Supply Chain Audit

Supply Chain Audit

Threat Landscape (as of March 2026)

Active campaigns targeting our stack:

Pre-Install Audit Checklist

Before running npm install, npm add, or cloning any repo, perform these checks:

1. Package Identity Verification

• Check publisher: npm view <package> maintainers — is the publisher the expected org/person?
• Check age: npm view <package> time — when was it first published? New packages (<30 days) are higher risk
• Check download count: npm view <package> --json | jq '.downloads' — low downloads + recent publish = suspicious
• Check name similarity: Is this a typosquat? Compare against the real package name character by character
• Check for slopsquatting: Does the name look like something an LLM would hallucinate? (e.g., @babel/helper-string-parser-v2 when the real one is @babel/helper-string-parser)

2. Package.json Analysis

• postinstall / preinstall scripts: jq '.scripts' package.json — any install-time scripts that download or execute code?
• Remote Dynamic Dependencies: Check dependencies and devDependencies for URLs instead of version numbers (e.g., "dep": "https://attacker.com/payload.tgz")
• Unusual dependency URLs: Any http:// (not https), any IP addresses, any non-registry URLs
• Scope consistency: If package is @org/package, verify the org owns it on npm

3. Source Code Spot Check

• Run Unicode scanner: python3 scan_unicode.py <package_dir> --strict
• Check for obfuscation: Look for base64-encoded strings, Buffer.from(...), atob(...) in non-obvious places
• Check for dynamic execution: Search for eval(, new Function(, require(variable), import(variable)
• Check for network calls in unexpected places: fetch(, http.request(, axios. in packages that shouldn't need network access
• Check for env access: process.env reads in packages that shouldn't need environment variables

4. Repository Verification

• GitHub stars vs. age: High stars + very recent creation = potentially manipulated
• Contributor analysis: Single contributor with generic profile = higher risk
• Recent commits: Were legitimate files recently replaced with something different?
• VS Code workspace files: Check .vscode/tasks.json for runOn: "folderOpen" auto-execution
• Build scripts: Check next.config.js, vite.config.ts, webpack.config.js for injected code

Post-Install Audit

After npm install completes:

Quick Scan

# Check what ran during install
npm ls --all 2>&1 | head -50

# Find postinstall scripts in node_modules
find node_modules -name 'package.json' -exec grep -l '"postinstall"' {} \;

# Find suspicious files
find node_modules -name '*.sh' -o -name 'deploy.js' -o -name 'setup.js' | head -20

# Check for network-calling install scripts
find node_modules -name 'package.json' -exec grep -l '"preinstall\|postinstall\|install"' {} \; | while read f; do
  dir=$(dirname "$f")
  echo "=== $f ==="
  grep -r 'fetch\|http\|curl\|wget\|axios' "$dir"/*.js 2>/dev/null | head -5
done

Deep Scan

# Unicode steganography scan on all new/changed packages
python3 scan_unicode.py node_modules/<new_package> --strict --decode

# Check for env exfiltration patterns
grep -rn 'process\.env' node_modules/<new_package> --include='*.js' --include='*.mjs'

# Check for dynamic code execution
grep -rn 'eval\|new Function\|require(\|import(' node_modules/<new_package> --include='*.js' --include='*.mjs' | grep -v 'node_modules/.*/node_modules'

Specific Attack Pattern Detection

Remote Dynamic Dependencies (PhantomRaven)

// MALICIOUS — dependency points to external URL
{
  "dependencies": {
    "helper-util": "https://artifact-cdn.example.com/helper-1.0.0.tgz"
  }
}

Detection: grep -r 'https\?://' package.json in any dependency value

Self-Propagating Worm (CanisterWorm)

Indicators:

• postinstall script that runs a .js file
• That file searches for .npmrc tokens: find / -name '.npmrc' or process.env.NPM_TOKEN
• Calls npm publish or npm version patch programmatically
• Contains ICP canister URLs: *.raw.icp0.io or canister IDs like tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai
• systemd service creation: writes to ~/.config/systemd/user/

VS Code Auto-Execution (Malicious Repos)

Check before opening ANY repo in VS Code:

# Check for auto-run tasks
cat .vscode/tasks.json 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'folderOpen\|runOn'

# Check for workspace settings that execute code
cat *.code-workspace 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'task\|terminal\|shell'

# Check for trojanized common libraries
find . -name 'jquery.min.js' -o -name 'lodash.min.js' | while read f; do
  # Real minified libs don't contain base64 or fetch
  grep -l 'atob\|btoa\|fetch\|XMLHttpRequest' "$f"
done

ClawHub Skill Malware

Before installing any skill from ClawHub:

1. Read the SKILL.md completely — look for instructions to web_fetch or exec external URLs
2. Check scripts/ directory — run file on each script, read the source
3. Check for hidden files: ls -la in the skill directory
4. Check for Unicode steganography in all skill files
5. Verify the publisher's profile and other published skills

Dependency Confusion Prevention

For private packages:

1. Always use scoped packages (@yourorg/package-name)
2. Set registry in .npmrc: @yourorg:registry=https://your-private-registry
3. Never publish internal package names to public npm (even as placeholders)
4. Use npm audit signatures to verify package provenance

Automated CI Integration

Add to GitHub Actions / CI pipeline:

- name: Supply Chain Audit
  run: |
    # Check for new postinstall scripts
    find node_modules -name 'package.json' -exec grep -l '"postinstall"' {} \; > postinstall_packages.txt
    
    # Unicode scan on all dependencies
    python3 scan_unicode.py node_modules/ --strict --json > unicode_scan.json
    
    # Check for RDD
    find node_modules -name 'package.json' -exec grep -l 'https\?://' {} \; > rdd_packages.txt
    
    # Fail if critical findings
    if [ -s rdd_packages.txt ]; then
      echo "::error::Remote Dynamic Dependencies found!"
      cat rdd_packages.txt
      exit 1
    fi

Response Procedure

If a malicious package is detected:

1. Do NOT run any more npm commands — your npm token may already be compromised
2. Rotate npm token immediately: npm token revoke all tokens, generate new ones
3. Check for persistence: Look for systemd services, cron jobs, startup scripts
4. Check for published packages: Verify none of your packages were silently re-published
5. Audit CI/CD: Check if the compromised env had access to deployment tokens, cloud credentials
6. Report: File with npm security (npm report) and the package's source platform

References

• For Unicode-specific scanning, see the unicode-steganography-detection skill
• For detailed campaign analysis, see references/attack-campaigns.md
• For dependency tree auditing techniques, see references/dependency-audit.md