Engagement Memory (cross-engagement learning)
When to Activate
- At recon/weaponize: recall what already worked against this target class / tech stack.
- At report: persist each
[CONFIRMED] finding as a reusable pattern (ranked by impact).
- Periodic housekeeping: compact the pattern DB / rotate the audit log.
Model
Append-only JSONL store (~/.claude/engagement-memory/patterns.jsonl, override $ENGAGEMENT_DB).
Three record types in their own files so they never mix: patterns (patterns.jsonl),
target profiles (profiles.jsonl), audit log (audit.jsonl, disposable). A pattern is keyed
by (target, vuln_class, technique), ranked by severity / CVSS / confidence (real impact, never
payout), and carries a lifecycle status (proposed/active/stale/deprecated/...). Recall is an
explicit top-N query (anti-context-bloat). Duplicates merge (count bumped, most-recent status
wins), never blind-discarded; compact runs automatically over a size threshold and stays lossless.
TTL stale patterns and deprecated/rejected ones drop out of default recall but are kept.
Commands
# RECALL — relevance-ranked (stdlib BM25 + aliases), active-only by default
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py match --vuln-class ssrf --query "imds metadata" --tech-stack aws
# INJECT — budgeted prior-intel card for a phase (top-N, byte-capped; $ENGAGEMENT_MEMORY_MODE=auto|debug|off)
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py inject --vuln-class ssrf --query imds --max-bytes 1500
# RECORD a confirmed finding (flags or finding JSON). A key collision needs --resolve update|merge|reject|force.
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py record --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf \
--cwe CWE-918 --attack-id T1190 --severity high --cvss 9.1 --tech-stack nginx,aws --technique "metadata theft"
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py record --json '<finding json from validate_findings>'
# LIFECYCLE + cross-client
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py promote --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf --technique "metadata theft" [--global]
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py deprecate --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf --technique "metadata theft"
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py match --vuln-class ssrf --include-global # add sanitized cross-client TTPs
# PROFILES + housekeeping + observability
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py profile --target acme.com --tech-stack nginx,aws --endpoints /api,/admin
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py recall-profile --target acme.com
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py compact # manual lossless dedup-merge
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py stats # patterns by class + profile count
python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py audit-stats # action log: by tool/action/outcome
Or use the /engage.memory command (recall | inject | record | promote | deprecate | gc | stats).
OPSEC & Detection
| Concern |
Note |
| Secrets at rest |
Stores technique + CWE/CVSS + an evidence reference, never loot. A secret-input guard rejects evidence_ref/source that look like inline secrets (private keys, password=, AKIA, JWTs, tokens) — store a path; rotate the exposed credential, don't just delete. |
| Cross-client bleed |
Per-client isolation is the default ($ENGAGEMENT_DB). The shared global store is opt-in (promote --global / record --global) and sanitized (target + evidence blanked); recall it only with --include-global. |
| Trust |
New auto-captures can be proposed; only confirmed/reviewed findings are active. A key collision is review-gated (--resolve), not silently merged. |
| Auditability |
Every record/match/compact/promote — and every refused line (denial) — is written to audit.jsonl (rotated by discard, with a retention-gap marker). The append-only patterns journal + audit log ARE the history. |
| Integrity |
Records carry schema_version; malformed/type-poisoned/foreign lines are skipped on read, never trusted. |
Deep Dives
scripts/schemas.py — record types (pattern/audit/target_profile/retention_gap), validation + secret guard, pattern_key/pattern_id, impact+confidence rank_score, recency-resolving merge.scripts/pattern_db.py — typed routing, merge-on-read with TTL staleness, BM25 relevance recall, inject, lifecycle verbs, global scope, CLI.scripts/rotation.py — compact/maybe_gc (lossless dedup-merge, auto-triggered) vs rotate_audit (discard the disposable log + write a retention-gap marker).
1---2name: engagement-memory3description: Use when recalling prior techniques at recon/weaponize, or recording a confirmed finding at report — cross-engagement pattern memory ranked by impact4---5
6# Engagement Memory (cross-engagement learning)
7
8## When to Activate
9
10- At **recon/weaponize**: recall what already worked against this target class / tech stack.
11- At **report**: persist each `[CONFIRMED]` finding as a reusable pattern (ranked by impact).
