Install Tend

Install Tend

Set up tend on the current repo, or change an installation it already has.

When asking the user questions during these steps, batch known questions into one interaction where the client supports it, and present concrete options when there are clear choices (e.g. secret-migration confirmation, registry token route).

When a question requires the user to do something off-screen (visit a URL, run a command, paste a value back), spell the next step out in the question or option description: the exact web link, the exact command. "Generate a token on the registry's site" is not enough — give the URL. The user should not have to ask "where do I do that?".

Kickoff

Read .config/tend.yaml first. Its presence says whether this is an install or a change to one, and where it exists it settles the harness: the harness key, or Claude when the key is absent, which is how a Claude install is normally written.

Derive REPO once at the start — the second call resolves a fork clone to its root source, so no remotes need touching (every command below passes --repo "$REPO" explicitly):

gh auth status
LOCAL=$(gh repo view --json nameWithOwner --jq '.nameWithOwner')
REPO=$(gh api "repos/$LOCAL" --jq 'if .fork then .source.full_name else .full_name end')
echo "$REPO"

When the resolution changes the name, or returns null (source deleted or invisible to the token), confirm the target with the user before touching anything — a deliberately maintained hard fork keeps its own name.

A config from a finished install makes this a change: take the harness from the config, lay out only the steps the task touches, and start. Finished means uvx tend@latest check passes — secrets, bot access, protection — and the workflows are live on the default branch, which that check never looks at (step 11 commits without pushing, so an install can stop with everything else in place):

gh api "repos/$REPO/contents/.github/workflows" \
  --jq '[.[].name | select(startswith("tend-"))] | length'

The summary checklist at the end describes a finished install, so skip it. A preference a step needs (7a's auth mode, 10's bio stance) is asked at that step.

Otherwise this is an install, including a resume of one that never finished (config present, later steps missing). Gather every preference at the Kickoff, so the rest of the install stops only where a step genuinely needs the user. First generate three bot-name candidates from the bare repo name (<repo>-bot, <repo>-tend, tend-<repo>) and check their availability in parallel:

for name in cand1 cand2 cand3; do
  gh api "users/$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "$name: TAKEN" || echo "$name: available"
done

Also check whether the repo has a README (names in step 5) — it decides whether the badge appears in question 3 and the customize follow-up.

In the message alongside the questions, lay out the install: it targets $REPO, runs the section headings below as steps, and typically takes 5–10 minutes of the user's hands-on time (browser logins, OAuth approvals, occasional copy-paste) — the agent drives the rest, ending at a local commit (pushing waits for their go-ahead, step 11).

Then ask these three questions together. Answering them is the go-ahead — no separate "ready to start?" confirmation. Drop any question the user's request or an existing config already answers (a supplied bot name, a chosen harness; the auth mode a config-settled harness leaves open is asked at 7a, not here); a fully specified request leaves nothing to ask, and is itself the go-ahead.

1. Harness — which model runs the bot and which credential it bills to:
   • Claude — OAuth token (recommended for adopters with a Claude subscription) — draws from the subscription's usage limits.
   • Claude — API key — a console.anthropic.com key, billed per token. Fits when there's no subscription to draw on, or the user wants a dedicated billing surface and per-key revocation.
   • Codex — Plus/Pro subscription — experimental. It needs two browser handoffs: a Codex device approval and a repo-scoped GitHub token form. Concurrent jobs receive an access-only token; one serialized weekly workflow owns renewal. It depends on Codex's internal auth mode; detail in ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-model.md.
   • Codex — OpenAI API key — standard pay-per-token path.
2. Bot name — the available candidates, recommended first. "Other" takes a custom name; check its availability before using it. The tool needs 2–4 options, so generate more candidates whenever fewer than two come back available.
3. Defaults — accept the default setup, or pick areas to change:
   • Accept all defaults (recommended) — no workflow overrides, a placeholder guidance overlay, the badge added, and the bot bio "tend agent for <owner>/<repo>. I triage issues and help maintain <repo>." Nothing is locked in: every default is an ordinary edit later (.config/tend.yaml, the files the install writes) or a re-run of this skill.
   • Customize… — pick the areas in a follow-up question.

