Desktop (Navin Security)
Overview
Audit Tauri and Electron apps: IPC surface, permissions, content security and updates. Default posture is read-only and non-destructive: report evidence and a proposed fix, never exploit, extract data or change the target.
When it applies
- Triggers: desktop.
- Families: mobile_desktop.
Controls covered
| Control | Level | Check |
|---|---|---|
| C5.07 | L1 | Tauri/Electron: allowlist, CSP, exposed commands, isolation |
| C5.08 | L1 | Updates: signature, channel, rollback |
Engines
- Registered scanners (use
navin.security.scanners, results arrive as normalized findings): cargo_audit. - Other engines named by the catalog: navin_desktop, navin_rules. Use one only when it is installed.
- A scanner that is not installed or did not run means the check was not done, not that it passed.
Method
- Tauri: capabilities and allowlist narrow, commands validate their arguments, no arbitrary shell or filesystem scope.
- Electron:
contextIsolationon,nodeIntegrationoff, preload exposes narrow functions,webSecuritynot disabled. - CSP on the app origin; remote content never loaded into a window with privileged IPC.
- Updates: signed, over TLS, channel pinned, rollback possible.
- Rust dependencies: run the registered advisory scanner on the lockfile.
Evidence and status
potential: a rule or a suspicion with static evidence only.confirmed: a dataflow trace from a controlled source to the sink, or a dynamic observation on the running target.exploitable: a non-destructive reproduction showed the impact, in an authorized environment.- Every finding carries file and line or endpoint, the evidence, impact, a concrete fix and the control ids above.
Anti-patterns
- Reviewing only the web code of a desktop app.
- Calling an IPC command safe because the frontend only passes known values.
- Treating a clean scan as proof of security: say which controls were not assessed.
