SOTA Engineering Skills — Master Router
A library of 41 domain skills, each with a SKILL.md entry point and a rules/
folder of focused rule files (each under 500 lines). Each skill works in two
modes:
- BUILD — apply the rules while designing or writing code.
- AUDIT — review existing code against the rules and emit findings in the
canonical format below (it supersedes any per-skill variant):
file:line | rule violated | severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info) | effort (trivial/small/medium/large) | fix.
Read only what the task needs: first the relevant skill's SKILL.md (it has its
own index of rules/ files with "read this when..." guidance), then only the
rules files that match the code in front of you. Never load all skills at once.
Operating principles (always apply)
- Validate every claim — mandatory. No claim ships unvalidated, in any mode. A claim is validated only by checking it against a primary source: code read in full context at the pinned commit (for findings), official docs/release notes/advisories fetched at use time (for versions, specs, CVEs, tool capabilities), or a reproduced behavior (for bugs). Training data, plausibility, and "the rules file says so" do not validate anything. What cannot be validated is either omitted or explicitly marked "needs verification" — never asserted. Before measuring, state what result would falsify the claim. If no obtainable result could, the experiment is theater — read the code path that decides the behavior instead of benchmarking its symptoms.
- Freshness first. The library's version/spec/regulation facts were web-verified as of the last refresh (see README). Never trust them — or training data — for anything version- or CVE-sensitive at use time: re-verify current releases and advisories before pinning or recommending.
- Stop-and-ask on security-relevant decisions. When a choice materially affects security posture (authn/z model, crypto primitive, trust boundary, secrets handling, network exposure), present the options with a recommendation and ask before proceeding. Do not silently pick.
- Evidence over vibes. Every audit finding cites file:line, maps to a
standard (CWE, OWASP, MITRE ATT&CK/ATLAS) where one applies, and proposes a
concrete fix. Uncertain findings are marked "needs verification", never
asserted. Borderline severities state the deciding assumption ("High if
internet-facing; Medium if internal-only"). A negative claim needs more
proof than a positive one: "no instances of X" and "I only looked one way"
are indistinguishable from the outside, so before asserting absence, widen
the search and use a second independent method — and state the search you
actually ran. "Independent" means a different failure mode, not a different
phrasing. Field-reported: two searches of the same tree agreed on zero and
both were wrong, because both were
grep -rover a directory of symlinks, which-rdoes not follow. The only check that works is a positive control — search for something you have already seen there, in the same invocation; if the control returns nothing, the instrument is broken and the absence is not evidence (sota-shell-scriptingrules/06 §2). - Stack profile. If the repo or
~/.claudecontains aprofiles/*.mdstack profile (preferred stores, auth provider, license policy, platform conventions), its choices are the defaults for BUILD mode and the expected baseline for AUDIT mode. - Universal build non-negotiables (apply regardless of routing). On any network-reachable endpoint or handler (HTTP, RPC, queue, webhook, upload), always include: (a) abuse control — rate limiting / quotas keyed to the caller; (b) transport enforcement — TLS, HSTS, no plaintext fallback; (c) tests for the logic; (d) structured logging without secrets/PII. These are cross-cutting, so they get silently dropped under a long, dense task even when a rules file covers them — a measured attention effect, not a coverage gap. Keep this list short and re-check it last, before you ship (BUILD step 4). If one is deliberately handled elsewhere (e.g. rate limiting at the gateway), say so — don't silently omit it.
- Claim "done" only with evidence. Never report a task complete or a fix working from plausibility — "should work", "this fixes it", "Done!" are not evidence. State the check you actually ran and its result: test output with pass/fail counts and exit code, the command and its output, or the reproduced behavior. If you did not run it, say so plainly. Unverified completion is not completion — this applies to your own build output before you hand it back.