A Customize… answer gets one more multi-select question: which areas to change, defaults applying to whatever is left unselected (an empty submission included), each option naming its default in its description. Both the defaults description and this follow-up list only the areas still open — drop an area the user's request settles (the request, not the default, governs its step: "skip the badge" skips it), an area a previous run already applied, and an area that can't apply (no README → no badge option). The tool caps a question at 4 options, so a new area means grouping, not appending.

• Workflow config — setup steps, workflow conditions, schedules, job permissions/timeouts, env vars (default: no overrides)
• Bot guidance overlay — PR title format, labels, review routing, target branch, nightly actions (default: a placeholder overlay)
• README badge — placement and style, or leaving it out (default: added, matching the README's existing badge style)
• Bot profile bio — the stance line on the bot's profile (default: "tend agent for <owner>/<repo>. I triage issues and help maintain <repo>.")

Each area selected there is asked about at its step (1, 4, 5, 10); the rest apply the default without asking. Steps that can't be defaulted — migrating a release secret, naming environment reviewers, creating the bot account, approving OAuth — still interact when they arrive.

Follow each step in order. Skip steps that are already done — check each prerequisite before acting.

Browser sessions

Step 6 (when the bot account must be created), step 7b's Codex subscription setup, and step 8's mint paths (8a/8b) need a browser session. Check whether mcp__claude-in-chrome__* is connected (tabs_context_mcp) before the first browser step, or any question that would offer one as an option. When it is, drive the browser steps yourself rather than offering a hand-off choice: hand the user only the prompts automation can't cross (a signup CAPTCHA, a 2FA or password reauth), and resume once they complete the prompt in the open tab. When it isn't but the runtime can open a URL in the user's browser, open each URL as soon as it appears and hand over the exact prompt or code. Otherwise, give the user the URL and wait for confirmation.

Driving uses the user's real Chrome profile, so logging in as the bot displaces their own github.com session until they sign back in — tell them when handing the browser back. Before acting as the bot, verify the logged-in user via the avatar menu.

1. Create config

Create .config/tend.yaml with at minimum bot_name, plus harness if the user chose Codex (the default Claude harness can be omitted). See README.md "Harnesses" for the comparison.

bot_name: <bot-name>
# For Codex:
# harness: codex
# model: gpt-5.6-sol
# Both harnesses optionally accept:
# effort: medium   # low | medium | high | xhigh; Claude Opus/Sonnet also accept max

Write the Codex model into the config. It is the installation's reviewed pin; the raw action deliberately has no model default.

List the secrets the repo already holds:

gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --json name --jq '.[].name'

Any repo-level secret not in secrets.allowed triggers a tend check warning. The operational secrets (bot token, harness auth) never belong at repo level — steps 7–8 store them in the tend environment, and a repo-level copy from a pre-environment install is exactly the exposure the environment closes, so it gets deleted once the environment copy is in place. Classify each remaining secret and act now — don't defer:

• Build/observability tokens (e.g., CODECOV_TOKEN, SENTRY_DSN) are fine at the repo level. Add them to the allowlist:

  secrets:
    allowed: ["CODECOV_TOKEN"]
  

• Release secrets (registry tokens like PYPI_TOKEN/NPM_TOKEN, signing keys, deploy credentials) at the repo level are reachable from any workflow run, including ones a write-access bot can trigger with no merge. Don't allowlist them. Migrate each to a GitHub Environment whose deployment policy pins to the admin-gated refs from §3 (the default branch and/or all tags). The bot can reach neither ref class, so it cannot reach the secret. tend check sweeps every credential-holding environment — one that stores a secret, or that an id-token: write job deploys to, since trusted publishing stores nothing — and fails on any it cannot confirm gated: no reviewer and no policy, an unverified branch entry, tag entries without §3's all-tags ruleset, or a ref policy on an environment some workflow reaches on release, repository_dispatch, or a workflow_dispatch with inputs, which the bot fires at a ref the policy already admits. A half-migrated environment surfaces on the next check rather than passing silently.

