Rust Unsafe Boundary Audit

Rust Unsafe Boundary Audit - make every unsafe edge small, named, and tested

Use this skill when a Rust change, crate, or repository needs a focused audit of unsafe blocks, raw pointer handling, layout assumptions, or foreign-function boundaries. The goal is not to forbid unsafe code; it is to make each unsafe operation local, justified, mechanically guarded where possible, and covered by tests or tooling that exercise the contract.

Critical Constraints

• Treat every unsafe block as a proof obligation. The audit must state the invariant that makes the operation sound, who must uphold it, and how the code prevents invalid callers from reaching the operation.
• FFI boundaries must document ownership, lifetime, nullability, threading, allocator, layout, and panic/unwind behavior. Missing contract text is a finding even when the implementation looks correct.
• Prefer shrinking the unsafe surface before adding comments. Safe wrappers, typed handles, length-checked slices, and sealed modules are stronger than broad caller obligations.
• Do not approve unsafe code from tool output alone. Tooling is evidence, not a substitute for checking aliasing, initialization, provenance, and lifetime assumptions in the source.
• Keep findings behavior-specific. A useful finding names the exact operation, the invariant that can fail, a realistic failure mode, and the smallest corrective action.

Read Before Auditing

Inspect only the project under review and its in-repo contracts:

• Cargo.toml, workspace layout, feature flags, build scripts, and target configuration that can change unsafe behavior.
• Modules containing unsafe, extern, repr(C), raw pointers, manual allocation, inline assembly, generated bindings, or platform-specific code.
• Public APIs that wrap unsafe internals, especially APIs accepting pointers, file descriptors, handles, lengths, callbacks, or ownership transfer.
• Tests, fuzz targets, Miri configuration, sanitizer jobs, Clippy settings, and CI workflows that claim to validate unsafe contracts.
• Existing safety comments, architecture notes, FFI headers, C ABI docs, and generated binding metadata.

If generated bindings are present, audit the handwritten boundary that calls them. Do not spend the main review on generated code unless the generation options or wrapper policy are part of the risk.

Boundary Inventory

Build a concise inventory before judging individual sites. Search broadly, then deduplicate by boundary:

rg -n '\bunsafe\b|extern[[:space:]]+"C"|no_mangle|export_name|repr\(C\)|repr\(transparent\)|from_raw|into_raw|as_ptr|as_mut_ptr|NonNull|MaybeUninit|ManuallyDrop|transmute|slice::from_raw_parts|CStr::from_ptr|CString::from_raw|libc::|windows_sys::|asm!' .

For each boundary, record:

Group repeated unsafe blocks behind the same abstraction. The audit should make the module's boundary shape clear, not bury the reader in duplicate line items.

Safety Invariant Checks

For each inventory item, test the contract against these questions.

Pointer and slice validity:

• Can null pointers, dangling pointers, unaligned pointers, or incorrect lengths reach the unsafe operation?
• Is provenance preserved when converting through integers, byte buffers, or foreign handles?
• Are zero-length slices handled without requiring a non-null data pointer where Rust requires one?

Aliasing and mutability:

• Can &mut T or mutable slices alias any other live reference?
• Does interior mutability use the right primitive and document synchronization or single-thread assumptions?
• Are Send and Sync implementations justified by the data they protect, not by the absence of compiler errors?

Initialization, layout, and drop:

• Is every byte read from initialized memory?
• Are repr(C) and repr(transparent) assumptions matched to the actual ABI requirement?
• Are MaybeUninit, ManuallyDrop, ptr::read, and ptr::write paired with a clear drop story for success and failure paths?

Lifetime and ownership:

• Does any pointer, callback, or handle outlive the Rust value it depends on?
• Is ownership transfer across FFI one-way and paired with the correct release function?
• Are borrowed buffers protected from mutation or deallocation by the foreign side while Rust references exist?

FFI and ABI behavior:

• Are nullability, length units, string encoding, struct packing, and enum values stated at the boundary?
• Can a Rust panic or foreign exception cross an ABI that does not permit unwinding?
• Does the code use the same allocator family for allocation and release?
• Are callbacks reentrant, thread-safe, and cancellation-safe according to the contract?

Integer and platform assumptions:

• Are pointer-sized values, signedness, truncation, endian behavior, and alignment different on supported targets?
• Do feature flags or target-specific modules bypass guards used on the primary platform?

Surface Reduction Procedure

When a boundary fails, prefer fixes in this order:

1. Encode the invariant in a safe type: non-zero length, owned handle, checked pointer wrapper, lifetime-bearing reference, or enum with valid variants.
2. Move the unsafe operation into the smallest private function that can check its inputs immediately before the operation.
3. Replace caller promises with runtime validation where validation is cheap and complete.
4. Split construction from use so invalid states cannot be represented after initialization.
5. Add a SAFETY: comment beside the unsafe block that names the invariant and points to the guard that enforces it.
6. If the invariant cannot be encoded or checked, document the public unsafe API contract and require call-site evidence for every caller.

Reject broad module-level safety comments that do not tie a specific unsafe operation to specific guards. A reader should be able to stand on the unsafe line and see why it is sound.

Validation Evidence

Match checks to the risk instead of running a generic omnibus gate:

• cargo test for normal behavior and regression coverage.
• cargo test --all-features when feature flags alter unsafe paths.
• cargo miri test for undefined-behavior-sensitive code when the crate and dependencies support Miri.
• Address, leak, or thread sanitizers for pointer lifetime, allocation, and data race risks on targets where those checks are available.
• Fuzz or property tests for parsers, length arithmetic, byte decoding, and FFI input adapters.
• ABI/layout assertions for repr(C) structs, exported symbols, and handles consumed outside Rust.
• Negative tests for rejected null pointers, invalid lengths, double-free attempts, callback misuse, panic containment, and mismatched ownership.

Record commands exactly as run, the platform, important feature flags, and any tests that were skipped. If a tool cannot run, say why and compensate with a targeted source review or narrower test.

Report Shape

Produce a short audit report in this order:

1. Scope: crate, modules, commit range, target platforms, and excluded areas.
2. Unsafe inventory: grouped boundary table with invariant and enforcer columns.
3. Findings: severity, file/function, failed invariant, failure mode, fix.
4. Surface-reduction plan: concrete wrappers, type changes, module moves, or call-site contract changes.
5. Validation evidence: commands run, results, platform, skipped checks, and why.
6. Residual risk: assumptions that still depend on callers, foreign code, platform ABIs, generated bindings, or unavailable tooling.
7. Verdict: pass, pass with follow-up, block until fixed, or needs owner decision.

Finding Standards

A finding is actionable when it includes:

• The exact unsafe operation or FFI edge.
• The invariant that is missing, unenforced, or contradicted by the code.
• A plausible path from safe or external input to undefined behavior, memory corruption, data race, leak, panic across FFI, or ABI mismatch.
• The narrowest fix that removes or encodes the unsafe obligation.
• The test or tooling evidence that should prove the fix.

Avoid findings that only say "unsafe code exists" or "add more tests." The audit exists to prove or improve the boundary, not to count unsafe keywords.

Quality Rubric

The audit passes when all hold:

• Every unsafe boundary has a named invariant and an identified enforcer.
• Public safe APIs cannot trigger undefined behavior by passing ordinary invalid input.
• Public unsafe APIs state caller obligations in Rust terms and, for FFI, ABI terms.
• The unsafe surface is private and minimal unless public unsafe is essential to the crate's purpose.
• Validation evidence targets the specific invariants under review.
• Residual risk is explicit enough for maintainers to accept, schedule, or block.