- Restate from the artifact, never from your own summary. Re-reading your
own write-up re-runs the reasoning that produced it — the weakest check
available. Before a claim reaches anything user-visible, go back to the
primary source: re-read the tool output, or re-run the command. Your earlier
prose in this session is not a primary source; summaries silently drop the
case that contradicts them and raw output does not. Full adversarial
procedure for audit findings: AUDIT step 7 and
rules/03§4. - Publishing under someone else's name raises the bar. A claim to the
person who asked costs one reader's trust and is cheap to retract. A claim
published as them — a PR review comment, an issue, a commit message, a
mailing-list post — is public, attributed and effectively permanent. Verify
every factual claim by execution rather than inference, say which parts you
did not test, check the thread first for whether it is already known, and
never publish on someone's behalf without approval of the final text. Full
procedure:
sota-docs-workflowrules/03 §8. - Match the rigour to the stakes — and name the level you chose. A spike, a one-off script, a local experiment: build it, say in one line that it is a prototype and what you left out, stop. Anything reachable by an untrusted caller or touching money, credentials or another tenant's data gets the full treatment including principle 5, whether or not the request said "quick"; if it is genuinely ambiguous, ask in one line. An unnamed shortcut is not a prototype.
Routing table
| Skill | Use when the task involves... |
|---|---|
sota-architecture |
System design, service boundaries, monolith vs microservices, DDD, event-driven design, sagas/outbox, reconciliation against a third party that holds authoritative state, resilience (timeouts/retries/circuit breakers), scalability, multi-tenancy, 12-factor/cloud-native, architectural anti-patterns |
sota-code-security |
Writing or reviewing code that touches untrusted input, authn/authz, sessions/JWT/OAuth, crypto, XSS/CSRF/CORS, file uploads, deserialization, error/log hygiene, LLM/agent app security, silent control failure (a safeguard that looks enabled and does nothing) |
sota-threat-modeling |
Designing a new system/feature with security in mind, drawing trust boundaries and DFDs, STRIDE/LINDDUN, risk rating, reconstructing a threat model from an existing codebase |
sota-skill-security |
Installing, authoring, reviewing or auditing anything an agent loads as instructions — skills, plugins, rulesets, AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md/.cursorrules: provenance and pinning, review-before-install, the instruction trust boundary (a PR that edits an agent file changes what your agent does), precedence and shadowing between overlapping skills, capability minimisation, and guidance that is confidently wrong |
sota-secrets-management |
API keys, passwords, tokens, signing/TLS/SSH keys, .env files, Vault/cloud secret managers, workload identity (OIDC), secret rotation, leak detection and remediation |
sota-sandboxing |
Isolation of untrusted code or input, least privilege, seccomp/Landlock/capabilities, container/K8s hardening, microVMs, WASM sandboxes, subprocess hygiene, sandboxing AI-agent code execution |
sota-performance |
Latency, throughput, profiling, memory usage, caching (incl. stampede protection), I/O and network efficiency, Core Web Vitals, performance regression in CI |
sota-async-concurrency |
async/await, threads, goroutines, channels, races, deadlocks, event-loop blocking, cancellation/timeouts, graceful shutdown, backpressure, bounded queues |
sota-api-design |
REST/HTTP semantics, pagination, idempotency, versioning/deprecation, GraphQL, gRPC/proto evolution, websockets/SSE/realtime, webhooks, API rate limiting and tenant isolation |
sota-devsecops |
CI/CD pipelines, GitHub Actions hardening, supply chain (SLSA, Sigstore, SBOM, dependency confusion), unused/inert dependencies and upstream-health checks, container builds, SAST/secret-scanning gates, Terraform/GitOps, admission control |
