majiayu000 Cloudflare Zero Trust Skill
Audit and implement Zero Trust security policies using Cloudflare Access, service tokens, and mTLS. Ensure all environments (production, staging, dev) have appropriate access controls.
Environment Protection Matrix
| Environment | Expected Protection | Common Gap | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production | CF Access + WAF + Rate Limiting | Usually protected | LOW |
| Staging | CF Access (should mirror prod) | Often missing Access | HIGH |
| Development | CF Access or IP restrictions | Frequently exposed | CRITICAL |
| Preview (PR deploys) | CF Access or time-limited | Often public | HIGH |
| Admin/Internal APIs | Service Tokens + mTLS | Basic auth only | CRITICAL |
Zero Trust Audit Workflow
Step 1: Environment Discovery
1. List all Workers in account via MCP
2. Identify environment patterns:
- *-staging, *-dev, *-preview
- staging.*, dev.*, preview.*
- Feature branch deployments
3. Check route configurations
Step 2: Access Policy Verification
For each environment, verify:
// Query Access applications
mcp__cloudflare-access__list_applications()
// For each route/hostname, check if Access policy exists:
// - Authentication requirement
// - Allow/Block rules
// - Session duration
// - Geographic restrictions
Step 3: Audit Findings
| ID | Name | Severity | Check |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZT001 | Staging without Access | CRITICAL | staging.* routes without Access policy |
| ZT002 | Dev environment exposed | CRITICAL | dev.* publicly accessible |
| ZT003 | Preview deploys public | HIGH | .pages.dev or preview. without Access |
| ZT004 | Admin routes unprotected | CRITICAL | /admin/* without Access or auth middleware |
| ZT005 | Internal APIs no service token | HIGH | Internal service routes without mTLS/tokens |
| ZT006 | Weak session duration | MEDIUM | Access session > 24h for sensitive routes |
| ZT007 | No geographic restriction | LOW | Admin access from any country |
| ZT008 | Missing bypass audit | MEDIUM | Bypass rules without justification |
| ZT009 | Jobs route no service token | CRITICAL | /jobs/* without service token auth |
| ZT010 | Admin without MFA | HIGH | Admin uses password-only (no OTP/MFA) |
| ZT011 | Hardcoded credentials | CRITICAL | Service token credentials in source |
| ZT012 | Long admin sessions | MEDIUM | Admin session > 4h |
Environment Detection Heuristics
Staging/Dev Indicators
Hostname patterns:
- staging.*, stage.*, stg.*
- dev.*, development.*
- preview.*, pr-*.*, branch-*.*
- *.pages.dev (Cloudflare Pages previews)
- localhost:*, 127.0.0.1:*
Wrangler config indicators:
- env.staging, env.development
- name: "*-staging", "*-dev"
- vars.ENVIRONMENT: "staging" | "development"
Admin Route Indicators
Path patterns requiring protection:
- /admin/*
- /api/admin/*
- /internal/*
- /dashboard/*
- /manage/*
- /config/*
- /_debug/*
- /metrics, /health (depends on sensitivity)
Output Format
# Zero Trust Audit Report
**Scope**: [Account/Zone]
**Environments Scanned**: X
## Critical Gaps (Immediate Action Required)
### [ZT001] Staging Environment Exposed
- **Route**: staging.example.com/*
- **Status**: No Access policy detected
- **Risk**: Staging data/functionality exposed to internet
- **Fix**: Create Access application with team email domain restriction
- **Provenance**: `[LIVE-VALIDATED]` via cloudflare-access MCP
## Recommendations
1. [ ] Create Access application for `staging.example.com`
2. [ ] Implement service token auth for CI/CD access
3. [ ] Add mTLS for internal service-to-service calls
4. [ ] Review and reduce session durations
MCP Tools for Zero Trust
// List Access applications
mcp__cloudflare-access__list_applications()
// Get application details
mcp__cloudflare-access__get_application({ app_id: "..." })
// List Access policies
mcp__cloudflare-access__list_policies({ app_id: "..." })
// Verify route protection
mcp__cloudflare-bindings__workers_list()
Quick Reference
| Topic | Recommendation |
|---|---|
| Preview deploys | Always protect with Access; use time-limited URLs |
| Service tokens | Rotate quarterly; scope to specific applications |
| mTLS | Required for PCI-DSS/HIPAA compliance scenarios |
| Session duration | Shorter for admin (1-4h), longer for general (24h) |
| Bypass rules | Document and audit regularly; set expiration |
| Geographic restrictions | Consider for admin access |
| Device posture | Enable for high-security environments (requires WARP) |
Reference Files
For detailed implementation patterns, consult:
references/access-policies.md- Access policy patterns, Terraform examples, policy generatorreferences/tunnel-config.md- Cloudflare Tunnel setup, config.yml examples, deployment patternsreferences/service-tokens.md- Service token auth, admin protection checklist, extended validation rules
Related Skills
- architect: Overall architecture including Access integration
- guardian: Security auditing across all Cloudflare services
- loop-breaker: Preventing service token abuse in loops