Ring-1.io bootkit analysis
Aftermath Labs (xeroxz / noahware / Eggsy / AVX) dumped and deobfuscated the Ring-1.io commercial cheat stack. PRIMARY here is analysis and detection of that architecture, not a rebuild.
Corpus: https://github.com/aftermathlabs/ring-1.io (also backengineering/ring-1.io)
Writeup: https://aftermathlabs.net/blog/04/02/2026/
Deobf engine they used: in-house BLARE2 (https://back.engineering/blare/) — not public. Use virtualization-deobfuscation + llvm-lift-deobfuscation as the stand-in.
Artifact map
| File |
Role |
bootmgfw.bin |
Tampered Windows boot manager |
bootloader-implant-obfuscated.bin |
On-disk implant |
bootloader-implant-deobfuscated.bin + .i64 |
Decompressed/decrypted implant + IDA DB |
loader-deobfuscated.bin |
Usermode/chain loader |
*-cheat.bin |
Injected game modules (Apex, BattleBit, COD6, EFT, Grayzone, R6) |
Hash every blob before opening. Work offline.
Workflow
Confirm the chain, do not start in the game DLL. Order on the writeup: Loader → bootloader implant → map into Hyper-V → SLAT + MTF → GPA redirect → VMEXIT hooks → implant comms → clone target CR3 → insert PTEs → hypercall to load tables → hide tables + contents via EPT → usermode hooks.
- Done when a one-page chain diagram names the file that implements each hop.
Bootloader implant. Open bootloader-implant-deobfuscated.i64 (IDA 9.4). Recover: how bootmgfw.ImgArchStartBootApplication / BlImgStartBootApplication is hooked, where winload/hvloader hooks land, how the Hyper-V image is found. This is Voyager’s hookchain (hypervisor-memory-introspection).
- Done when hook sites have names + RVAs in the IDB.
Hyper-V payload. Recover SLAT setup, EPT-violation handler, MTF single-step, VMEXIT table. GPA redirect = the implant’s physical R/W. Compare to Voyager (append-to-hv image) vs hyper-reV (standalone attachment, timestamps restored).
- Done when EPT-violation and MTF paths are commented and the comms ABI (CPUID/VMCALL/shared page) is written down.
Process injection. Clone the game’s page tables, insert malicious PTEs, ask the HV to switch/load them, hide the new tables and the payload pages with EPT execute/read split. Game module *-cheat.bin is the payload, not the persistence.
- Done when one cheat.bin is mapped, its imports/entry named, and the PTE-clone step is cited to a function in the implant.
Detections (write these as a lab checklist). Aftermath section “Possible Detections”:
bootmgfw.efi hash / Authenticode vs known-good- Measured-boot / TPM PCR for the replaced boot manager (
tpm-attestation-research)
- Hyper-V image size / allocation-after-hvix64 shift (Voyager-class)
- EPT split on game or ntos pages →
ept-hook-detection
- Extra CR3 / cloned PML4 not backing a real process
- Unexpected VMEXIT rate on the game’s
.text
- Done when each detector has a command or probe and a pass/fail on the corpus (static) or a lab VM.
Do not treat vmp2 handler tables as the deobf plan. Aftermath retired that. Themida (2026-05-09) and Tencent VM (2026-07-31) posts: incremental lift, const/memory model, DCE, branch fold, lower 1:1. Route the *-cheat.bin protectors through virtualization-deobfuscation.
- Done when the protector on each cheat.bin is labeled and the recovery product is chosen.