  Migrate the secret: recreate it on the Environment, delete the repo-level copy (confirm with the user first), and set environment: <name> on the publishing job.

  Configure the deployment policy. Allow whichever ref classes the workflow runs on:

  REPO=<owner>/<repo>; ENV=<name>
  DEFAULT_BRANCH=$(gh api "repos/$REPO" --jq .default_branch)
  gh api --method PUT "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV" \
    -F 'deployment_branch_policy[protected_branches]=false' \
    -F 'deployment_branch_policy[custom_branch_policies]=true'
  # Continuous-deploy on default branch:
  gh api --method POST "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
    -f "name=$DEFAULT_BRANCH" -f type=branch
  # Release on tags (workflow has `on: push: tags:`):
  gh api --method POST "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
    -f 'name=*' -f type=tag
  

  Verify:

  gh api "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
    --jq '.branch_policies | map({name, type})'
  

  Each entry must match a ref class from §3 (default branch and/or all tags).

  Then sweep deploy/publish workflows. Each must trigger on push: tags: or push: branches: [<default-branch>] (per §3 workflow design) and declare an Environment. The grep below catches the common shapes; it misses reusable workflows in other repos and over-matches pull_request_target references in expressions and step inputs, so read each hit:

  grep -RniE 'tags:|workflow_dispatch|release:|schedule:|workflow_run|repository_dispatch|deployment:|pull_request_target' .github/workflows
  

  An OIDC-to-cloud deploy has no secret to migrate; the Environment with its admin-gated deployment policy plus the cloud provider's trust policy is then the only control on that path.

  The original repo-level secret value isn't readable (GitHub secrets are write-only), so a fresh token is needed. Ask the user how to obtain it; recommend whichever fits the registry:

  • CLI — if the registry has a token-issuing CLI (e.g., npm token create), run it and capture the token.
  • Chrome — drive the registry's token page via mcp__claude-in-chrome (most registries — PyPI, crates.io, Docker Hub — only issue tokens via the web UI). Some registries (PyPI in particular) force a 2FA reauth at token-creation time; the user completes it in the open tab, per Browser sessions.
  • Manual — user generates the token themselves on the registry's site and stores it themselves: hand over the environment's gh secret set command fully substituted. With neither --body nor a pipe it prompts for the value, so the token never sits in the chat transcript. Don't delete the repo-level copy until gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --env "$ENV" --json name shows it — the write is theirs on this route, so nothing else tells the agent it landed.

  Whichever route is chosen, include the exact token-creation URL in the question or option description (and in the follow-up message if manual). Common registries:

  • PyPI: https://pypi.org/manage/account/token/
  • npm: https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<user>/tokens/new (or npm token create)
  • crates.io: https://crates.io/settings/tokens
  • Docker Hub: https://app.docker.com/settings/personal-access-tokens
  • GitHub Packages / deploy: https://github.com/settings/tokens

  For other registries, look up the token page before asking. Accept any other route the user suggests. Never ask the user to dig the old token out of their password manager and re-paste it — issuing a fresh token and revoking the old one is part of the migration's point.

Discover existing CI workflows so tend-ci-fix can watch them:

grep -l 'push:\|pull_request' .github/workflows/*.yml .github/workflows/*.yaml 2>/dev/null

For each match, extract the workflow name: field. These are the workflows that run tests, linting, or builds — tend-ci-fix should watch them. Configure:

workflows:
  ci-fix:
    watched_workflows: ["ci", "lint"]  # names of workflows to watch

If no CI workflows exist, either skip ci-fix (enabled: false) or help the user create one first.