sota-databases |
Schema design, Postgres/NoSQL choice, migrations (zero-downtime), indexes/EXPLAIN, transactions/isolation, ledgers & account balances, connection pooling, replication/backups, Redis, RLS/DB security, pgvector |
sota-frontend-design |
UI/UX, visual design, typography/color/layout, design systems and tokens, components, forms, accessibility (WCAG 2.2), motion/animation design, modern CSS, responsive design |
sota-web-frameworks |
React/Next.js and Vue/Nuxt engineering — Server Components & Server Actions, the RSC/client trust boundary, Next caching (use cache/PPR/ISR), Nitro server routes, hydration correctness, SSR state serialization, and framework-specific security & CVEs |
sota-observability |
Logging, metrics, tracing (OpenTelemetry), SLOs/error budgets, alerting, health checks, dashboards, debugging production, "can we answer why is this slow?" |
sota-testing |
Test strategy (pyramid/trophy), unit vs integration boundaries, test design/smells, mocks/fakes/test data, contract testing, e2e, property-based/fuzzing/mutation testing, flaky tests, coverage policy |
sota-llm-engineering |
Building LLM features — evals, prompt/context engineering, structured output, RAG, agents/tool design, MCP, model selection/routing, latency/cost engineering, LLM observability — and any question about a model's tokens, context window, pricing or limits, including measuring your own files |
sota-ml-engineering |
Production ML/MLOps (classical/predictive, not LLM apps) — training→serving→monitoring lifecycle, feature stores & registries, data leakage & train/serve skew, evaluation (ML Test Score, slices), deployment (canary/shadow/rollback), drift monitoring (PSI/KS) & retraining, ML security/governance (poisoning, MITRE ATLAS, NIST AI RMF) |
sota-cloud-infrastructure |
Cloud accounts/landing zones, cloud IAM, VPC/subnet/DNS/CDN setup, compute selection (serverless vs containers vs K8s), object storage, FinOps/cost, RTO/RPO and disaster recovery |
sota-kubernetes |
Kubernetes platform security & ops — RBAC & escalation paths, admission control (PSA/Kyverno/Gatekeeper/VAP, Audit→Enforce), GitOps controllers (Argo CD/Flux, AppProject scoping), operators/CRDs/webhooks, control plane & etcd encryption, Helm supply chain, multi-tenancy, cluster lifecycle, K8s audit logging; self-hosted (Talos/k3s) and managed |
sota-identity-access |
Identity infrastructure & access management — OIDC/OAuth2.1/SAML/SCIM protocols, running an IdP (Kanidm/Keycloak/etc.), RBAC/ABAC/ReBAC authorization design, group→role mapping, joiner-mover-leaver lifecycle, deprovisioning, privileged access & break-glass, SPIFFE/workload identity, phishing-resistant MFA/passkeys, federation risk |
sota-network-security |
Network security as a discipline — zero-trust (NIST 800-207), segmentation & blast-radius, the world/any over-broad-rule trap, Kubernetes NetworkPolicy depth (Cilium L7, default-deny egress), service mesh & mTLS / internal encryption, edge/ingress/WAF, egress control & metadata-endpoint blocking, DNS/TLS/PKI & cert lifecycle, email auth (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) |
sota-confidential-computing |
Protecting workloads/data from the infrastructure operator — TEEs (AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX, ARM CCA, SGX enclaves, Nitro Enclaves, confidential GPUs), remote attestation (RATS, attest-then-release), confidential VMs/nodes/containers on K8s (CoCo/Kata/Trustee), and cryptographic PETs (FHE, MPC, ZKP, PSI) when hardware trust is off the table |
sota-detection-engineering |
Detective controls, SOC & IR — detection-as-code, Sigma/YARA/Suricata/Falco/Tetragon rules, ATT&CK coverage, SIEM & telemetry coverage, alert tuning/SOAR, threat hunting & intel (STIX/TAXII), deception/honeytokens, incident response (NIST 800-61), detection validation (Atomic Red Team/Caldera) |
sota-data-engineering |
Data pipelines, ELT/orchestration, dbt, Kafka/streaming, CDC, schema registry, lakehouse (Iceberg/Delta/Parquet), data quality/contracts, warehouse modeling |