Pair with
hypervisor-memory-introspection — Voyager / hyper-reV mechanicsept-hook-detection — guest-side SLAT-hook probessecure-boot-uefi-research / analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistencevirtualization-deobfuscation / llvm-lift-deobfuscationanti-cheat-bypass / eac-kernel-driver-re — what Ring-1 is hiding from
Verification
1---2name: ring-1-bootkit3description: Use when reversing or detecting a Ring-1.io-class bootkit cheat: bootmgfw implant, Hyper-V SLAT/MTF hooks, cloned game page tables, EPT-hidden inject, or the Aftermath Labs ring-1.io corpus and 2026 writeup.4license: MIT5---67# Ring-1.io bootkit analysis89Aftermath Labs (xeroxz / noahware / Eggsy / AVX) dumped and deobfuscated the Ring-1.io commercial cheat stack. PRIMARY here is *analysis and detection of that architecture*, not a rebuild.1011Corpus: `https://github.com/aftermathlabs/ring-1.io` (also `backengineering/ring-1.io`) 12Writeup: `https://aftermathlabs.net/blog/04/02/2026/` 13Deobf engine they used: in-house BLARE2 (`https://back.engineering/blare/`) — not public. Use `virtualization-deobfuscation` + `llvm-lift-deobfuscation` as the stand-in.1415## Artifact map1617| File | Role |18|---|---|19| `bootmgfw.bin` | Tampered Windows boot manager |20| `bootloader-implant-obfuscated.bin` | On-disk implant |21| `bootloader-implant-deobfuscated.bin` + `.i64` | Decompressed/decrypted implant + IDA DB |22| `loader-deobfuscated.bin` | Usermode/chain loader |23| `*-cheat.bin` | Injected game modules (Apex, BattleBit, COD6, EFT, Grayzone, R6) |2425Hash every blob before opening. Work offline.2627## Workflow28291. **Confirm the chain, do not start in the game DLL.** Order on the writeup: Loader → bootloader implant → map into Hyper-V → SLAT + MTF → GPA redirect → VMEXIT hooks → implant comms → clone target CR3 → insert PTEs → hypercall to load tables → hide tables + contents via EPT → usermode hooks.30 - Done when a one-page chain diagram names the file that implements each hop.31322. **Bootloader implant.** Open `bootloader-implant-deobfuscated.i64` (IDA 9.4). Recover: how `bootmgfw.ImgArchStartBootApplication` / `BlImgStartBootApplication` is hooked, where winload/hvloader hooks land, how the Hyper-V image is found. This is Voyager’s hookchain (`hypervisor-memory-introspection`).33 - Done when hook sites have names + RVAs in the IDB.34353. **Hyper-V payload.** Recover SLAT setup, EPT-violation handler, MTF single-step, VMEXIT table. GPA redirect = the implant’s physical R/W. Compare to Voyager (append-to-hv image) vs hyper-reV (standalone attachment, timestamps restored).36 - Done when EPT-violation and MTF paths are commented and the comms ABI (CPUID/VMCALL/shared page) is written down.37384. **Process injection.** Clone the game’s page tables, insert malicious PTEs, ask the HV to switch/load them, hide the new tables and the payload pages with EPT execute/read split. Game module `*-cheat.bin` is the payload, not the persistence.39 - Done when one cheat.bin is mapped, its imports/entry named, and the PTE-clone step is cited to a function in the implant.40415. **Detections (write these as a lab checklist).** Aftermath section “Possible Detections”:42 - `bootmgfw.efi` hash / Authenticode vs known-good43 - Measured-boot / TPM PCR for the replaced boot manager (`tpm-attestation-research`)44 - Hyper-V image size / allocation-after-hvix64 shift (Voyager-class)45 - EPT split on game or ntos pages → `ept-hook-detection`46 - Extra CR3 / cloned PML4 not backing a real process47 - Unexpected VMEXIT rate on the game’s `.text`48 - Done when each detector has a command or probe and a pass/fail on the corpus (static) or a lab VM.49506. **Do not treat vmp2 handler tables as the deobf plan.** Aftermath retired that. Themida (2026-05-09) and Tencent VM (2026-07-31) posts: incremental lift, const/memory model, DCE, branch fold, lower 1:1. Route the `*-cheat.bin` protectors through `virtualization-deobfuscation`.51 - Done when the protector on each cheat.bin is labeled and the recovery product is chosen.5253## Pair with5455- `hypervisor-memory-introspection` — Voyager / hyper-reV mechanics56- `ept-hook-detection` — guest-side SLAT-hook probes57- `secure-boot-uefi-research` / `analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence`58- `virtualization-deobfuscation` / `llvm-lift-deobfuscation`59- `anti-cheat-bypass` / `eac-kernel-driver-re` — what Ring-1 is hiding from6061## Verification6263- [ ] All corpus hashes recorded64- [ ] Boot hook RVAs named in the IDB65- [ ] SLAT/MTF/comms ABI written66- [ ] One game module’s entry + inject primitive identified67- [ ] Detection checklist has an observable per row68- [ ] No live multiplayer client was instrumented
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