Authorization (Navin Security)
Overview
Prove or refute that one identity can reach another identity's data or a higher role's function. Default posture is read-only and non-destructive: report evidence and a proposed fix, never exploit, extract data or change the target.
When it applies
- Triggers: auth, api, web.
- Families: authorization.
Controls covered
| Control | Level | Check |
|---|---|---|
| C2.07 | L2 | IDOR / BOLA on every resource |
| C2.08 | L3 | BFLA, RBAC and ABAC: vertical escalation |
Engines
- Other engines named by the catalog: navin_auth, schemathesis, zap. Use one only when it is installed.
- A scanner that is not installed or did not run means the check was not done, not that it passed.
Method
- List every route or resolver that takes an object id and the check that binds it to the caller.
- Look for ownership checks done only in the client, or on list endpoints but not on read, update and delete.
- Compare roles: for each privileged function find the server-side role check; a hidden button is not a control.
- With two test accounts, replay a request of account A using account B's session and an id of A; compare status and body.
- A confirmed IDOR needs the dynamic evidence (both requests, both responses redacted); read-only requests only.
- Fix by deriving the owner from the session and filtering the query, not by checking after the fetch.
Evidence and status
potential: a rule or a suspicion with static evidence only.confirmed: a dataflow trace from a controlled source to the sink, or a dynamic observation on the running target.exploitable: a non-destructive reproduction showed the impact, in an authorized environment.- Every finding carries file and line or endpoint, the evidence, impact, a concrete fix and the control ids above.
Anti-patterns
- Using production accounts or real customer ids.
- Reporting a missing check without finding out whether a layer below enforces it (row level security).
- Treating a clean scan as proof of security: say which controls were not assessed.