If the user picked workflow config at Kickoff, ask which overrides to set in a multi-select question — otherwise set none:

• Setup steps and env vars (system deps, language version, pre-build hooks, top-level env vars)
• Workflow conditions (e.g., skip review on tend:dismissed PRs — see below)
• Schedule overrides (cron timing for nightly/weekly)
• Permissions / timeouts on specific jobs

For each selected category, follow up with a free-text ask, then write the override into .config/tend.yaml. See the next subsection for override syntax.

Customizing generated workflow YAML

The generator owns every tend-*.yaml file — direct edits are lost on the next uvx tend@latest init. Instead, set workflow_extra (top-level) or jobs.<name> (job-level) overrides in .config/tend.yaml. Overrides follow RFC 7396 (JSON Merge Patch): mappings deep-merge, scalars and lists replace.

Common example — skip review on PRs labeled tend:dismissed (so authors can opt out of re-reviews after the initial pass). Because scalars replace under Merge Patch, the override must repeat the generated TEND_ENABLED pause check (init refuses one that drops it):

workflows:
  review:
    jobs:
      review:
        if: "vars.TEND_ENABLED != 'false' && !contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'tend:dismissed')"

See ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/tend.example.yaml for more override examples (extending permissions, timeouts, top-level env vars).

2. Generate workflows

uvx tend@latest init --with-install-test

--with-install-test adds a one-shot tend-install-test.yaml workflow that runs on the install PR to verify the committed workflows match the generator's current output. (It cannot see secrets — its pull_request run is outside the tend environment — so tend check is what verifies those.) The next nightly regen runs uvx tend@latest init without the flag, and the init cleanup step removes the file from the default branch.

Verify workflow files appear in .github/workflows/tend-*.yaml.

Check for workflows using anthropics/claude-code-action:

grep -rl 'anthropics/claude-code-action' .github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null

If found, delete them — tend replaces claude-code-action entirely. Remind the user that team members should @-mention the bot account instead of @claude.

3. Ref protection

Two ref classes can land code that reaches a deploy or publish workflow: the default branch (via merge) and tags (via tag push). Restrict both to admin-only operations so every privileged code path chains back to an admin action. The bot has write, which is below every role that can bypass, so it satisfies neither.

Survey existing rulesets; skip any slot already covered:

gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --jq '.[] | {name, target, enforcement}'

Merge restriction on the default branch. Create if missing:

gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --method POST --input - << 'EOF'
{
  "name": "Merge access",
  "target": "branch",
  "enforcement": "active",
  "conditions": {
    "ref_name": { "include": ["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], "exclude": [] }
  },
  "rules": [{ "type": "update" }],
  "bypass_actors": [{
    "actor_id": 5,
    "actor_type": "RepositoryRole",
    "bypass_mode": "exempt"
  }]
}
EOF

actor_id: 5 is the admin role. The base role IDs run maintain 2, write 4, admin 5 — not ordered by privilege, so the plausible guess for maintain is in fact write, the bot's own role, and granting it hands the bot the merge. Before adding any bypass actor, read back what the ruleset actually granted:

gh api graphql -f query='{repository(owner:"<owner>", name:"<repo>")
  {rulesets(first:10){nodes{name bypassActors(first:10)
  {nodes{repositoryRoleDatabaseId repositoryRoleName}}}}}}'

Tag operations. Same shape, applied to all tags. Pushing a new tag or moving an existing one becomes an admin operation; the bot can do neither. Skipping the "what pattern do your tags use?" question is deliberate: matching all tags removes a per-repo configuration choice and gives the chain a single, uniform rule.

gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --method POST --input - << 'EOF'
{
  "name": "Tag operations",
  "target": "tag",
  "enforcement": "active",
  "conditions": {
    "ref_name": { "include": ["~ALL"], "exclude": [] }
  },
  "rules": [
    { "type": "creation" },
    { "type": "update" }
  ],
  "bypass_actors": [{
    "actor_id": 5,
    "actor_type": "RepositoryRole",
    "bypass_mode": "exempt"
  }]
}
EOF

creation blocks the bot from pushing a fresh admin-gated tag; update blocks rewriting an existing tag to point at a bot-controlled commit. The chain doesn't need deletion separately. Recreation is already blocked by creation, so a deleted tag can't be replaced with malicious code. Bot-deleting an admin-pushed tag is brief availability damage at worst; repos that need stronger protection against published-tag deletion can add a no-bypass deletion ruleset (see the publisher uplift below).