sota-privacy-compliance |
PII inventory/classification, privacy by design, consent, DSAR/deletion architecture, retention, GDPR/CCPA/HIPAA/PCI/AI Act engineering obligations, SOC 2/ISO 27001 audit readiness, breach response |
sota-security-compliance |
Cybersecurity control frameworks & product-security regulations as engineering — NIST CSF 2.0, SP 800-53, 800-171/CMMC, SSDF (800-218), FedRAMP, EU Cyber Resilience Act (SBOM/CVD/signed updates), ISA/IEC 62443 (OT zones & conduits, Security Levels); control-framework-as-code crosswalks, CUI boundaries, FIPS-validated crypto |
sota-mobile |
iOS/Android/cross-platform apps — stack choice, offline-first/sync, push, mobile security (Keychain/Keystore, attestation), performance budgets, store requirements, staged rollouts |
sota-cli-ux |
CLI/developer-tool design — flags/subcommands, config precedence, stdout/stderr and --json contracts, exit codes, TTY detection, signals, completions, distribution |
sota-shell-scripting |
Bash/sh scripts, CI run blocks, entrypoints, Makefiles — safety baseline (quoting, set -euo pipefail, traps), injection, secrets in scripts, shellcheck/shfmt |
sota-docs-workflow |
Documentation (Diátaxis, READMEs, runbooks, API docs, changelogs, AGENTS.md), code review/PR workflow, commit/branch/release discipline |
sota-ux-writing |
Any user-facing interface text — microcopy, button/label wording, error messages, empty states, onboarding copy, notifications, tone of voice, terminology, alt text, i18n-ready strings |
sota-copywriting |
Outward-facing content — landing pages, headlines/CTAs, value propositions, SEO content, testimonials/social proof, claim substantiation, email marketing, app-store listings |
sota-rust |
Any Rust code — ownership/API design, error handling, unsafe discipline, tokio/async, supply chain (cargo audit/deny/vet), performance, clippy/CI |
sota-golang |
Any Go code — errors, package/interface design, goroutines/channels/leaks, net/http hardening, security (os/exec, os.Root, govulncheck), pprof/performance, golangci-lint/CI |
sota-c-cpp |
Any C/C++ code — RAII/idioms, memory safety (UAF/overflow/sanitizers), undefined behavior, security (CERT/MISRA, banned APIs, OpenSSF hardening flags), concurrency/atomics, CMake/clang-tidy/fuzzing CI, performance |
sota-jvm |
Any Java/Kotlin code — modern idioms (records/sealed/pattern-matching, Kotlin null-safety/coroutines), API/null/immutability design, concurrency (virtual threads, JMM, j.u.c, coroutines), security (deserialization/JNDI/XXE/injection, JCA crypto), GC/JFR/GraalVM performance, Maven/Gradle supply-chain & CI |
sota-python |
Any Python code — uv/ruff/typing setup, idioms/pitfalls, asyncio, security (pickle/subprocess/SQL), performance, FastAPI/Django/pytest |
sota-javascript-typescript |
Any JS/TS code — strict tsconfig/type design, idioms, promises/AbortController, Node backend hardening, XSS/supply-chain security, bundle/React performance, vitest/ESLint |
sota-dotnet |
Any C#/.NET code — modern idioms (records, nullable reference types, pattern matching, spans), API/disposal/DI design, async/await & concurrency (ConfigureAwait, cancellation, channels), security (EF/Dapper SQL, deserialization, ASP.NET Core auth, crypto), GC/Span/AOT performance, NuGet supply chain & analyzers/CI |
sota-php |
Any PHP code — strict_types/modern idioms (enums, readonly, match), security (PDO/SQLi, XSS escaping, uploads/LFI, unserialize/Phar, sessions, password_hash/sodium), framework-neutral web hardening, Composer supply chain, PHPStan/Psalm, OPcache/FPM/JIT performance |
sota-ruby |
Any Ruby code — idioms (frozen strings, pattern matching, RBS/Sorbet), security (AR/SQLi, ERB escaping, strong params, Marshal/YAML.load, command injection, ReDoS), Bundler supply chain (bundler-audit, lockfile checksums), RuboCop/Brakeman, GVL/Ractors/YJIT performance |
Cross-cutting routing rules
Language skills stack on domain skills. Auditing a Go API server →
sota-golang+sota- api-design+sota-code-security. The language skill covers idioms and runtime-specific traps; domain skills cover the design.Security tasks usually need three skills. Code-level flaws →
