Data: Managed Agents tools and skills

Managed Agents — Tools & Skills

Tools

Server tools vs client tools

Recommendation: Enable all prebuilt tools via agent_toolset_20260401, then disable individually as needed.

Versioning: The toolset is a versioned, static resource. When underlying tools change, a new toolset version is created (hence _20260401) so you always know exactly what you're getting.

Agent Toolset

The agent_toolset_20260401 provides these built-in tools:

Enable the full toolset:

{
  "tools": [
    { "type": "agent_toolset_20260401" }
  ]
}

Per-Tool Configuration

Override defaults for individual tools. This example enables everything except bash:

{
  "tools": [
    {
      "type": "agent_toolset_20260401",
      "default_config": { "enabled": true },
      "configs": [
        { "name": "bash", "enabled": false }
      ]
    }
  ]
}

Permission Policies

Control when server-executed tools (agent toolset + MCP) run automatically vs wait for approval. Does not apply to custom tools.

{
  "type": "agent_toolset_20260401",
  "default_config": {
    "enabled": true,
    "permission_policy": { "type": "always_allow" }
  },
  "configs": [
    { "name": "bash", "permission_policy": { "type": "always_ask" } }
  ]
}

Responding to always_ask: Send a user.tool_confirmation event with tool_use_id from the triggering agent_tool_use/mcp_tool_use event:

{ "type": "tool_confirmation", "tool_use_id": "sevt_abc123", "result": "allow" }
{ "type": "tool_confirmation", "tool_use_id": "sevt_def456", "result": "deny", "message": "Read .env.example instead" }

The optional message on a deny is delivered to the agent so it can adjust its approach.

To enable only specific tools, flip the default off and opt-in per tool:

{
  "tools": [
    {
      "type": "agent_toolset_20260401",
      "default_config": { "enabled": false },
      "configs": [
        { "name": "bash", "enabled": true },
        { "name": "read", "enabled": true }
      ]
    }
  ]
}

Custom Tools (Client-Side)

Custom tools are executed by your application, not Anthropic. The flow:

1. Agent decides to use the tool → session emits a agent.custom_tool_use event with inputs
2. Session goes idle waiting for you
3. Your application executes the tool
4. You send back a user.custom_tool_result event with the output
5. Session resumes running

No permission policy needed — you're the one executing.

{
  "tools": [
    {
      "type": "custom",
      "name": "get_weather",
      "description": "Fetch current weather for a city.",
      "input_schema": {
        "type": "object",
        "properties": {
          "city": { "type": "string", "description": "City name" }
        },
        "required": ["city"]
      }
    }
  ]
}

MCP Servers

MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers expose standardized third-party capabilities (e.g. Asana, GitHub, Linear). Configuration is split across agent and vault:

1. Agent creation declares which servers to connect to (type, name, url — no auth). The agent's mcp_servers array has no auth field.
2. Vault stores the OAuth credentials. Attach via vault_ids on session create.

This keeps secrets out of reusable agent definitions. Each vault credential is tied to one MCP server URL; Anthropic matches credentials to servers by URL.

Agent side — declare servers (no auth):

{
  "mcp_servers": [
    { "type": "url", "name": "linear", "url": "https://mcp.linear.app/mcp" }
  ],
  "tools": [
    { "type": "mcp_toolset", "mcp_server_name": "linear" }
  ]
}

Session side — attach vault:

{
  "agent": "agent_abc123",
  "environment_id": "env_abc123",
  "vault_ids": ["vlt_abc123"]
}

💡 Per-tool enablement (empirical): mcp_toolset has been observed accepting default_config: {enabled: false} + configs: [{name, enabled: true}] for an allowlist pattern. The API ref shows only the minimal {type, mcp_server_name} form.

💡 Changing tools/MCP servers on a running session: sessions.update() can replace agent.tools, agent.mcp_servers, and vault_ids while the session is idle — a session-local override that doesn't touch the agent object. See shared/managed-agents-core.md → Updating the agent configuration mid-session.

Large MCP tool outputs. If an MCP tool returns more than 100K tokens, the output is automatically offloaded to a file in the sandbox — the agent receives a truncated preview plus the file path and can read the full content. No configuration required.

Invalid vault credentials don't block session creation. If a vault credential is invalid for a declared MCP server, the session still creates successfully; a session.error event describes the MCP auth failure, and auth retries on the next session.status_idle → session.status_running transition.

⚠️ MCP auth tokens ≠ REST API tokens. Hosted MCP servers (mcp.notion.com, mcp.linear.app, etc.) typically require OAuth bearer tokens, not the service's native API keys. A Notion ntn_ integration token authenticates against Notion's REST API but will not work as a vault credential for the Notion MCP server. These are different auth systems.