Immutable releases. Enable this before the next release. It locks that release, its assets, and its associated tag; GitHub does not apply the setting retroactively:

gh api "repos/$REPO/immutable-releases" \
  -H 'X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2026-03-10' --method PUT

Environment gates. A new Environment admits every ref and requires no approval — deployment_branch_policy: null, no reviewers — so a bot-pushed branch or tag reaches its secrets and mints its OIDC token. Survey what exists, including environments GitHub created on the repo's behalf (github-pages) and ones that predate tend:

gh api "repos/$REPO/environments" \
  --jq '.environments[] | {name, deployment_branch_policy, rules: [.protection_rules[].type]}'

Each environment that holds a secret, or that a job with id-token: write names, needs a gate: a deployment policy pinned to admin-gated refs, or required reviewers who exclude the bot. Either clears credential-environments, so an environment already behind reviewers stays as it is.

Pin the policy to the admin-gated refs its workflows actually use — all tags for a release, the default branch for a continuous deploy. The rulesets above are what hold those refs out of the bot's reach:

gh api "repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV" --method PUT --input - << 'EOF'
{"deployment_branch_policy": {"protected_branches": false, "custom_branch_policies": true}}
EOF
gh api "repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
  --method POST -f name='*' -f type=tag

type is tag or branch and defaults to branch when omitted, so a tag entry that leaves it out silently protects nothing. Prefer this explicit list to the "protected branches only" setting, which admits any branch carrying a classic protection rule — a set that grows as branches are created, and that excludes a branch protected by the ruleset above.

Name required reviewers where no ref list fits — a deploy running from a ref no policy can name, such as a preview published from refs/pull/N/merge. Approval holds whatever ref the run starts from. Ask which humans to name; the bot cannot be one of them:

ID=$(gh api "users/<login>" --jq .id)
gh api "repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV" --method PUT --input - << EOF
{"reviewers": [{"type": "User", "id": $ID}], "deployment_branch_policy": null}
EOF

Release/deploy workflow design. Workflows that use release or deploy secrets must trigger on push: tags: (release) or push: branches: [main] (continuous deploy from the default branch), and reference an Environment (§1). Don't trigger on pull_request. A pull_request workflow runs the YAML at the PR's head ref, which a bot can write, so the workflow code is no longer admin-vetted and the chain breaks at the workflow file itself. Triggers a write-scoped bot can fire and steer are outside the packaged recipe: release: published (creating a release against an existing tag takes no tag operation, and its body and assets are the bot's), repository_dispatch, and a workflow_dispatch carrying inputs. Their workflow files still run from the default branch, so the code is admin-vetted, but the bot chooses when they fire and what payload they see. If a repo keeps one on a release/deploy workflow, gate that Environment with required reviewers before migrating release or deploy secrets to it.

Run uvx tend@latest check after this section. It exits non-zero until the later steps set the secrets and grant the bot access; read its credential-environments line, which reports any environment still reachable by the bot.

More complicated approaches are possible (per-pattern tag rulesets, mixed bypass actors, layered no-bypass immutability rulesets for repos that publish actions consumed via tag pins). Install-tend packages the recipe above because it is the simplest configuration that holds the chain; adopters with stricter requirements can layer additional rulesets or environment protection rules on top.

4. Create skill overlay (recommended)

Create .claude/skills/running-tend/SKILL.md with tend-specific project guidance, opening with the frontmatter below so discovery lists it by description rather than by its first heading. An existing overlay without frontmatter needs it added in place.