sota-code-security; design- level gaps →sota-threat-modeling; leaked or mishandled credentials →sota-secrets- management. Pipeline/supply-chain →sota-devsecops; isolation blast-radius →sota- sandboxing.Performance complaints about queries → start in
sota-databases(EXPLAIN, indexes, N+1) beforesota-performance(caching, I/O).Anything realtime (websockets, SSE, pub/sub fanout) →
sota-api-designrules/05 +sota- async-concurrency(backpressure).AI/LLM features →
sota-code-securityrules/08 (prompt injection, tool authorization) +sota-sandboxingrules/05 (executing model output) +sota-databasesrules/07 (vectors/RAG).Frontend work →
sota-frontend-designfor design/UX/a11y/motion;sota-web-frameworksfor React/Next or Vue/Nuxt engineering (RSC/client boundary, Server Actions, caching, hydration, SSR security);sota-javascript-typescriptfor the language/TS;sota-performancerules/06 for Web Vitals. A React/Next or Vue/Nuxt security review pulls all four.Tests accompany everything. Any BUILD task that writes logic also loads
sota-testing(strategy + design rules); any AUDIT includes a suite-health pass. Language-specific runner mechanics stay in the language skills.LLM features split three ways. Quality/architecture →
sota-llm-engineering; security (prompt injection, tool authz) →sota-code-securityrules/08; executing model output →sota- sandboxingrules/05; PII in prompts/logs →sota-privacy-compliance.Infra layers split four ways. Cloud-provider setup (accounts, VPC, compute, cost, DR) →
sota-cloud-infrastructure; the Kubernetes platform itself (RBAC, admission, GitOps controllers, operators, etcd) →sota-kubernetes; pod/container/workload isolation mechanics →sota-sandboxing; CI/CD and supply chain →sota-devsecops. A K8s cluster audit loadssota- kubernetes+sota-network-security+sota-sandboxing.Identity is its own layer. App-level login/session/JWT-validation code →
sota-code- securityrules/02-03; identity infrastructure (IdP, OIDC/SAML config, RBAC/role-mapping design, provisioning, break-glass, SPIFFE) →sota-identity-access; the credentials themselves →sota-secrets-management.Network: setup vs security. Cloud VPC/DNS/CDN provisioning →
sota-cloud-infrastructurerules/03; segmentation, zero-trust, NetworkPolicy depth, service mesh/mTLS, egress/DNS/PKI posture →sota-network-security.Prevention vs detection. Building the control → the relevant domain skill; verifying you'd catch the attack at runtime (logs, rules, hunting, IR) →
sota-detection-engineering. Ops telemetry plumbing stays insota-observability; design-time threat enumeration insota- threat-modeling.Ingesting untrusted/attacker-authored data (feeds, scraping, uploads, webhooks, RAG corpora, hostile parsers) →
sota-code-securityrules/09, withsota-sandboxingrules/04 for parser isolation. A tool ingesting whole repositories (scanner, SAST wrapper, review bot, agentic analyser) addssota-sandboxingrules/05 §7 — staging, build execution, egress.Data: OLTP vs analytics. App databases →
sota-databases; pipelines, streaming, warehouse/lakehouse →sota-data-engineering; anything touching personal data → addsota- privacy-compliance.Any handling of user/personal data (new fields, exports, logs, analytics, ML training) → check
sota-privacy-complianceminimization and retention rules, even when the task isn't "about" privacy.User-facing words split three ways. In-product UI text (labels, errors, empty states) →
sota-ux-writing; marketing/site/email content →sota-copywriting; technical docs →sota- docs-workflow. The component patterns the text lives in staysota-frontend-design.Shell scripts hide everywhere — CI run blocks, Dockerfile RUN lines, Makefiles, entrypoints, and the one-liners you type to verify a claim: unlinted shell run against the system under test, which when wrong produces a false finding about the product (a usage error, exit 2, from the callee is the tell — but a failed glob is silent and fakes a clean result). Audit it all with
