Multitenancy (Navin Security)
Overview
Verify that tenant A can never read or write tenant B through the app, the database, caches or storage. Default posture is read-only and non-destructive: report evidence and a proposed fix, never exploit, extract data or change the target.
When it applies
- Triggers: multitenant, database.
- Families: multitenancy.
Controls covered
| Control | Level | Check |
|---|---|---|
| C2.09 | L3 | Multi-tenant isolation: tenant_id source, RLS, cache |
Engines
- Other engines named by the catalog: navin_tenant. Use one only when it is installed.
- A scanner that is not installed or did not run means the check was not done, not that it passed.
Method
- Find where
tenant_idcomes from: it must come from the session, never from a header or body the client sets. - Database: row level security enabled and forced on every tenant table, policies using the session claim, no
service_rolekey in a client. - Caches and queues: keys and topics include the tenant; background jobs set the tenant context explicitly.
- Storage: object paths and signed URLs scoped per tenant; listing a prefix must not cross tenants.
- With two test tenants, repeat each read and write across the boundary and record the denial or the leak.
Evidence and status
potential: a rule or a suspicion with static evidence only.confirmed: a dataflow trace from a controlled source to the sink, or a dynamic observation on the running target.exploitable: a non-destructive reproduction showed the impact, in an authorized environment.- Every finding carries file and line or endpoint, the evidence, impact, a concrete fix and the control ids above.
Anti-patterns
- Trusting an ORM default scope without reading where it is bypassed (raw queries, admin tools, exports).
- Testing with one tenant only and calling the result clean.
- Treating a clean scan as proof of security: say which controls were not assessed.