Do not create a second independent copy of project instructions and do not invent project conventions. If the repo has only one of CLAUDE.md or AGENTS.md, create a relative symlink at the other name so both harnesses read the same content. Preserve both when both already exist, and create neither when neither exists:

if [ -f CLAUDE.md ] && [ ! -e AGENTS.md ] && [ ! -L AGENTS.md ]; then
  ln -s CLAUDE.md AGENTS.md
elif [ -f AGENTS.md ] && [ ! -e CLAUDE.md ] && [ ! -L CLAUDE.md ]; then
  ln -s AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md
fi

If the user picked the overlay at Kickoff, ask which tend-specific preferences to capture in a multi-select question:

• PR conventions (title format — e.g., conventional commits, Jira ticket prefix — and labels the bot should apply)
• Review request routing (specific teams or people)
• Target branch if not the default branch
• Optional nightly actions (e.g., changelog maintenance — specify file and branch)

For each selected item, follow up with a free-text ask to capture the specifics, then write them into the overlay. Otherwise create a placeholder:

---
name: running-tend
description: Project-specific guidance for tend workflows running on this repo.
---

No project-specific tend preferences yet. Add guidance here as
needed — this file is loaded by tend workflows alongside the project's
instruction file.

Build commands, test commands, code style, and project structure belong in the project's CLAUDE.md or AGENTS.md; Tend reads the applicable project instructions like any other agent session.

5. README badge

If the repo has a README (any of README.md, README.rst, README), add a "maintained with tend" badge. If the user picked the badge at Kickoff, first ask what they want (skip it, or a placement/style preference); otherwise insert it without asking.

Base URL (always include the logo):

https://img.shields.io/badge/maintained_with-tend-bba580?logo=

Match the style parameter used by existing badges in the README. For example, if the repo uses style=for-the-badge, append &style=for-the-badge to the URL. If no existing badges or no style parameter, use the default (no style parameter needed).

Wrap the image in a link to https://github.com/max-sixty/tend — always this exact URL, regardless of the consumer's org or repo name. The full markdown shape:

[![maintained with tend](<image-url>)](https://github.com/max-sixty/tend)

Wherever the badge comes up in chat (the Kickoff defaults description, the customize follow-up), describe it briefly ("an olive-green 'maintained with tend' badge with the tend wordmark") — do NOT paste the raw img.shields.io URL or its base64 logo blob into the chat; the blob is hundreds of characters of noise.

Place it near the top of the README — after the title/heading but before the first paragraph. If there are already badges on that line, append to the same line.

6. Bot account

gh api users/<bot-name> --jq '.login,.id' 2>/dev/null && echo "EXISTS" || echo "NOT FOUND"

If the account doesn't exist (the name comes from Kickoff or bot_name in the config):

1. Ask for the bot's email address. It must be one the user can read — the verification code lands there; a plus-alias of their own address (user+<bot-name>@…) works.
2. Navigate Chrome to https://github.com/signup and fill the form. The user types the password and solves the CAPTCHA — the password stays out of the conversation like any secret. Have them save it; later bot logins (device-flow approvals, scope refreshes) need it.
3. If a verification code is needed and an email-reading skill or MCP is available, use it to fetch the latest GitHub verification email (from:github subject:code); otherwise have the user paste the code.
4. After confirmation, re-verify via API.

7. Harness auth token

This step and step 8 store their secrets in the tend GitHub Environment — a repo-level secret is readable by any workflow the repo runs, including one pushed to a branch, and the environment's deployment policy is what closes that. tend check --fix owns the environment's shape (it creates it and admits exactly the default branch and each protected_branches entry), so create it with:

uvx tend@latest check --fix

It exits non-zero here, reporting the secrets this step and step 8 are about to set. Read its environment line: that is the one that must pass.

A repo-level copy of an operational secret (from a pre-environment install) can't be read back — GitHub secrets are write-only — so mint the value into the environment per the steps below, then delete the repo-level copy; tend check flags it until deleted.

Where a path below has the user run gh secret set themselves, the step finishes when its pre-check prints SET — re-run it once they say they're done.

Branch on the harness.