sota-shell-scriptingrules/01 §3 and rules/06, the file for pasted and agent-issued commands. And a script that produces or verifies evidence (attestations, ledgers, gate records, audit trails) is a security control written in shell: addsota-code-securityrules/10, rules/12 and rules/15.Cryptography fans out — there is no single crypto skill (by design). Algorithm choice, AEAD/nonce discipline, CSPRNG, in-code key handling, TLS client config, constant-time comparison, tamper-evident logs/audit ledgers (keyed hash chains, external anchoring, integrity-vs-completeness), crypto agility, and post-quantum migration →
sota-code-securityrules/04. The key material — storage backends (KMS/HSM, Vault, SOPS+age), lifecycle, rotation, per-credential-type handling →sota-secrets-management. Transport/PKI — TLS server config, cert lifecycle/ACME, private CA, mTLS →sota-network-securityrules/06. FIPS-140-3-validated-module requirements →sota-security-compliancerules/02. Language- specific APIs (JCA,crypto/*, .NET) stay in the language skill. The stance throughout is use a vetted library, don't roll your own.Which direction does the trust boundary point? Protecting the host from the workload (untrusted code, seccomp/microVMs/WASM sandboxes) →
sota-sandboxing. Protecting the workload from the host/operator — TEEs (SEV-SNP/TDX/CCA/SGX), remote attestation, confidential VMs/containers, or computing on encrypted data (FHE/MPC/ZKP) →sota- confidential-computing. Both can apply to one system. Key custody/release stayssota- secrets-management; differential privacy and de-identification staysota-privacy- compliance."It's enabled" is a claim, not a fact. Whenever a control's presence is established but its effect isn't — a banner, a config flag, a green test, "we have a scanner" — route to
sota-code-securityrules/10 (silent control failure). It pairs withsota-testingrules/06 (mutation-probe the control) and rules/09 (a security test must be watched to fail),sota- observabilityrules/05 (degradation must be visible), andsota-devsecopsrules/04 (does the shipped artifact contain what the control needs at runtime?). Not for controls that are simply missing — that's the owning domain skill's audit checklist.Model facts hide in your own tooling — the same shape as rule 17. Any question about a model's tokens, context window, pricing or limits is
sota-llm-engineering(rules/02 §2 for counting, rules/05 for cost), including measuring your own files, prompts or docs, and even when the surrounding task is repo maintenance and nothing looks like an LLM feature. The tell is reaching for a chars/4 estimate or another vendor's tokenizer instead of the provider'scount_tokens: measured 2026-08-26, that shortcut under-counts Claude by 54% on markdown-dense text — in the direction that makes you think you have room.
Day zero — a repo this library has not been applied to yet
Installing is ambient: the rules apply in every directory, including a repo
with no gates, no agent file and no LICENSE. They then govern the code you write
and nothing else — the repo keeps accepting unscanned commits. Check this
once per repo, on the first BUILD task in an unfamiliar one, by looking (not
inferring): is there a .pre-commit-config.yaml or any other hook manager or
CI job running a secret scan; a license file (LICENSE*, COPYING* or
COPYRIGHT — never match the bare name, projects name it after the licence);
an AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md; and how long is the git history? Two or more missing
and a history of a few commits = day zero. A long history means a mature
repo that likely decided against them; say nothing.
When it fires, say it once, in a line, with the command, then get on with the
task: scripts/init-gates.sh + pre-commit install --hook-type pre-push for
gates (before the first commit, while a leaked credential is still free to
remove), scripts/gen-agents-md.sh for the cross-tool entry point. Full ordering
and reasoning — LICENSE, .gitignore, ambient-vs-repo-resident, the
core.symlinks trap — in sota-docs-workflow rules/01 §10.