Vaults — the MCP credential store

Vaults store OAuth credentials (access token + refresh token) that Anthropic auto-refreshes on your behalf via standard OAuth 2.0 refresh_token grant. This is the only way to authenticate MCP servers in the launch SDK.

Credentials and the sandbox

Vaults store credentials; those credentials never enter the sandbox. This is a deliberate security boundary — code running in the sandbox (including anything the agent writes) cannot read or exfiltrate a vaulted credential, even under prompt injection. Instead, credentials are injected by Anthropic-side proxies after a request leaves the sandbox:

• MCP tool calls are routed through an Anthropic-side proxy that fetches the credential from the vault and adds it to the outbound request.
• Git operations on attached GitHub repositories (git pull, git push, GitHub REST calls) are routed through a git proxy that injects the github_repository resource's authorization_token the same way.

Not yet supported: running other authenticated CLIs (e.g. aws, gcloud, stripe) directly inside the sandbox. There is currently no way to set container environment variables or expose vault credentials to arbitrary processes. If you need one of these today:

• Prefer an MCP server for that service if one exists — it gets the same vault-backed injection.
• Otherwise, register a custom tool: the agent emits agent.custom_tool_use, your orchestrator (which already holds the credential) executes the call and returns user.custom_tool_result over the same authenticated event stream. No public endpoint is exposed; the sandbox never sees the secret. See shared/managed-agents-client-patterns.md → Pattern 9.

Do not put API keys in the system prompt or user messages as a workaround — they persist in the session's event history.

Formerly known internally as TATs (Tool/Tenant Access Tokens).

Flow:

1. Create a vault (client.beta.vaults.create(...)) — one per tenant/user, or one shared, depending on your model
2. Add MCP credentials to it (client.beta.vaults.credentials.create(...)) — each credential is tied to one MCP server URL
3. Reference the vault on session create via vault_ids: ["vlt_..."]
4. Anthropic auto-refreshes tokens before they expire; the agent uses the current access token when calling MCP tools

Credential shape:

{
  "display_name": "Notion (workspace-foo)",
  "auth": {
    "type": "mcp_oauth",
    "mcp_server_url": "https://mcp.notion.com/mcp",
    "access_token": "<current access token>",
    "expires_at": "2026-04-02T14:00:00Z",
    "refresh": {
      "refresh_token": "<refresh token>",
      "client_id": "<your OAuth client_id>",
      "token_endpoint": "https://api.notion.com/v1/oauth/token",
      "token_endpoint_auth": { "type": "none" }
    }
  }
}

The refresh block is what enables auto-refresh — token_endpoint is where Anthropic posts the refresh_token grant. token_endpoint_auth is a discriminated union:

Omit refresh entirely if you only have an access token with no refresh capability — it'll work until it expires, then the agent loses access.

💡 Getting an OAuth token. How you obtain the initial access and refresh tokens depends on the MCP server — consult its documentation. Once you have them, store them in a vault credential using the shape above; Anthropic auto-refreshes via the refresh.token_endpoint from there.

Scoping: Vaults are workspace-scoped. Anyone with developer+ role in the API workspace can create, read (metadata only — secrets are write-only), and attach vaults. vault_ids can be set at session create time but not via session update (the SDK docstring says "Not yet supported; requests setting this field are rejected").

Skills

Skills are reusable, filesystem-based resources that provide your agent with domain-specific expertise: workflows, context, and best practices that transform general-purpose agents into specialists. Unlike prompts (conversation-level instructions for one-off tasks), skills load on-demand and eliminate the need to repeatedly provide the same guidance across multiple conversations.

Two types — both work the same way; the agent automatically uses them when relevant to the task at hand:

Max 20 skills per agent. Agent creation uses managed-agents-2026-04-01; the separate Skills API (for managing custom skill definitions) uses skills-2025-10-02.

Enabling skills on a session

Skills are attached to the agent definition via agents.create():

const agent = await client.beta.agents.create(
  {
    name: "Financial Agent",
    model: "{{OPUS_ID}}",
    system: "You are a financial analysis agent.",
    skills: [
      { type: "anthropic", skill_id: "xlsx" },
      { type: "custom", skill_id: "skill_abc123", version: "latest" },
    ],
  }
);

Python:

agent = client.beta.agents.create(
    name="Financial Agent",
    model="{{OPUS_ID}}",
    system="You are a financial analysis agent.",
    skills=[
        {"type": "anthropic", "skill_id": "xlsx"},
        {"type": "custom", "skill_id": "skill_abc123", "version": "latest"},
    ]
)

Skill reference fields:

Skills API