7a. Harness = claude

The action prefers CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN when both auth modes' secrets are set.

gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --env tend --json name --jq '.[].name' \
  | grep -E -q '^(CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN|ANTHROPIC_API_KEY)$' \
  && echo "SET" || echo "NOT SET"

If not set, mint per the auth mode chosen at Kickoff. Absent a Kickoff answer — the config records the harness, never the auth mode, so a change flow or a resumed install lands here without one — first ask the user to choose between the two Claude options from Kickoff question 1.

For OAuth token (sk-ant-oat01-… from claude setup-token; advertised as 1-year), two mint paths, routed by environment rather than asked:

• CLI — the default when claude is on PATH (command -v claude) and uname reports macOS or Linux; the bundled wrapper needs python3 and a pty and has only been validated there, so MINGW*, CYGWIN*, MSYS*, Windows_NT, etc. route to Manual. The wrapper drives claude setup-token (OAuth 2.0 PKCE) and prints only the token to stdout, so piping straight into gh keeps it out of the transcript.

  Launch the command below as a background task — a foreground call sits blocked with the URL trapped in its pending result, and times out before the user has anything to click. Start it only once the user says they are at the browser: the wrapper prints the authorize URL within seconds, then waits — up to 15 minutes — for their approval, and a run started ahead of them spends its window and takes its own URL down.

  TOKEN=$("${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/oauth_token.py" --code-file /tmp/tend-oauth-code)
  [ -n "$TOKEN" ] && printf '%s' "$TOKEN" \
    | gh secret set CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN --repo "$REPO" --env tend
  

  Read the task's output as it runs and hand the user the authorize URL it prints. Approving it normally ends the run on its own — the CLI holds a localhost listener that takes the redirect, so the approval is the whole of the user's job. Only when the browser lands on a page showing a code#state string is a paste needed; have them send that string back and write it to the watched path while the task runs, and the wrapper types it into the prompt:

  printf '%s' '<code#state>' > /tmp/tend-oauth-code
  

  Each run generates a fresh PKCE challenge and each code is good once, so a code from an earlier run — or one the localhost listener already redeemed — is dead, and a restart needs a fresh approval. Keep reading the task's output either way: the wrapper reports whatever claude setup-token says and exits on it, so a rejected code names its own cause within seconds instead of going quiet until the window ends.

  The window needs the user at the browser throughout it. The authorize URL logs the browser out on the way in (claude.ai/login?reauth=1&from=logout), which means an already-signed-in Claude session doesn't shorten the job, and the login in front of the approval is theirs — an agent driving Chrome reaches that page and stops there. After a window lapses twice, stop reissuing and hand over the Manual path, which has no window.

  When the task exits, its status alone says whether the secret was stored: 0 stored it; anything else wrote nothing. The guard is load-bearing for that — gh secret set stores empty stdin as an empty secret and exits 0, and every check downstream reads names rather than values (check_secrets, and this step's own pre-check above) — so one unguarded failed run would leave a CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN that the next run reads as already set, skips, and finishes green on.

• Manual — when the CLI path is unavailable, the wrapper errors out, or the user isn't at the browser when the agent is. Hand over both commands, fully substituted, for them to run in their own terminal (any machine with Claude Code installed and gh logged in as the maintainer; https://claude.com/claude-code to install it), whenever suits them:

  claude setup-token
  

  gh secret set CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN --repo "$REPO" --env tend
  

  Given neither --body nor a pipe, gh secret set prompts for the value, so the token goes from the first command's output to that prompt and nowhere else. Don't ask for it in chat: the agent has no use for the value, and a token pasted there is a live credential sitting in the transcript. The prompt refuses an empty submission and keeps waiting, so the empty-value hazard that makes the CLI path's guard load-bearing has no counterpart here.