Offer, never perform. These write config into the user's repo. Mention once, act only on a yes, and treat a decline as decided.
BUILD mode — workflow
Reasoning and worked examples: rules/02-build-workflow.md. Changing a step below?
It is mirrored in four places — rules/02 §5 lists them, and three fail silently.
- Identify the domains the feature touches (table above) and the language(s).
- Load lean. Read each relevant skill's
SKILL.mdand, from its index, open only the rules files that match the work. Lean costs less and measures no worse; the degradation this step once claimed is not supported —rules/02§1. - Plan first, with the checks in the plan. Before writing code, list the task's requirements as concrete, checkable items — a specific outcome you can mark done/not-done ("rate-limit login to N/min per IP", not "add rate limiting") — covering the top-10 non-negotiables of each loaded skill plus operating principle 5. Vague items don't survive to step 4. Then implement against that list.
- Self-audit gate (do this LAST — do not present code until it passes). Re-read each
loaded rules file's Audit checklist and operating principle 5, and verify your
diff satisfies every item. For each unmet item, implement it or state why it is out
of scope — silence is not allowed. For every control, ask the falsification
question: if this were silently a no-op, would anything observable differ? If
nothing would — no log, no metric, no failing test — it is not done
(
sota-code-securityrules/10). If the control emits an artifact, read back the one this run just produced. Doing this last is deliberate: a long context makes mid-context rules fade, and the final re-read is what recovers the rate limiting, transport, tests and logging a model otherwise drops — measured as the bulk of the library's completeness lift (evals/run-completeness.py). For a large build, run it as a separate pass over the diff, and push the few critical invariants into deterministic gates (rules/02§3).
AUDIT mode — workflow
Procedure lives in two rules files, read together for any full audit: rules/01-audit-methodology.md
(scoping, the verified tool matrix, triage, hygiene) and rules/03-audit-findings.md (severity —
chain closure, the diff baseline — evidence, the decision ledger, refutation, the report template).
A new pass needs a line in this router and a section in the rules file that owns it, never here.
For a focused audit, load the matching skills and follow their AUDIT sections. For a full project audit, work in passes:
- Recon. Inventory languages, frameworks, entry points (HTTP routes, queues, cron,
webhooks), data stores, CI config, Dockerfiles, IaC. This determines which skills
apply; skip skills with no matching surface. Full procedure:
rules/01§2. - Threat model first.
sota-threat-modelingrules/06 (reconstruction): assets, trust boundaries, entry points. Its output prioritizes the rest. - Per-domain passes. For each applicable skill, follow its AUDIT mode and audit
checklists. Suggested order: secrets sweep (fast, high yield) → code security (incl.
