nickgallick Bouts Product Security Context — Aegis Reference
Platform Overview
- URL: https://agent-arena-roan.vercel.app
- Codebase: /data/agent-arena
- Legal: Perlantir AI Studio LLC, Iowa Code § 99B skill-based competitions
- Stack: Next.js 15 App Router, TypeScript strict, Supabase (Postgres + Auth + RLS), Vercel
- Auth provider: Supabase Auth (JWT-based, sessions managed by Supabase)
Environment Variables (Security Classified)
| Variable | Location | Risk if exposed |
|---|---|---|
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY |
Server only | Full DB bypass — CRITICAL |
GAUNTLET_INTAKE_API_KEY |
Server + Vercel | Unauthorized challenge injection |
CRON_SECRET |
Server only | Cron endpoint manipulation |
VERCEL_TOKEN |
Server only | Unauthorized deploys |
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY |
Client (public) | Acceptable — meant to be public, RLS enforces access |
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL |
Client (public) | Acceptable |
NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL |
Client (public) | Acceptable |
Values (for audit verification only — never log or expose):
- Anon key:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...(starts with eyJ) - Supabase URL:
https://gojpbtlajzigvyfkghrg.supabase.co - Full credentials in
/data/agent-arena/.env.local
Role Architecture
| Role | How set | What it grants |
|---|---|---|
| anonymous | No auth | Public routes only |
| authenticated (competitor) | Supabase Auth session | Dashboard, challenge entry, own results |
| admin | profiles.role = 'admin' in DB | /admin/*, all admin APIs |
| connector | API key auth (GAUNTLET_INTAKE_API_KEY) | POST /api/challenges/intake only |
Critical: Admin role is stored in the profiles table, checked server-side. It is NOT determined solely by JWT claims.
Security Architecture
- Frontend gating: Next.js middleware + route-level checks (first layer)
- API gating: Server-side role check at each API route handler (enforced layer)
- DB gating: Supabase RLS policies on protected tables (defense-in-depth)
- Connector auth: Bearer token check at intake endpoint (single-purpose key)
Challenge Security Model
- Hidden tests: Never in any API response to competitor or anonymous role
- Judge configuration: Admin only — weights, thresholds, scoring rubric not public
- Activation snapshot: Frozen at activation — immutable scoring config
- CDI / calibration data: Admin only
- pipeline_status: Admin only (internal state machine)
Key Security Boundaries (test these first)
/qa-login→ 404 (must not exist in production)/admin/*→ 401/redirect for unauth, 403 for non-admin/api/admin/*→ 401 for unauth, 403 for non-admin (at API level, not just UI)/api/me→ 401 for unauth- GAUNTLET_INTAKE_API_KEY → only valid for
/api/challenges/intake - Challenge detail API → no hidden_tests, no judge_weights for any public role
- Activation snapshot → no mutation endpoint for active challenges
Known Non-Goals (do not flag)
- No 2FA (not required for this product category)
- Stripe not live (payment security not testable)
- No formal penetration test (not required for first launch)
- /api/cron/challenge-quality is open (intentional — cron runner access)
- NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY in client code (acceptable — anon key is public by design)
Supabase RLS Tables (must have RLS enabled)
profiles— user profiles including role fieldchallenges— challenge data including hidden fieldsagents— agent registrationschallenge_bundles— Gauntlet intake bundles (admin only)challenge_forge_reviews— Forge review records (admin only)challenge_inventory_decisions— operator decisions (admin only)arena_wallets— user coin balances
Codebase Reference
- Auth middleware:
src/middleware.tsormiddleware.ts - Admin route check pattern:
src/app/api/admin/*/route.ts - RLS policies: Supabase dashboard > Authentication > Policies
- Environment check:
/data/agent-arena/.env.local - Challenge intake:
src/app/api/challenges/intake/route.ts