For API key: the user takes a key from https://console.anthropic.com/settings/keys and runs this themselves, substituted, pasting the key at the prompt:

gh secret set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY --repo "$REPO" --env tend

7b. Harness = codex

Use the auth mode selected at kickoff. If an existing install has one complete mode, keep it rather than prompting again:

gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --env tend --json name --jq '.[].name'

For Plus/Pro subscription, explain that the path is experimental because it depends on Codex's internal auth mode. Use an isolated Codex login: the weekly workflow will rotate its refresh-token chain, so copying the user's ordinary ~/.codex/auth.json would eventually break their local Codex login.

Run the bundled provisioner yourself. The user approves the device login in their browser; they do not run commands or handle the resulting Codex credentials. Start it in the background, surface the URL and one-time code from its output, and keep reading until it exits:

python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/install_codex_subscription_auth.py" provision --repo "$REPO"

The provisioner uses codex, or npx -y @openai/codex@latest when the CLI is absent. It validates and splits the login, stores both GitHub secrets without printing them, verifies the secret names, and removes its temporary Codex home.

The serialized refresh workflow also needs a fine-grained PAT scoped only to $REPO, with repository permission Environments: Read and write; GITHUB_TOKEN cannot replace environment secrets. GitHub does not provide an API for minting this PAT. Open a prefilled token form, then select Only select repositories and $REPO; the user handles any password or 2FA prompt and clicks Generate token, then Copy:

python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/install_codex_subscription_auth.py" pat-url --repo "$REPO"

When the browser and shell share a clipboard, pipe the copied token to the provisioner without displaying it. Use the host's clipboard reader; on macOS:

pbpaste | python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/install_codex_subscription_auth.py" store-pat --repo "$REPO"

The provisioner validates the fine-grained-token prefix, stores the secret, and verifies all three subscription secret names. If no shared clipboard is available, have the user run gh secret set CODEX_REFRESH_PAT --repo "$REPO" --env tend in their own terminal and paste the token at its hidden prompt. Never ask them to paste it into chat. Finish only after all three secret names appear in the environment's secret listing.

For API key, the user takes a key from https://platform.openai.com/api-keys and runs this themselves, pasting it at the prompt:

gh secret set OPENAI_API_KEY --repo "$REPO" --env tend

8. Bot token and secret

The bot's token needs scopes repo, workflow, notifications, write:discussion, gist, and user (per-scope justifications in ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/tend.example.yaml).

This step checks what gh already stores for the bot, mints a token only if needed (8a or 8b), and pushes it to the environment secret (8c). It serves both the install sequence and a standalone Bot PAT scope-audit remediation; in the audit case it is the whole fix, and you close the issue once 8c verifies. <bot-name> is bot_name in .config/tend.yaml; $REPO derives as in the Kickoff (whose recipe resolves a fork clone to the canonical repo).

Bot auth lives in a dedicated config dir, $HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>, with the token stored plaintext (mode 0600) via --insecure-storage — never the OS keychain, which gh keys by account name globally, so a keychain-backed bot login could overwrite the maintainer's own credential. The bot also never enters the default config, which git's gh credential helper answers as, so a stray git push can't land as the bot. The token is already an Actions secret, so the on-disk copy adds no exposure. The dir is durable: scope audits and reinstalls read it to skip a fresh device flow. Full rationale: ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-model.md.

Three auth postures, one per command — never export a token for the session (git's gh helper would forward it):

• Bot dir (gh auth …, gh api user): prefix with env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>". Ambient env tokens otherwise hijack the reads and block the auth writes.
• Bot via token (GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api …): each block reads the token, then skips its action if the read came back empty — an empty GH_TOKEN silently falls back to the maintainer's stored auth, and gh secret set accepts an empty body. Guards skip rather than exit because blocks may be pasted into the user's shell.
• Maintainer (gh secret, the collaborator API in step 9): bare, on ambient auth. A 403 means that auth lacks admin — often a weak env token; env -u it to fall back to the stored login.

No step writes the maintainer's default config — and the bot must not sit there either (pre-dir installs put it there). If a bare gh auth token --user <bot-name> prints a token, evict it with env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN gh auth logout --user <bot-name>; workflows run on the repo secret, so nothing breaks.

Check what the bot dir holds:

env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \

…(truncated)