Sota Privacy Compliance

SOTA Privacy & Compliance Engineering

Engineering-facing privacy and compliance architecture: how to design, build, and audit systems so that data protection is a property of the code and infrastructure, not a binder of policy documents. Compliance that lives in schemas, TTLs, IAM policies, and CI checks survives staff turnover and audit scrutiny; compliance that lives in wiki pages does not.

This is engineering guidance, not legal advice. Regulations change, vary by jurisdiction, and turn on facts about your business that code review cannot see. Regulatory facts below were verified against primary sources as of June 2026 — re-verify deadlines and statuses before relying on them, and route legal interpretation (lawful basis selection, contract terms, breach reportability decisions) to qualified counsel or your DPO. This skill tells you how to build the machinery those decisions require.

Related skills — reference, don't duplicate:

• sota-databases rules/06 — DB-level PII mechanics (column encryption, row-level security, GDPR-friendly schema design)
• sota-secrets-management — credentials, KMS, key rotation (crypto-shredding depends on it)
• sota-observability — log redaction and PII-safe telemetry pipelines
• sota-threat-modeling — LINDDUN privacy threat modeling methodology
• sota-code-security / sota-devsecops — vulnerability management, supply chain (SOC 2/ISO control overlap)

BUILD mode

When designing or implementing systems that touch personal data:

1. Inventory first. Before writing a schema or integrating a vendor, classify every field you intend to collect and record where it flows (rules/01). The cheapest control is the field you never store.
2. Annotate at the source. Schemas, structs, and API contracts carry classification and purpose annotations; tooling derives the data map from code, not the other way around (rules/01, rules/02).
3. Build user rights as features, not afterthoughts. Export, deletion, and consent are product capabilities with APIs, state machines, and tests — design them with the first table, because retrofitting deletion into a 200-table schema with denormalized copies is a quarter-long project (rules/03).
4. Automate retention. Every datastore gets a TTL, lifecycle rule, or partition-drop schedule at creation time. "We'll clean it up later" is how seven-year-old PII ends up in a breach disclosure (rules/03).
5. Emit evidence as a byproduct. Access reviews, change approvals, and config baselines should fall out of normal engineering workflow (PRs, IaC, IdP logs) so audits are queries, not scrambles (rules/05).
6. Know your regimes. Check rules/04 for which regulations the system triggers (data types × subjects' locations × sector) before architecture freezes — data residency and breach-clock requirements shape topology.

AUDIT mode

When reviewing an existing codebase/infrastructure for privacy and compliance gaps:

Process: (1) Build or obtain the data inventory — grep schemas, API payloads, log statements, analytics events, object storage for personal data (rules/01 has discovery patterns). (2) Trace lifecycle per data category: collection → purpose → storage → sharing → retention → deletion. (3) Test user rights paths end-to-end (does deletion actually propagate?). (4) Check evidence trails for auditable controls. (5) Map findings to applicable regimes (rules/04).

Severity conventions:

Finding format:

[SEVERITY] <title>
Location: <file:line / table / bucket / service>
Data: <what personal data, what classification tier>
Regimes: <GDPR Art. X / CCPA / HIPAA / PCI DSS req N / SOC 2 CC-N — as applicable>
Issue: <what is wrong, lifecycle stage affected>
Impact: <realistic consequence: fine exposure, breach scope, audit failure, DSAR failure>
Fix: <concrete engineering remediation>
Evidence: <how you verified — query, code path, test>

Report findings grouped by data lifecycle stage (collection / storage / sharing / retention / deletion), not by file — that is how regulators and auditors think.

Rules index

Top 10 non-negotiables

1. No unmapped personal data. Every field of personal data has a recorded classification, purpose, owner, retention period, and list of systems it flows to. Unmapped data is unprotectable data.
2. Collect the minimum. Each field collected must trace to a specific, documented purpose. A field without a purpose is deleted, not "kept just in case" — it is pure liability with zero value.
3. Deletion must actually delete. A deletion request propagates to primary stores, replicas, caches, search indexes, analytics, ML training sets, and is handled for backups (expiry or crypto-shred). A soft-delete flag alone is a finding, not a deletion architecture.
4. Retention is enforced by machines. TTLs, object lifecycle rules, partition drops — running and monitored. A retention policy with no automated enforcement is fiction.
5. Consent is versioned, granular, revocable state — recorded with timestamp, policy version, and scope; checked at point of use; revocation propagates to processors. Never inferred, never a boolean column named gdpr_ok.
6. No PII in logs, URLs, or analytics events unless explicitly classified, redaction-tested, and retention-bounded (see sota-observability for pipeline mechanics). Logs are the most common shadow copy of personal data.
7. Pseudonymized ≠ anonymous. Data that can be re-linked (hashed emails, "anonymized" user IDs, quasi-identifier combinations) is still personal data. Treat claimed anonymization as a re-identification risk to verify, not a label to trust.
8. Encrypt personal data at rest and in transit, with keys you can destroy. Key-per-user or key-per-tenant where deletion/residency demands it (crypto-shredding); keys managed per sota-secrets-management.
9. Cross-border flows are deliberate. Know which regions data lives in and transits; region-pin where required; every processor/subprocessor has a DPA and appears in the data map before the first byte flows.
10. Evidence or it didn't happen. Access reviews, consent records, deletion proofs, DPIAs, breach timelines — generated and retained automatically. If you cannot produce the artifact in minutes, the control will fail its audit.