12- Periodic housekeeping: compact the pattern DB / rotate the audit log.
13
14## Model
15
16Append-only JSONL store (`~/.claude/engagement-memory/patterns.jsonl`, override `$ENGAGEMENT_DB`).
17Three record types in their own files so they never mix: **patterns** (`patterns.jsonl`),
18**target profiles** (`profiles.jsonl`), **audit log** (`audit.jsonl`, disposable). A pattern is keyed
19by `(target, vuln_class, technique)`, ranked by **severity / CVSS / confidence** (real impact, never
20payout), and carries a **lifecycle status** (`proposed/active/stale/deprecated/...`). Recall is an
21**explicit top-N query** (anti-context-bloat). Duplicates **merge** (count bumped, most-recent status
22wins), never blind-discarded; `compact` runs automatically over a size threshold and stays lossless.
23TTL `stale` patterns and `deprecated/rejected` ones drop out of default recall but are kept.
24
25## Commands
26
27```bash
28# RECALL — relevance-ranked (stdlib BM25 + aliases), active-only by default
29python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py match --vuln-class ssrf --query "imds metadata" --tech-stack aws
30# INJECT — budgeted prior-intel card for a phase (top-N, byte-capped; $ENGAGEMENT_MEMORY_MODE=auto|debug|off)
31python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py inject --vuln-class ssrf --query imds --max-bytes 1500
32
33# RECORD a confirmed finding (flags or finding JSON). A key collision needs --resolve update|merge|reject|force.
34python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py record --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf \
35 --cwe CWE-918 --attack-id T1190 --severity high --cvss 9.1 --tech-stack nginx,aws --technique "metadata theft"
36python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py record --json '<finding json from validate_findings>'
37
38# LIFECYCLE + cross-client
39python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py promote --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf --technique "metadata theft" [--global]
40python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py deprecate --target acme.com --vuln-class ssrf --technique "metadata theft"
41python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py match --vuln-class ssrf --include-global # add sanitized cross-client TTPs
42
43# PROFILES + housekeeping + observability
44python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py profile --target acme.com --tech-stack nginx,aws --endpoints /api,/admin
45python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py recall-profile --target acme.com
46python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py compact # manual lossless dedup-merge
47python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py stats # patterns by class + profile count
48python skills/engagement-memory/scripts/pattern_db.py audit-stats # action log: by tool/action/outcome
49```
50
51Or use the `/engage.memory` command (recall | inject | record | promote | deprecate | gc | stats).
52
53## OPSEC & Detection
54
55| Concern | Note |
56|---------|------|
57| Secrets at rest | Stores technique + CWE/CVSS + an evidence *reference*, never loot. A **secret-input guard** rejects `evidence_ref`/`source` that look like inline secrets (private keys, `password=`, AKIA, JWTs, tokens) — store a path; **rotate** the exposed credential, don't just delete. |
58| Cross-client bleed | Per-client isolation is the default (`$ENGAGEMENT_DB`). The shared global store is opt-in (`promote --global` / `record --global`) and **sanitized** (target + evidence blanked); recall it only with `--include-global`. |
59| Trust | New auto-captures can be `proposed`; only confirmed/reviewed findings are `active`. A key collision is **review-gated** (`--resolve`), not silently merged. |
60| Auditability | Every record/match/compact/promote — and every refused line (`denial`) — is written to `audit.jsonl` (rotated by discard, with a retention-gap marker). The append-only patterns journal + audit log ARE the history. |
61| Integrity | Records carry `schema_version`; malformed/type-poisoned/foreign lines are skipped on read, never trusted. |
62
63## Deep Dives
64
65- `scripts/schemas.py` — record types (pattern/audit/target_profile/retention_gap), validation + secret guard, `pattern_key`/`pattern_id`, impact+confidence `rank_score`, recency-resolving `merge`.
66- `scripts/pattern_db.py` — typed routing, merge-on-read with TTL staleness, BM25 relevance recall, `inject`, lifecycle verbs, global scope, CLI.
67- `scripts/rotation.py` — `compact`/`maybe_gc` (lossless dedup-merge, auto-triggered) vs `rotate_audit` (discard the disposable log + write a retention-gap marker).
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