rules/09 untrusted-data ingestion) → language-specific (incl. shell scripts) → API →
database → async/concurrency → identity & access → sandboxing/devsecops → kubernetes
platform → network security → cloud infrastructure → privacy/compliance → architecture
→ testing suite health → performance → observability → detection-engineering posture →
frontend/a11y → LLM features, data pipelines, mobile, CLI, docs as applicable. For an
infrastructure/cluster audit the heavy hitters are
sota-kubernetes,sota-network-security,sota-identity-access,sota-sandboxingandsota-detection-engineering. - Silent-control pass (always run it). The per-domain passes ask "is the control
there?" — this one asks "does it do anything?", then "does it cover every site it
is credited with?". Apply
sota-code-securityrules/10 (inert controls — invisible to the other passes and to SAST), sweeping withrules/11first to find where to look: stage duration vs work claimed, every gate's denominator (0 checked, 0 failed, exit 0), size-gated paths no fixture crosses, cache keys narrower than the behaviour, one-sample parsers,assert-as-control. Then count:sota-code-securityrules/14 §6 censuses what a working mitigation guards (9 of 61 is the finding), §7 falsifies the prose. - Decision-ledger review. Code passes find defects in what was built; they cannot
find the defect where the code faithfully implements a choice that stopped being
right — a store picked for scale that never arrived, an expired constraint still
shaping the design. Reconstruct the expensive-to-reverse decisions (ADRs, design docs,
CHANGELOG, the PRs behind each major component) and classify each JUSTIFIED / STALE /
UNJUSTIFIED / UNVERIFIABLE. Where a decision rests on a number, re-measure it this
session. Full procedure:
rules/03§3. Then ask where else the team's knowledge lives — an agent's private memory store, an IDE's notes, a chat log. Anything in there that is a fact about the repository with no home in the repository is a finding: invisible to review, absent from a fresh clone, gone when the store is cleared. It is an absence claim and the naive search for it lies —rules/01§4a. - Findings. Emit every finding in the canonical cross-domain format (
file:line | rule | severity | effort | fix) — skill-local formats are fine within a domain pass but must carry an effort field so the roll-up can be sequenced — deduplicate across domains, and roll up into the report structure fromrules/03§5. Severity:rules/03§1 — a Critical/High names its chain, and a diff is rated against the code it replaced. - Refute before reporting. Re-reading your own finding re-runs the reasoning that
produced it — it is the weakest check available. Every Critical/High gets an
independent pass prompted to kill it (a separate agent, or a fresh-context hostile
read), working from the code at the pinned commit rather than your write-up, defaulting
to REFUTED when the evidence is ambiguous. Survivors ship; the rest are dropped or
downgraded with the refutation recorded — and swept first: the refuted pattern
routinely closes somewhere else, and that sweep is where the report's strongest finding
comes from. Absence claims ("no X found") get a refuter too, and carry the heavier
burden of principle 3. Full procedure and failure modes:
rules/03§4.
Library map (rules files per skill)
Which rules/NN file holds what, for all 41 skills: rules/04-library-map.md.
Read it when you know the domain but not the file. When you are already opening a skill's
SKILL.md (BUILD step 2), use that skill's own index instead — it carries the "read this
when…" guidance the map drops.
Context budget discipline
Each rules file is 200–310 lines. A typical focused task needs 2–5 rules files; a full audit pass should load one skill at a time, finish its findings, then move on. If context is tight, prefer the skill's top-10 non-negotiables plus the single most relevant rules file.
When this library is wrong or missing something
These rules are maintained and measured, and they are still incomplete — the library has no telemetry and learns nothing from use unless someone says so. You are the only observer of the gap at the moment it appears.
If, while applying a skill, you hit one of these, say so in one line at the end of your answer and point the user at the report path — then carry on with the task:
- a rule contradicted by a primary source you just checked (version, spec, API, advisory) — freshness rot;
- a rule that does not fit the situation and states no exception for it;
- real surface area in the task with no owning skill — a routing gap;
- guidance that, followed literally, would have shipped a defect.
Two loaded rules that contradict each other are usually a scope collision: one is a general default, the other a requirement inside a narrower domain. The narrower wins in its domain — pick by which failure mode is worse here (a needless idiom vs an outage), never silently: name the rule you followed and why in a comment beside the code, or the next reader reverts it. Then report it — the fix is an explicit exception in whichever rule was too broad.
A routing gap should end as a test, not just a report. If the right skill existed
and the task never reached it, the fix is the trigger — the skill's description is the
only auto-loading text and is the whole classifier — and the proof is a regression case in
evals/cases/desc-routing-regressions.jsonl, which pins the mis-route so it cannot return.
Report: https://github.com/martinholovsky/SOTA-skills/issues/new/choose
(bad-guidance / skill-request templates). Anything dangerous or
security-sensitive goes to a private advisory instead — see SECURITY.md.
Do not fire this for personal preference, for a rule you simply did not need, or mid-task. One line, at the end, only when the library actually let the user down. An unreported gap stays in the library for everyone.