Bundled with Unleash skills pack. Upstream: https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill
Cloud / Container / Kubernetes Security
ACTION REQUIRED (execute immediately after reading)
NOW: read../field-journal/precedent-pentest.md— cloud/K8s testing requires written authorizationNOW: case-init + scope; clarify account boundaries, no destructive operations allowedNOW: confirm this is cloud metadata/container/K8s/IAM, not ordinary web scanning (for that,pentest-tools/)NEXT: tool-index; kubectl/aws/gcloud etc. are mostly manual installsACT: start from "identity and exposure surface"; no default whole-network scanning
Applicable Scenarios
- Cloud metadata SSRF (169.254.169.254 / IMDS)
- IAM excessive permissions, public storage buckets, wrong security groups
- Docker/containerd escape path assessment
- Kubernetes RBAC, Secrets, Admission, supply-chain images
- Container image vulnerabilities (can bring in
supply-chain-security/)
Workflow
Phase 1 — Identity and Boundaries
□ Current identity: cloud AK/SK, K8s SA, node SSH?
□ Scope: single account / single cluster / single namespace
□ Network profile: authorized_target_only
Phase 2 — Cloud Control Plane
# Examples (substitute per vendor; MUST stay within the authorized account)
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws s3 ls
# Azure / GCP equivalent identity commands
□ Public buckets / wrong ACLs
□ Metadata: IMDSv1 vs v2; SSRF chains
□ Roles that can be assumed (PassRole) and lateral movement
Phase 3 — Containers
□ Privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork?
□ Capabilities (SYS_ADMIN etc.)
□ Writable host paths → escape candidates
□ Image history and known CVEs → Trivy
Phase 4 — Kubernetes
kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl get pods,secrets,svc -A
kubectl get clusterrolebindings
□ SA token mounts and permissions
□ Missing dangerous-admission webhooks
□ etcd / dashboard exposure
□ Whether network policies default to allow
Toolchain
| Tool | Purpose | Bootstrap |
|---|---|---|
| kubectl | Cluster interaction | Manual |
| trivy | Image/IaC | bootstrap trivy if available |
| kube-bench / kubeaudit | CIS/config | Manual |
| pacu / scoutsuite | Cloud auditing (authorized) | Manual |
| nuclei | Known cloud vulnerability templates | bootstrap nmap/nuclei ecosystem |
References
references/k8s-cloud-checklist.md- CTF counterpart:
../../CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-agent-cloud/ ../supply-chain-security/../pentest-tools/
Routing Context
Upstream: MASTER R23
Downstream: node shell obtained → attack-chain / windows-ad; image vulnerabilities → supply-chain
MUST NOT: scan other tenants of a public cloud without authorization
Task Completion Self-Check
- Confined to the authorized account/cluster?
- Findings include reproduction and impact?
- Destructive operations avoided?
- Report / journal?