- type: ip
value: <resolved ip>
reason: hosts_url
- type: domain
value: <contacted domain>
reason: contacted_by_url
- type: hash
value: <dropped file>
reason: url_delivers
5. Automatic follow-up (when warranted)
If the URL is malicious / phishing / suspicious AND the user's request was open-ended ("investigate this URL"), automatically invoke:
/domain-investigationon the parent domain/ip-investigationon the resolved IP
Do NOT auto-chain if the verdict is clean/benign or the user's request was narrow ("just scan this URL").
5b. Exposure check — was it seen in OUR environment? (if Sentinel is configured)
If $SENTINEL_WORKSPACE_ID + app credentials are set and the verdict is malicious or suspicious, chain /lookup-sentinel to sweep the URL (and its domain) across the workspace's available tables (DeviceNetworkEvents RemoteUrl, EmailUrlInfo, UrlClickEvents, CommonSecurityLog, … — that skill discovers what exists before querying). UrlClickEvents hits mean a user actually clicked — escalate those first. Report a miss as "not observed in collected telemetry over ", never "not compromised".
6. Apply rigor
Chain:
/source-assessment/tlp-guide(consider AMBER+STRICT for active phishing kits to avoid tipping off actors)/confidence-levels
7. Return
title: "URL Investigation: <url>"
tlp: AMBER | AMBER+STRICT
confidence: <0-100>
summary: <2-3 sentences>
verdict: <...>
live_scan: <...>
reputation: <...>
contacted_infrastructure: <...>
community_context: <...>
pivot_candidates: <top 3-5>
related_investigations:
- parent_domain_investigation: <ref or inline summary>
- resolved_ip_investigation: <ref or inline summary>
source_ratings: <...>
investigation_date: <ISO8601>
recommended_next_steps: <...>
Special cases
- Phishing kit URLs — often target a specific brand; note the brand in
behaviors_observed. Consider/sigma-writingto build a detection. - Redirector chains — the final URL matters most. Also capture intermediate domains; they're sometimes attacker-controlled infrastructure reused across campaigns.
- URL with auth tokens / sensitive query params — scrub before submitting anywhere public. If you cannot scrub, don't scan — note limitation instead.
- Already-dead URL — URLScan may report no response; check archive.org / urlscan history; don't assume benign.
Related skills
/ip-investigation,/domain-investigation,/hash-investigation/malware-analysis— if the URL delivers a file, follow up on the hash/phishing-social-engineering— knowledge cell for phishing TTPs/sigma-writing— for detection/cti-orchestrator