mn-youssef API Security Testing (FIND/EXPLOIT — OWASP API Top 10)
Overview
Modern apps are API-first, and APIs fail differently from web pages: the bugs are in authorization per object/field and resource limits, not rendering. Test the API directly, bypassing the UI entirely.
Core principle: The UI is one client; attackers talk to the API raw. Every endpoint, field, and method must enforce authz and limits on its own — the front-end protects nothing.
Applies when / Skip when
- Applies when: the app exposes a programmatic API — REST, GraphQL, gRPC, or WebSocket — including the API behind a SPA or mobile client.
- Skip when: the app is purely server-rendered HTML with no API anyone calls → N/A.
- If N/A: report "api-security-testing: N/A — no API surface" and stop.
⚠️ Authorization
Your own/authorized API. Use test accounts and a non-production instance for stateful tests.
Get the spec first
Pull the contract, then test every operation it (and the UI) reveals:
- OpenAPI/Swagger (
/swagger,/openapi.json,/api-docs), GraphQL introspection, gRPC reflection, Postman collections, mobile-app traffic via proxy. - Diff documented endpoints vs. what the app actually calls — undocumented endpoints are gold.
OWASP API Top 10 — the checklist
| # | Risk | Test |
|---|---|---|
| API1 | BOLA (object authz) | Swap object ids across accounts → see access-control-testing |
| API2 | Broken authentication | Weak tokens/JWT/keys → see authentication-testing |
| API3 | BOPLA (property authz) | Read fields you shouldn't (excessive exposure) / write fields you shouldn't (mass assignment) |
| API4 | Unrestricted resource consumption | No rate/size/page limits; expensive queries; cost/DoS |
| API5 | BFLA (function authz) | Call admin/privileged operations as a normal user |
| API6 | Unrestricted access to business flows | Automate a flow meant to be human-paced (scalping, spam) |
| API7 | SSRF | Server fetches a URL you supply → see file-upload-and-ssrf |
| API8 | Misconfiguration | Verbose errors, permissive CORS, missing security headers |
| API9 | Improper inventory | Old /v1 next to /v2, staging APIs, undocumented endpoints |
| API10 | Unsafe third-party consumption | App trusts an external API's response blindly |
See references/api-attacks.md for REST, GraphQL, gRPC, and WebSocket recipes.
Excessive data exposure vs. the UI
The API often returns more than the UI shows (full user objects with passwordHash, internal
flags, other users' fields). Inspect raw JSON responses, not the rendered page.
GraphQL specifics (high-value)
- Introspection enabled → full schema map. Pull it.
- Batching / aliasing → bypass rate limits, brute-force via one request.
- Query depth/complexity → nested recursive queries for DoS.
- Field-level authz → a field guarded in one query exposed via another path/mutation.
Output
Per finding: endpoint/operation, method, account used, the raw request/response, which API-Top-10 class, and impact. BOLA/BFLA findings are typically High–Critical.
Hand-off
Deep authz → access-control-testing; auth/JWT → authentication-testing; flow abuse →
business-logic-testing; reproduce → active-pentest; fix → security-hardening.
Common mistakes
- Testing through the UI only — hit the API directly; that's the real attack surface.
- Reading the rendered page instead of the raw JSON — that's where over-exposure hides.
- Forgetting GraphQL introspection/batching and gRPC reflection — they hand you the whole map.
- Ignoring old API versions —
/v1often lacks/v2's fixes.