How do I install the Game Hacking Exploits skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add netvar1337/game-hacking-exploits in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Game Hacking Exploits safe to use?

This skill has not completed SkillMD's automated safety review yet. SkillMD never runs a skill's scripts for you; review the SKILL.md before installing.

Which AI agents work with Game Hacking Exploits?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Game Hacking Exploits free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free. This skill is licensed under GPL-3.

Who published Game Hacking Exploits?

netvar1337 (@netvar1337) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Game Hacking Exploits by netvar1337

Name: Game Hacking Exploits
Author: netvar1337

File contents

Game hacking exploits

Classes

Class	Where	Notes
Client memory	local process	ESP/aim/speed if not server-auth
Packet abuse	protocol	spoofed movement, inventory dups
RPC/cmd abuse	server handlers	unchecked args, authz gaps
Race/TOCTOU	servers	double-spend, interact races
Prediction abuse	client-server	bunny/strafe edge cases
Asset/logic	scripts	exposed debug, GM cmds
OOB R/W	parsers	custom binary protocols
Auth/parser CVE	CoD / FiveM	momo5502 `cod-exploits`: Steam-Auth CVE-2018-20817, Huffman CVE-2018-10718 (`E:\Tools\git\momo5502\cod-exploits`). Aftermath 2022-09-26 FiveM/GTA V client RCE.

Workflow

Authority analysis first: what does the server trust?
If server-auth: focus packets/RPC/logic bugs, not local godmode fantasies.
Build minimal PoC with logging; then reliability.
AC/EAC considerations only after PoC (pair game-hacking).

Deliverables

Repro steps, net capture, offset/version table, risk to stability.

Authority-break deep classes

Movement/prediction abuse

UE SavedMove replay: client-simulated movement re-simulated on server; mismatches snap back. Exploits: temporal desync (delayed ServerMove batches to rewind hit windows), speed via tick-rate mismatch (moves computed at higher dt), strafe-acceleration edge cases (source-style air-control yielded 1.5-2x speed classes historically).
Source1 lag-comp: server rewinds hit targets to shooter's cmd time — fake latency shoots rewind-further; cl_interp manipulation class.

RPC surface methodology

Dump protocol: hook engine send/recv → map opcodes → rebuild structs (network-protocol-re).
Enumerate handlers in the dispatch switch; for each opcode: client-callable? server-side authz? (most bugs = missing authz, not authn).
Replay privileged RPC with mutated args — classic: item-drop-on-death race, remote interact, force-trade states.
Server-trust inversion: still found in projectile-despawn-on-client and interact-confirm paths of otherwise hardened titles.

Race/dup patterns

Double-spend: two sessions same inventory (weak session locking, mobile titles); ToCTOU equip/use (start use → drop → finish = use-while-not-held).
Server-tick race: two rapid interacts pre-transition (verify via timestamp deltas in capture).

OOB in custom protocols

Declared-length trusted for both alloc and copy → adjacent-struct corruption via negative/oversized length.
Mutation-fuzz captured flows with grammar rebuilt from structs; kick-vs-crash signatures tell authz vs parser bugs.

PoC discipline

Live-like private server first; PoC as minimal script (python raw socket or engine replay).
Full logs (timestamps, seq, opcodes); dup bugs can permanently corrupt character state — burn accounts knowingly.

---name: game-hacking-exploitsdescription: Game exploit classes: memory R/W cheats, packets, authority breaks, race bugs, movement exploits, server RPC abuse.license: GPL-3.0-or-later---# Game hacking exploits## Classes| Class | Where | Notes ||---|---|---|| Client memory | local process | ESP/aim/speed if not server-auth || Packet abuse | protocol | spoofed movement, inventory dups || RPC/cmd abuse | server handlers | unchecked args, authz gaps || Race/TOCTOU | servers | double-spend, interact races || Prediction abuse | client-server | bunny/strafe edge cases || Asset/logic | scripts | exposed debug, GM cmds || OOB R/W | parsers | custom binary protocols || Auth/parser CVE | CoD / FiveM | momo5502 `cod-exploits`: Steam-Auth CVE-2018-20817, Huffman CVE-2018-10718 (`E:\Tools\git\momo5502\cod-exploits`). Aftermath 2022-09-26 FiveM/GTA V client RCE. |## Workflow1. Authority analysis first: what does the server trust?2. If server-auth: focus packets/RPC/logic bugs, not local godmode fantasies.3. Build minimal PoC with logging; then reliability.4. AC/EAC considerations only after PoC (pair `game-hacking`).## Deliverables- Repro steps, net capture, offset/version table, risk to stability.## Authority-break deep classes### Movement/prediction abuse- UE `SavedMove` replay: client-simulated movement re-simulated on server; mismatches snap back. Exploits: temporal desync (delayed ServerMove batches to rewind hit windows), speed via tick-rate mismatch (moves computed at higher dt), strafe-acceleration edge cases (source-style air-control yielded 1.5-2x speed classes historically).- Source1 lag-comp: server rewinds hit targets to shooter's cmd time — fake latency shoots rewind-further; `cl_interp` manipulation class.### RPC surface methodology1. Dump protocol: hook engine send/recv → map opcodes → rebuild structs (`network-protocol-re`).2. Enumerate handlers in the dispatch switch; for each opcode: client-callable? server-side authz? (most bugs = missing authz, not authn).3. Replay privileged RPC with mutated args — classic: item-drop-on-death race, remote interact, force-trade states.4. Server-trust inversion: still found in projectile-despawn-on-client and interact-confirm paths of otherwise hardened titles.### Race/dup patterns- Double-spend: two sessions same inventory (weak session locking, mobile titles); ToCTOU equip/use (start use → drop → finish = use-while-not-held).- Server-tick race: two rapid interacts pre-transition (verify via timestamp deltas in capture).### OOB in custom protocols- Declared-length trusted for both alloc and copy → adjacent-struct corruption via negative/oversized length.- Mutation-fuzz captured flows with grammar rebuilt from structs; kick-vs-crash signatures tell authz vs parser bugs.## PoC discipline- Live-like private server first; PoC as minimal script (python raw socket or engine replay).- Full logs (timestamps, seq, opcodes); dup bugs can permanently corrupt character state — burn accounts knowingly.

Frequently asked questions

Game Hacking Exploits